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SUMMARY 
A real security right improves a creditor’s chances of recovering a debt owed to him 
by the debtor. In the case of an ordinary pledge, the pledgor delivers physical control 
of his movable property to his creditor to serve as security for the repayment of the 
principal debt. The increasing value and use of movable property as an object of 
security coupled with technological advancement have resulted in many countries 
calling for legal reform of real security rights over movable property. In South Africa 
this led to the introduction of the Security by Means of Movable Property Act 57 of 
1993 which makes provision for a pledge without possession. The Act regulates only 
special notarial bonds and does not apply to general notarial bonds. The real 
security right vests in the bondholder upon registration of the bond, provided that the 
movable property encumbered is described in a notarial bond in a way that makes it 
readily recognisable. The Act has substituted delivery with registration in the Deeds 
Registry. Registration of the notarial bond in the Deeds Registry is questioned as to 
whether it complies with the publicity principle. This is because movable property can 
be shifted from one place to another without any knowledge on the part of the 
creditor due to the inaccessible and costly registration system. The third party then 
receives the property subject to the real security right of the creditor. The substitution 
of delivery with registration is the controversial feature in this study. Linked to the 
legal problems regarding compliance with the publicity principle, is the description 
and identification requirement as provided for under the Act, the exclusion of general 
notarial bonds from the application of the Act, and the question of whether it is 
appropriate to regard special notarial bonds as pledges without possession. This 
study questions whether the current land registry system should be used for the 
registration of notarial bonds and suggests that a new system designed specifically 
for the registration of real security rights over movables be considered. I compare the 
position in the Belgian legal system as regards developments in real security rights 
over movables to identify possible solutions and recommendations for the South 
African approach. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
In recent years certain legal systems1 have engaged in legal reform of real security 
rights over movable property.2 In the past movable property3 were generally not as 
valuable as immovable property. However, in today’s world where the cost of a motor 
car can exceed that of a house, the increasing value of movable things makes it a 
popular and appropriate security object. Many people do not own immovable property 
to offer as security but do have movable property which can be offered as security for 
the repayment of a debt. With the aim of promoting commerce, certain countries have 
taken the initiative in reforming their laws on pledge to allow the debtor (pledgor) to 
retain possession4 of the movable property that serves as security.5 Furthermore, 
technology has advanced to a level where national registration systems which can be 
accessed easily at a minimal cost can be established. Another changing factor is the 
increase of the use of incorporeal things (eg a claim) as a form of security in the 
current economic climate. Although there is still room for the common-law pledge 
construction – giving your antique watch as security for the repayment of a debt there 
is clearly a need for reform of real security by means of movable property, including 
security rights where the debtor remains in control of his6 thing and security rights 
over incorporeal movables. This study focuses on real security rights over movable 
property by means of notarial bonds in South Africa. It examines the efficacy of the 
current legal position of notarial bonds in South African law and identifies areas for 
development. 
 
                                                          
1 The Netherlands, Germany, Scotland and Belgium. 
2 The research for this dissertation has been done until August 2016.  
3 For purposes of this dissertation the terms ‘movable property’ and ‘movable things’ are used 
interchangeable.  
4 Possession refers to the broad interpretation. In other words, it refers to physical control. Any 
reference to possession includes control and any reference to control includes possession.   
5 See Scott 2010 CILSA 95. 
6 In this dissertation, the terms he/him and his are used in preference to the more ‘politically 
correct’ he/she, etc. This is neither a political statement nor an act of rebellion, but a simple 
reflection of the fact that it would be incorrect to speak of ‘him or her’ in Roman, early Roman-
Dutch, or Germanic law, where – although they certainly existed – women had few if any 
rights. 
2 
1.2 Background 
In order to create a limited real right, a real agreement followed by delivery (in the 
case of movable property) and registration (in the case of immovable property) are 
required. The delivery of movable property is aimed at ensuring compliance with the 
principle of publicity7 through (direct) control.8 The principle of publicity entails that 
third parties should be able to infer from externally perceivable indications whether a 
real right in a thing exists and when transfer of a real right from one person to another 
person occurs.9 In South Africa a common-law pledge requires delivery of the 
pledged object to the pledgee. As stated above, there is a need for establishing a 
form of security over movable property without relinquishing control over the security 
object.  
South African law has known general notarial bonds (algemene notariële verbande) 
since 1880, and subsequently special notarial bonds (spesiale notariële verbande) 
too.10 The aim of notarial bonds is to provide security to the creditor without the 
debtor losing control of his thing. A general notarial bond, governed by the common 
law, applies to all of the debtor’s movable property – corporeal and incorporeal. This 
may include movables acquired after the execution of the bond.11 A general notarial 
bond does not confer a limited real right on the holder despite its registration in the 
Deeds Office.12 A creditor (general notarial bondholder) will only acquire a limited real 
right once the bond has been perfected in terms of a valid and an enforceable 
perfecting clause.13 In Development Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Van Rensburg14 
(the Development Bank case), the court held that a perfecting clause amounts to an 
agreement to create a pledge. In order to exercise a right under a perfecting clause, 
the creditor must obtain control over the property either with the consent of the 
debtor, or if the debtor refuses such consent, by means of a court order for 
attachment in terms of the specific performance of a contract. Once the bond has 
been perfected the creditor is in the same position as a pledgee and acquires a 
                                                          
7 See 3.3.2 below. 
8 Van Erp & Akkermans International Property Law 439.  
9 Mostert & Pope Property Law 56. See also Ikea Trading Und Design v BOE Bank 2005 (2) SA 
7 (SCA).  
10 See 5.2 below. 
11 Mostert & Pope Property Law 322. 
12  LAWSA Vol 17(2) 511.  
13  Chesterfin (Pty) Ltd v Contract Forwarding (Pty) Ltd 2003 (2) SA (SCA) para 3. 
14  2002 (5) SA 425 (SCA) para 20. 
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limited real right. Should the bond not be perfected, the creditor will only enjoy a 
preference over the debtor’s concurrent creditors15 in respect of the free residue if he 
(debtor) is declared insolvent or when his estate is wound up.16 
Before the enactment of the Security by Means of Movable Property Act (the 
SMPA)17 a special notarial bond had to be perfected before the bondholder acquired 
a limited real right. Since 1938 the Notarial Bond (Natal) Act18 incorporated legal 
principles distinct from those applicable in the rest of the country. This Act deemed 
the movable property specified and described in a duly registered notarial bond to 
have been delivered to the notarial bondholder (creditor) as if it had in fact been 
delivered. The creditor acquired a limited real right on registration of the notarial 
bond. The notarial bondholder enjoyed a secured claim which took preference over 
other of the debtor’s creditors. In the other provinces of South Africa Cooper v Die 
Meester19 (the Cooper case) laid down the principles applicable to the rest of the 
country: a special notarial bondholder who had not perfected his bond ranked equally 
with all other unsecured creditors in the case of insolvency. Consequently, he was in 
a weaker position than a general notarial bondholder who had not perfect his bond or 
a special notarial bondholder in Natal.  
The SMPA was introduced to rectify the unsatisfactory legal consequences of the 
Cooper case. The position of special notarial bonds changed significantly throughout 
the country in that the legal principles applicable in Natal were extended to the rest of 
the country. The legislature’s main objective in enacting the SMPA was to justify the 
position of a pledge economically without the debtor having to pass control of the 
movable property to the creditor.20  
                                                          
15  S 102 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
16  Jansen 2003 Juta Business Law 154. 
17 53 of 1993. 
18 18 of 1932. 
19  1992 (3) SA 60 (A). 
20 The purpose is to allow the debtor to retain control of the movable property that serves as 
security as the same property may be utilised by the debtor in order to repay the debt. This 
may be the case where, for example, the debtor, being a farmer, borrows money from the 
creditor and gives his tractor (movable property) as security for the repayment of the loan. The 
debtor may need his tractor to continue with his farming operations in order to generate an 
income enabling him to repay the loan. His practical business needs require this to be the 
case. 
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In terms of the SMPA the specified movable property21 over which a notarial bond is 
registered is deemed to have been delivered to the notarial bondholder as if delivery 
had in fact taken place. This means that the bondholder22 acquires a limited real right 
over the property that serves as security upon registration of the bond in terms of the 
Deeds Registries Act,23 despite the absence of delivery.24 However, section 1(1) of 
the SMPA places a condition that must be met before the movables can be deemed 
pledged and delivered: the movable property must be specified and described in a 
way that renders it readily recognisable. The test of specifying and describing the 
movable property in the notarial bond has been set out in Ikea Trading Und Design 
AG v Boe Bank Ltd25 (the Ikea Trading case).  The test is whether a third party is able 
to identify the property from the terms of the bond itself without recourse to extrinsic 
evidence. 
A general notarial bond is not governed by the SMPA and the legal position of a 
general notarial bondholder is unchanged. The SMPA is also not applicable to 
incorporeal property. Incorporeal property can, therefore, only be used as security 
under a general notarial bond. 
This study includes a comparative legal analysis of the position of real security rights 
under Belgian law. Belgian law is relevant to the development of South African law 
because of its Roman-law origin and the recent reform of real security rights over 
movable property. On 30 May 2013, the Belgian House of Representatives adopted a 
new Act on security interests – the Belgian Pledge Act26 – which allows for a non-
possessory pledge over movable property. The new Act abolished the compulsory 
requirement of dispossession of the movable property that serves as security as a 
constitutive element of a pledge and allows the parties to either opt for a pledge 
without dispossession.27 In terms of the Belgian Pledge Act, the pledge is perfected 
and becomes effective towards third parties after registration of the pledge in a newly 
created public register called the ‘Electronic Pledge Register (EPR)’. The reform of 
                                                          
21 The terms ‘movable property’ and ‘movable thing’ are used interchangeably.   
22 Special notarial bondholder. 
23 47 of 1937.   
24 Publicity for movables. 
25 2005 (2) SA 7 (SCA). 
26 Act of 11 July 2013. 
27 De Backer & Van Oekel A “Pledge over moveable assets-time for a radical change” available 
at http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ae845af5-f915-4638-bcc7-6d5b0724224a 
(date of use: 19 August 2014). 
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the law of security over movable property in Belgium was (as in South African law) 
also based on a desire to promote the economic needs of the debtor (pledgor). 
With reference to terminology, it is important to note that the term ‘pledge without 
possession’ refers to the situation where the debtor (pledgor/mortgagor) retains 
control over the movable property that serves as security. Although this term will be 
used throughout the dissertation (also when Belgian law is dealt with), a clear 
distinction should be drawn between a ‘pledge’ and a ‘notarial bond’ in South African 
law. In terms of section 1(1) of the SMPA, movable property specified and described 
in the notarial bond shall be deemed to have been pledged, thus creating a fictitious 
pledge. However, we refer to this form of security as a ‘special notarial bond’ and not 
a ‘pledge’. In South African law the term ‘pledge’ refers to the common-law pledge. 
1.3 Problem statement  
Before the SMPA came into operation, Sacks28 questioned the efficacy of registering 
security rights over movable property and whether this complies with the principle of 
publicity, in the following terms: 
The difficulties that arise from the fact that movable property can be moved, that 
movables are now so frequently mass-produced as to render the identification of 
an article extremely difficult and that no system of registering any interest in 
movable goods may exist at all call for very careful solutions to be rationally 
applied when movables are to be used as security. 
Although the introduction of the SMPA brought about significant changes, there are 
still many questions surrounding notarial bonds in South Africa.29  
The fact that the debtor is not divested of the control of the property that serves as 
security allows him to transfer the title to someone else without any knowledge on the 
part of the creditor or third party. Issues of preference in the case of insolvency may 
therefore arise. The acid test of whether a real right of security is functional is 
whether it is effective if the debtor becomes insolvent and grants the holder of the 
real right a preference over other creditors.30 A real right of security is effective when 
                                                          
28 Sacks 1982 SALJ 605. 
29 Sonnekus & Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 745-60. See also Scott 1995 THRHR 672. 
30 See Wood Security and Guarantees 3. See also Eidenmuller & Kieninger Secured Credit 248. 
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the creditor can prevent the debtor from disposing of the movable property that 
serves as security.   
In the case of notarial bonds, the debtor can easily alienate the movable property that 
serves as security without the creditor’s knowledge. The third party will then receive 
the thing subject to the creditor’s real security right. The question is whether 
registration of the real security right in movable property serves as sufficient publicity 
to third parties and the debtor’s other creditors. Two problems result from the above: 
the effectiveness of the creditor’s real security right over the movable property; and 
the legal position of the third party who has bought the property. The position of third 
parties and creditors will, therefore, be investigated.   
It is questionable whether the current Land Registry (Deeds Registry) should be used 
for registration of notarial bonds. A new system specially designed for the registration 
of real security rights over movable property should be considered. Currently it is not 
possible for third parties to access the registry easily and inexpensively in order to 
establish the existence of a real security right over a specific movable thing. It is a 
challenge to identify the exact content of the real security right. There are no 
guidelines describing a movable asset apart from the vague wording: ‘readily 
recognisable without use of extrinsic evidence’ as contained in section 1(1) of the 
SMPA. The current registration system does not allow registration of a special 
notarial bond over a debtor’s revolving assets and excludes incorporeal movable 
property as security object. In the current economic climate there is a dire need for 
the inclusion of these things as security objects. The system must be easy and 
inexpensive to access. All of these shortcomings in the current registration system 
contribute to legal uncertainty and possible prejudice to either the creditor or third 
parties and the underutilisation of special notarial bonds as security. 
1.4 Purpose of study   
Academic writers31 have shown the need for reform of real security rights over 
movable property. Other countries, for example Belgium, Scotland, the Netherlands 
and Germany, have or are in the process of reforming their laws governing real 
security rights. In 1988 The South African Law Commission conducted a study on 
                                                          
31 See Scott 1995 THRHR 675; Sonnekus 1983 TSAR 252-3; and Brits 2015 SA Merc LJ 246-
74. 
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possible reform of real security rights over movable property. As a result the SMPA 
was enacted in 1993. Although the SMPA was welcomed, it did not entirely satisfy all 
concerned parties. The purpose of this study is to investigate the merits of earlier 
criticism of the SMPA and the efficacy of the legal position of notarial bonds in South 
African law 23 years after the enactment of the SMPA. The aim is to establish 
whether the SMPA – still or at all – effectively addresses the need for security based 
on movable property in the current economic climate. 
I further undertake a comprehensive analysis of the purpose of the publicity principle. 
I consider whether the way in which the principle is applied truly reflects its purpose. 
Throughout the dissertation the publicity required to vest a real right is carefully 
considered. The success of a legal system acknowledging a pledge without 
possession depends to a great extent on a registration system that complies with the 
publicity requirement. The problems with the current registration system, as set out 
above, are analysed and possible solutions or recommendations made. I consider 
whether our legal system should perhaps endeavour to accept a more contemporary 
reading of the publicity principle.  
Furthermore, the purpose of and the need for a general notarial bond are 
reconsidered in the light of its current exclusion from the SMPA. The South African 
legal position with regard to the non-possessory pledge is compared with the legal 
position in Belgian law, not only to identify problems relating to the non-possessory 
pledge, but also to focus on effective legal practices, plausible solutions, and useful 
recommendations for South African law. 
Lastly, I provide an overview of important criticism of and discussions on the topic of 
notarial bonds in South African law published in Afrikaans. This English overview will, 
to a certain extent, open these commentaries to a broader audience. 
1.5 Methodology and outline of chapters  
This study is not empirical. Legislation, case law and international instruments32  
serve as primary sources, while journal articles, academic writing and electronic 
                                                          
32 Legislative guide on secured transactions (UNCITRAL); Cape Town Convention on 
International Interests in Mobile Equipment (UNIDROIT); Organisation for the Harmonisation 
of Business Law in Africa (OHADA); Model Law on Secured Transactions (EBRD); Draft of a 
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resources are my secondary sources. Qualitative research is the focus of this 
dissertation. 
An overview of the historical background to and development of real security rights in 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law is provided in Chapter 2. This overview illustrates the 
need to secure due performance of an obligation by a debtor from as early as Roman 
times. It explains the origin and legal development of the first phenomenon of a 
notarial bond as we know it today.  
In Chapter 3 the nature and operation of real security rights in South African law are 
discussed. The publicity function, as a key element in the vesting of a real right, is 
fully discussed and analysed in this chapter. A clear distinction is made between the 
legal position of the holder of a real security right before and after the insolvency of 
the debtor.  
Chapter 4 focusses on the common-law pledge. The chapter sets out the legal 
nature, vesting, and operation of a common-law pledge in South African law. This 
discussion is necessary to establish the difference between a common-law pledge 
and a fictitious pledge as granted by the SMPA. (A fictitious pledge is a special 
notarial bond under the SMPA, or a perfected general notarial bond.) The influence 
of the National Credit Act33 on the validity of certain clauses in a pledge agreement 
(secured loan) is discussed. 
The background and historical development of notarial bonds in South African law is 
fully discussed in Chapter 5. I concentrate, in particular, on legislation and case law 
which have proved pivotal in the development of notarial bonds in South African law. 
Thereafter the nature, vesting and legal operation of a general notarial bond is 
discussed. I draw particular attention to the fact that the SMPA excludes general 
notarial bonds from its operation.  
In Chapter 6 I discuss special notarial bonds in detail. The discussion is divided into 
two main periods: the legal position before the enactment of the SMPA; and the legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR); and Model Inter-American Law on Secured 
Transactions (OAS). 
33 34 of 2005. 
9 
position after the enactment of the SMPA. Thereafter the problems encountered with 
notarial bonds in South African law are set out.  
Chapter 7 provides an overview of the Belgian legal system. Emphasis falls on real 
security rights and pledge under the Civil Code followed by a study of the non-
possessory pledge under the New Belgian Pledge Act.   
To close, Chapter 8 offers a comparative summary, recommendations and 
concluding remarks.  
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF REAL SECURITY RIGHTS 
2.1 Introduction 
This dissertation deals with notarial bonds in South African law and with pledge 
without possession in Belgian law. Both notarial bonds and pledge without 
possession are real security rights. A brief overview of the historical development of 
real security rights in Roman and Roman-Dutch law is necessary if one is fully to 
comprehend their nature and operation in the respective legal systems.  
2.2 Terminology 
Real security rights (saaklike sekerheidsregte / zakelijke zekerheidsrechten) are a 
sub-category of limited real rights and are classified as iura in re aliena.34 Real rights 
(saaklike regte / zakelijke rechten) as a category of rights (consisting of ownership, 
servitudes, usufruct, pledge and mortgage) do not appear in the Corpus Iuris.35 The 
Corpus Iuris did, however, provide certain legal actions for the creditor – for example, 
the Actio Serviana.36 The terms ius in re and ius in personam were unknown in early 
Roman law. Later, during the Middle Ages, Romanists used the term ius reale 
(meaning ius in re) and developed the concept of real rights. They failed, however, to 
draw a clear distinction between real rights and limited real rights (beperkte saaklike 
regte / beperkte zakelijk rechten). In the 16th century Hugo De Groot formulated the 
distinction between ownership (ius in re propria) and limited real rights (ius in re 
aliena).37  
I first reflect on the term ‘real security right’ and ‘mortgage’ and distinguish between 
conventional and legal or tacit hypothecs, and special mortgages and general 
mortgages. Thereafter I briefly discuss the different types of mortgage in Roman and 
Roman-Dutch law.  
                                                          
34 Sonnekus & Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel  403. 
35 “De gedachte dat eigendom enerzijds, vruchtgebruik, servituten, pan den hypotheek 
anderzijds samen tot één categorie behoren, nl. Die der zakelijke rechten, is in het Corpus 
iuris nerens te vinden”.  Feenstra Romeinsrechtelijke Grondslagen 81. 
36 This real action was available to a landlord in the case of the tacit hypothec of a landlord. The 
landlord could claim the invecta et illata from the tenant and/or third parties. Once the landlord 
was in control thereof he was in the same position as a pledgee and could also rely on the ius 
distrahendi. See Thomas Ph J Essentialia 83-4. 
37 Feenstra Romeinsrechtelijke Grondslagen 81. 
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A real security right can be defined as:  
The right of a creditor over the debtor’s property that serves as security is a 
limited real right which is usually designated by the generic term of mortgage.38   
The term ‘mortgage’ is a generic term that, in the broader sense, refers to mortgage, 
hypothec or pledge. A special notarial bond is included in the reference to 
‘mortgage’.39 ‘Mortgage’ and ‘pledge’ are also used to refer to the contract of 
mortgage and the contract of pledge. This then refers only to the conventional 
mortgage as it is based on contract. At times, mortgage is used to refer to the 
property that is the subject of the real security right. In the narrowest sense, 
‘mortgage’ and ‘pledge’ are used to refer to the specific real rights and the privileges 
that attach to them.40 
The term ‘mortgage’ (meaning a right) used in a comprehensive sense is “a right over 
the property of another which serves to secure an obligation”.41 This definition does 
not qualify the nature of the property that is the subject of the mortgage, how the 
mortgage is constituted, or the nature of the obligation it secures. In the restricted 
sense ‘mortgage’ refers to security over immovable property.42 ‘Pledge’ is a form of 
‘mortgage’ in the comprehensive sense. A pledge is “a right over the movable or 
incorporeal property of another which serves to secure an obligation”.43 
In its restricted sense a mortgage is a real right in favour of a person (the mortgagee) 
over the property of another person (the mortgagor) for the repayment or fulfilment of 
a debt due by the mortgagor or a third party to the mortgagee. The mortgagee has a 
preferential claim that must be satisfied from the proceeds of the sale of the property. 
This preferential claim is enforceable against all creditors of the mortgagee save for 
creditors who have a prior or stronger claim to the property. The real right attaches to 
the property and limits the entitlements of the owner of the property. When the 
property that forms the object of the security is movable, the real right is referred to 
                                                          
38 Hosten et al Introduction 544. 
39 S 11(a)(i) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969. See Land and Agricultural Development Bank of 
South Africa t/a The Land Bank v Factaprops 1052 CC and Another 2016 (2) SA 477. 
40 Hall Maasdorp’s Institutes 180-81 and Wille Mortgage and Pledge 1. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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as a pledge and the parties are the pledgor (owner of movable property) and the 
pledgee (the creditor in whose favour the real right vests).  
A mortgage may arise from a contract in which case it is referred to as a conventional 
(or express) mortgage. A tacit or legal mortgage arises through operation of law. 
Furthermore, mortgages may be classified as either general or special. In principle a 
general mortgage bond binds all present and future property of the debtor, whereas a 
special mortgage bond binds specifically defined property of the debtor.44   
In Roman law and Roman-Dutch law the term hypothecation, in its widest sense, 
includes mortgage and pledge. The term ‘mortgage’ was unknown in Roman law. In 
early Dutch law, the term ‘vadium’ was used for the object that was given as security 
for repayment of a debt. The transaction of securing due performance of an 
obligation was called a ‘vadium contract’. A ‘mortuum vadium’ was, in early English 
law, a transaction referring to a pledge of land that was effected by conveying the 
land to the creditor to hold until the debtor paid his debt. The parties could agree that 
the creditor would use the rent and profits from the land to reduce the debtor’s debt, 
or he (creditor) received the land without any liability or duty to maintain the land. In 
French the term ‘mortuum vadium’ is referred to as a mortgage – dead pledge. The 
term is appropriate seeing that the debtor will receive dead or unprofitable land once 
he has paid off the principal debt.45  
In Roman law the term pignus denoted security in cases where possession of the 
property was given to the creditor. This usually applied to movable property although 
it even at times applied to immovable property. Hypotheca denotes a security where 
possession was not given to the creditor. Roman-Dutch law jurists distinguish 
between pignus and hypothec on two grounds: possession; and the nature of the 
property. Pignus is a right which secures due performance of an obligation over the 
movable property of the debtor and that property is delivered to the creditor. 
Hypotheca is a right which secures due performance of an obligation, over the 
immovable property of the debtor and the property remains in control of the debtor.46 
                                                          
44 Id at 40, 61 and 66. 
45 Hall Maasdorp’s Institutes 180-1; Nathan Common Law 1043; and Wille Mortgage and Pledge 
2. 
46 Wille Mortgage and Pledge 3. 
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A real security right is a right over the property of another securing due performance 
of an obligation. In modern law, the term mortgage may be interpreted either 
comprehensively or restrictively. When interpreted comprehensively mortgage refers 
to all forms of security right, including mortgage over immovable property, pledge, 
and hypothecs. In the restrictive sense, mortgage refers to the real security right over 
immovable property for which a mortgage bond is registered in the Deeds Office. In 
Roman law real security rights were not specifically formulated in the Corpus Iuris. 
However, three forms of security in favour of a creditor were acknowledged: fiducia; 
pignus; and hypotheca. Roman-Dutch law distinguished between two forms of 
hypothecation: pignus and hypotheca. I turn now to the legal position governing real 
security rights in Roman and Roman-Dutch law.  
2.3 Roman law real security rights (hypothecation) 
In Roman law lawyers treated real security rights (hypothecation47) as a contract 
that … exists between the parties that a certain thing shall be granted, or a grant 
understood of a right on the object pledged, as a security for the outstanding debt, 
and it is said to be re, because all those contracts are such which are perfected 
by the delivery of a thing … But it is not termed a real contract, because it gives a 
jus in re, for no contract gives other than actio personalis.48 
The real security right was therefore not seen as a real contract, but as a contract 
which was perfected through delivery. Only after delivery did the real security right 
holder acquire a jus in re. Nathan49 explains that a real security right in Roman law 
could be described as a quasi-contract: the parties did not necessarily intend to 
create a real security right, but the right arose by operation of law as a consequence 
of some other contract between the parties. 
Thomas50 emphasises two aspects of real security rights in Roman law: (i) the real 
security right is dependent on the debt that it secures and a debtor-creditor 
relationship is therefore a pre-requisite for the existence of a real security right; (ii) 
the creditor has no intention to use and enjoy the thing – he holds it for security 
                                                          
47 ‘[U]sing the term in the widest sense, as embracing both mortgage and pledge’. Nathan 
Common Law 1043.  
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Thomas Essentialia 83. 
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purposes only. Various tacit hypothecs, created in statutes, were available in Roman 
law.51 A mortgage in Roman law was created by agreement with or without delivery 
of the thing.52 As stated previously, Roman law acknowledged three forms of real 
security right – fiducia, pignus and hypotheca.53   
Fiducia is the oldest form of real security and has its origins in the Ius Civile. This 
form of security applied only to res mancipi,54 although over time it was extended to 
cover all corporeal property. The fiducia operated as follows: the debtor transferred 
ownership of the security object to the creditor by means of mancipatio55 or iure 
cessio.56 This means that the debtor lost ownership and the creditor acquired 
ownership subject to the condition that the creditor transfer ownership back to the 
debtor once the debt had been paid (pactum fiducia). 57 In practice the creditor often 
gave use and control of the thing to the debtor in terms of a hire-purchase 
agreement. This was done to enable the debtor to exploit the thing in order to acquire 
money to repay the debt.58 Initially the debtor had to rely on the good faith of the 
creditor and had no right with which he could reclaim his thing if the creditor did not 
return it once the debt had been paid. Later, the debtor acquired a right – the actio 
fiducia – with which he could enforce the pactum fiducia against the creditor. The 
creditor, who acquired a ius in re propria,59 was in a very strong position.60  
The right of pignus, on the other hand, is not found in the Ius Civile. Pignus only 
applied to movable corporeal things and vested through traditio (delivery). Pignus is a 
pledge: the pledgor (debtor) gave control of his thing to the pledgee (creditor) as 
                                                          
51 The hypothec in favour of the state for outstanding taxes is an example of a tacit hypothec 
created in classic Roman law, while most others were created in post-classical Roman law. 
See Van der Merwe Sakereg 609. 
52 Lee Introduction 185. 
53 Thomas Romeinse Reg 83. 
54 Land, buildings, certain rural servitudes, slaves and ‘certain beasts of draught and burden 
(oxen, horses, mules and donkeys)’.  Thomas, Van der Merwe, & Stoop Historical 
Foundations 140. 
55 The act of transferring ownership of a thing. Thomas, Van der Merwe & Stoop Historical 
Foundations 159. 
56 The act of transferring ownership of a thing during a mock trial in front of the Praetor. Both 
parties and the thing appeared before the Praetor. The transferee (creditor) took the thing and 
declared that it was his. The transferor (debtor) did not contest the declaration, and the 
Praetor then declared that the thing belonged to the transferee (creditor). Thomas, Van der 
Merwe & Stoop Historical Foundations 160. 
57 Thomas Romeinse Reg 83-4. 
58 Van der Merwe Sakereg 607. 
59 A right in your own property.  
60 Thomas Romeinse Reg 83-4. 
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security for the repayment of the debt. Even though this right was not found in the Ius 
Civile, it was used in practice. Only later did it become a real security right granted by 
the Praetor. Before or during the physical transfer of the thing, the parties agreed that 
the pledgee would return the thing once the debt had been paid. This agreement 
(pactum), together with delivery of the thing, created an agreement of pledge. The 
pledgor had a right – the actio pigneraticia – to reclaim his thing from the pledgee 
once the debt had been settled. Should the thing be in control of a third party (other 
than the pledgee) the pledgor could claim his thing using the rei vindicatio. Roman 
law acknowledged certain clauses in the pactum.   
The pactum antichresis is an agreement that the pledgee may use the thing and the 
use serves as ‘payment’ of interest on the amount due. In terms of the pactum 
distrahendi the parties could agree that the pledgee could sell the pledged thing if the 
debtor could not pay his debt. The pledgee could redeem only his claim, and the 
remainder of the proceeds of the sale went to the pledgor. Emperor Constantine 
prohibited a clause (pactum commissorium) in terms of which a pledgee could keep 
the thing if the pledgor was not able to pay his debt.61  
The third form of security in Roman law is hypotheca. Hypotheca was seen as a 
‘suspensive pledge’ or ‘pledge without possession’. The creditor had the right to take 
possession, but was not in control from the outset. It originated from the rent and 
lease of land. The landlord required some form of security from the tenant for the 
rental amount and the parties agreed that the invecta et illata serve as security for 
payment of the rent. This was a pactum (agreement) between the parties and could 
not be enforced against third parties. Later, the Praetor granted an interdict 
(interdictum Salvianum) in favour of the landlord by which he could claim the invecta 
et illata. The interdict was only enforceable against the tenant. In order to accord the 
landlord greater protection, the Praetor granted him a real action, the actio Serviana. 
With this real action the landlord could claim the invecta et illata from the tenant 
and/or third parties. Once the landlord was in control of the goods he was in the 
same position as a pledgee and could also rely on the ius distrahendi. 62   
                                                          
61 See 4.3.2 below for the discussion on pactum commissorium in South African law and 7.4.1.3 
below for the discussion in Belgian law. 
62 Ibid. 
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In later classical Roman law the distinction between pignus and hypotheca fell away 
and the terms were used interchangeably. In practice the term pignus was generally 
used to refer to a pledge over movable property, while hypotheca was used for 
pledge without possession of an immovable thing. The creditor was, however, not 
required to be placed in control of the thing. The terms were basically synonyms and 
Roman law of pledge was generally referred to as pignus hypotheca.63    
The Roman law of pledge may be criticised for failing to address the rights of the 
debtor’s other creditors. No publicity was required and third parties and other 
creditors of the debtor were in most instances unaware of the existence of a right of 
pignus hypotheca. A general hypothec could vest in the creditor over all the things of 
the debtor without it being described at all. This was contrary to the principle that the 
object of the security must be determined or determinable.64   
Owing to the fact that Roman-Dutch law can be described as a compilation of Roman 
law and Germanic law, it is important to note certain differences between Roman law 
and Germanic law as regards hypothecation. In Germanic law the debtor’s estate as 
a whole was not liable for his debt. Only a specific movable or immovable thing was 
assigned to the creditor as security object, and the creditor’s security was limited to 
that specific thing. Pledge in Germanic law was not, as in Roman law, accessory in 
nature. Essentially, the debtor provided the thing as an alternative form of payment 
should he fail to pay his debt. The debtor could reclaim the specific thing assigned to 
the creditor once he had paid the debt. If the debtor was unable to pay the debt the 
pledge lapsed or expired and the creditor became owner of the thing specified. This 
was referred to as ‘vervalpand’ (lapse or expiry of pledge). Later, the ‘vervalpand’ 
was replaced with the ‘verkooppand’ (sale pledge) and the pledge object was sold at 
a judicial sale. The creditor’s claim was satisfied and the remainder of the purchase 
price was given to the debtor. Germanic law drew a clear distinction between 
movable and immovable property. A pledge of a movable thing required transfer of 
physical control to the creditor. The rule mobilia non habent sequelem ex causa 
hypothecate applied in Germanic law, and a creditor (pledgee) could only claim the 
pledged thing from a third party if there had been involuntary loss of possession. 
From the 14th century, a hypotheca over immovable property could only vest if there 
                                                          
63 Van der Merwe Sakereg 608. 
64 Id at 609. 
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was some form of publicity. Later, the right only vested if there was a process in a 
court where the property was situated, by which the right was noted.65   
2.4 Roman-Dutch real security rights 
Roman-Dutch law drew a significant distinction between legal or tacit hypothecs and 
conventional mortgages. Legal or tacit hypothecs66 were created by operation of law, 
while conventional mortgages arose from agreement.67 Various hypothecs created by 
operation of law were acknowledged in Roman-Dutch law. It is interesting to note that 
the landlord’s tacit hypothec is classified as a hypothec created by law, and not, as in 
Roman law, a hypothec created by contract. Other examples of Roman-Dutch law 
hypothecs created by operation of law included, but were not limited to, legal 
hypothecs in general, the hypothec of the state or the Treasury, the hypothec of 
churches and public bodies, and the hypothec for dowry.68 
For purposes of this discussion I consider only the legal position of conventional 
mortgages. Four different conventional (express) mortgages were known in Roman-
Dutch law: a special mortgage over immovable property; a special mortgage over 
movable property delivered to the creditor; general and special mortgages over 
movable property not delivered to the creditor; and a mortgage over a right (res 
incorporales).69  
Conventional mortgages in Roman-Dutch law were pignus (pledge) and hypotheca 
(mortgage). The Roman law fiducia fell away.70 In Roman-Dutch law a hypothecary 
right was used as an umbrella term for a pignus (pledge) and hypotheca (mortgage). 
The hypothecary right is defined as “a real right attaching on a thing belonging to 
another, granted to a creditor as security for his claim”.71 Voet defined pignus as “a 
contract attached to the thing which is the subject of pledge, whereby possession of 
the thing passes to the creditor”.72 A hypotheca can be defined as “a jus in re (real 
right) constituted in favour of the creditor in security of what is due to the creditor, 
                                                          
65 Id at 610. 
66 It is interesting to note that tacit hypothecs are unknown to English law. 
67 Morice English and Dutch law 54. 
68 See Nathan Common Law 1059-95 for a comprehensive discussion of Roman-Dutch 
hypothecs. 
69 Lee Roman-Dutch Law 185. 
70 For a comprehensive discussion see Feenstra Romeinsrechtelijke Grondslagen 104-5. 
71 Nathan Common Law 1045. 
72 Ibid. 
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while the possession is not transferred to the creditor”.73 In the case of a pignus, the 
creditor was in control of the thing and held the remedy in his hands. His remedy was 
available to him without judicial intervention, whereas the creditor with a hypotheca 
could only enforce his remedy through legal action.74 
Hypothecation was divided into general or special mortgage. This distinction applied 
to both conventional mortgages and mortgages arising through operation of law. A 
general mortgage extended over all the present and future property of the debtor. 
Property included movable things, immovable things, and incorporeal things. A 
general mortgage over immovable property had to be registered, duty75 had to be 
paid, and it must have been accepted by a court. 
A special mortgage could vest over movable and immovable property. The object of 
the mortgage was the specified property. Special mortgages usually contained a 
‘general clause’: 
 This had all the effects of a general mortgage, or of a duly registered 
 notarial general bond in insolvency. It applies to all present and future 
 property to which the mortgagor or pledgor may become entitled, from 
 whatever source, whether inheritance or gifts, whether movable or 
 immovable […]. The right of general mortgage in a bond is not lost by 
 discharge of the special hypothecation contained therein […]. But the 
 right of general mortgage must be conferred by the bond; and if it is not 
 mentioned it will not apply.76   
The general clause provided a general mortgage conjoined with the special 
mortgage. However, the clause had to be set out in the bond and could not be 
implied.  
                                                          
73 Ibid. 
74 Id at 1044. 
75 ‘[A]ccording to Roman-Dutch Law, after the promulgation of the Placaat of 1665 – (1) no public 
instrument, containing a clause of general hypothecation of movables, was entitled to any 
preference whatever, unless payment of the fortieth penny -2½ per cent. – on the amount of 
the debt had been made when the instrument was passed[.]’ See also Nathan Common Law 
1046.  
76 Nathan Common Law 1045-6. 
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The fruit of the specified property (before litis contestatio) was also subject to the 
special mortgage. Fruit that accrued after litis contestatio was not subject to the 
special mortgage, unless the principal thing was insufficient to repay the debt.77   
Nathan78 discusses the vesting of a mortgage in Roman-Dutch law. He refers to Voet 
and indicates that a real security right would only enjoy preference over other 
creditors if the mortgage were registered. Voet further stated that the Registrar of 
Deeds could be held liable for damages to a creditor who lost his right of mortgage 
due to the Registrar’s omission (negligently or fraudulently) to comply with 
registration formalities. It is interesting to note that these characteristics of a positive 
registration system do not apply in South African law. South African law follows the 
negative registration system in terms of which the Registrar of Deeds is not 
responsible for any damages resulting from omissions or mistakes in the Deeds 
Registry.79 The system of registration of real rights in land was unknown in Roman 
law and originated in Roman-Dutch law.80  
Roman-Dutch law acknowledged two ways in which a real security right could be 
granted over movable property. Firstly, this could be done by means of a pledge 
agreement together with delivery; and secondly, by means of a notarial bond without 
delivery. In Hare v Heath’s Trustee81 Judge De Villiers discussed the legal position of 
a notarial bond in the law of Holland: 
The mortgagee in whose favour a notarial bond has been passed but without 
delivery, had no greater security than was afforded by the personal honesty of 
the debtor. He took his mortgage subject to all prior special or general 
hypothecations affecting the property, and if the debtor chose afterwards to 
alienate the property, or even if the property was judicially attached at the suit of 
another creditor, the mortgagee lost his right of preference pro tanto. But as far 
as the concurrent creditors were concerned he might in a concursus creditorum 
claim a preference to the extent of the value of the mortgaged articles in the 
possession of the debtor or his trustee in insolvency. 
                                                          
77 Id at 1044-5. 
78 Id at 1047. 
79 Sonnekus & Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 403.   
80 Ibid. 
81 3 SC 32. 
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In terms of earlier Dutch law an unregistered notarial bond could be valid against the 
insolvent debtor and concurrent creditors. Later Dutch law (as relied on in South 
African law) required registration of the notarial bond with the Registrar of Deeds for it 
to be valid against the insolvent debtor and concurrent creditors.82  
In Roman-Dutch law a general conventional hypothec over movable property gave 
the person in whose favour the hypothec was made a preferential right. The 
movables had to remain the dominium of the debtor and must not have been 
delivered to a third party in terms of a special hypothec. The rule qui prior est 
tempore potior est in jure applied to general hypothecs over movable property. If 
however, the debtor, alienated the movables to a third party the creditor lost his right 
of pledge.83 In the case where the debtor granted a special hypothec over the 
movables to another person, the creditor’s general hypothec ranked below the 
special hypothec. A creditor’s right in terms of a general hypothec also ranked below 
a ius retentionis. In the case of a special conventional mortgage containing a general 
clause,84 the creditor had to realise the specially mortgaged property before he could 
execute the property generally bound to him (unless all the debtor’s creditors agreed 
that he could execute the goods generally bound to him).85      
Hypothecation in Roman-Dutch law was accessory: the right of mortgage depended 
on a principal obligation. The principal obligation could be a principal debt or an 
accessory obligation (eg suretyship). A person could constitute a mortgage over his 
property for his own debt or for that of someone else.86    
Roman-Dutch law acknowledged a pactum anthichresis – an agreement that the 
pledgee could use the pledged thing instead of receiving interest on the debt. 
Roman-Dutch law (as did Roman law) prohibited a clause (pactum commissorium) in 
terms of which a pledgee could keep the thing if the pledgor was unable to repay the 
debt. The parties could, however, agree that the pledgee take over the pledged 
object at a fair valuation if the pledgor could not fulfil the obligation. 
 
                                                          
82 Nathan Common Law 1048-9. 
83 The debtor will be guilty of a crime. Nathan Common Law 1052. 
84 See discussion above on 2.4. See also Nathan Common Law 1045-6. 
85 Nathan Common Law 1051-2. 
86 Id at 1052. 
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2.5 Summary 
The need to secure due performance of an obligation by a debtor arose in early 
Roman law. Real security rights in the form of mortgage and pledge have been 
acknowledged for centuries. In Roman law the legal institution of fiducia was found in 
the Ius Civil. The debtor transferred ownership of his thing to the creditor and relied 
on the creditor to re-transfer ownership once the debt had been paid. This form of 
security placed the creditor, who acquired ownership, in a very strong position. 
Initially the debtor had no right to compel the creditor to transfer ownership back to 
him, but as the law developed the debtor acquired an action (actio fiducia) with which 
he could force the creditor to re-transfer the security object to him.  
Pignus was not found in the Ius Civil but was practiced amongst citizennry: a debtor 
gave possession of his thing (generally movable but also immovable on occasion) to 
the creditor as security for repayment of the debt. The creditor had to return the thing 
to the debtor once he had paid his debt. Later, the Praetor acknowledged this right 
and granted the debtor an actio pigneraticia with which he could reclaim his thing 
from the pledgee once the debt had been satisfied. Pignus was a very effective form 
of security and fiducia became less attractive to parties in secured transaction. Lastly, 
Roman law acknowledged hypotheca – pledge without possession. The landlord’s 
hypothec over the invecta et illata of the tenant granted him the right to claim the 
goods if the tenant failed to pay his rent.  
Fiducia, pignus and hypotheca are regarded as contracts in terms of which the 
debtor’s obligation towards the creditor is secured. Roman-Dutch law distinguished 
between legal or tacit hypothecs and conventional hypothecs. The latter arose from 
contract and the former by operation of law. Roman-Dutch law drew a clear 
distinction between security over movable property and security over immovable 
property. Movable property could be used as security in terms of pignus or a notarial 
bond. In the case of pignus the property had to be delivered to the creditor, while in 
the case of a notarial bond the property remained in possession of the debtor. 
Immovable property could serve as security for repayment of a debt in the case of 
hypotheca. The debtor remained in control of the immovable property.  
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In the following chapter I analyse South African law with regard to real security rights 
in detail. I focus specifically on the legal nature and operation of pledge and notarial 
bonds. I also highlight problem areas surrounding notarial bonds. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF REAL SECURITY RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the legal nature and operation of real security 
rights in South African law. Real security rights aim to strengthen a creditor’s legal 
position in the case of a concurrence of creditors (concursus creditorum) on the 
debtor’s insolvency. Where several creditors have claims against the debtor’s 
insolvent estate, the principle of equality of creditors (paritas creditorum) applies: all 
creditors must be treated equally. A creditor may, however, secure his claim for 
payment by means of a real security right. His real security right gives the creditor 
preference over the claims of other creditors.87 South African law distinguishes 
between express or conventional real security rights, tacit real security rights, and 
judicial real security rights. These rights vest and operate in different ways. When 
considering the operation of a real security right it is important to distinguish between 
the secured creditor’s position in the case of default by a solvent debtor, and his 
position in the case of default by an insolvent debtor. I first consider the definition and 
legal nature of a real security right and then discuss the vesting requirements and 
legal operation of the real security right.88    
3.2 Definition and legal nature 
A real security right is generally defined as a limited real right over the debtor’s 
property.89 It is a ius in re aliena. Du Bois et al90 provide the following all-inclusive 
definition of a real security right: 
Real security in the form of a mortgage, pledge, tacit hypothec or lien is a 
limited real right in the property of another that secures an obligation by 
entitling the creditor to exercise certain rights in respect of encumbered 
property in preference to unsecured creditors.  
                                                          
87 LAWSA Vol 17(2) 323.  
88 I consider real security rights in general but provide a more focussed discussion of certain 
aspects of express real security rights. 
89 Scott & Scott Wille’s Law of Mortgage and Pledge 632. See also Thomas Introduction to 
Roman Law 67 where he defines a real security right as a situation where the debtor or third 
party offers an object over which a real right in favour of the creditor is vested. 
90 Van der Merwe CG ‘Real Security’ in Du Bois Wille’s Principles 630. 
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This right limits the owner’s right of ownership. Since the aim is to secure the 
repayment of a principal debt, a limited real right is classified as a real security right.91 
It secures performance of an obligation by the debtor towards the creditor.92 The 
creditor is the real security right holder while the debtor is the person who must repay 
the debt to the creditor. A real security right can be created expressly or tacitly.93 An 
express real security right (or ‘conventional mortgage’ under Roman-Dutch law) is 
created by means of an agreement between the parties (a debtor and a creditor – or 
sometimes even a third party),94 while a tacit real security right (or ‘legal mortgage’ 
under Roman-Dutch law) is created by operation of law. Express real security rights 
can be divided into pledge (which includes security by means of claims), notarial 
bonds (both general and special), special mortgage bonds over immovable property, 
the kustingbrief, covering bonds, and participation bonds. Tacit real security rights 
are divided into the tacit hypothec of a credit grantor, the tacit hypothec of a landlord, 
and right of retention (lien).95 Judicial mortgage or pledge is regarded as a third 
category of real security right which is regulated by statute and arises from judicial 
attachment.96  
Real security rights are accessory in nature.97 This means that the creation and 
existence of a real security right depends on the existence of a valid principal debt.98 
A real security right can therefore not be created in the absence of a valid principal 
debt.99 Should the principal debt be invalid, the real security right will not come into 
existence. When the principal debt is discharged, the real security right is 
extinguished ex lege.100  
A real security right gives its holder (the creditor) no entitlement to use and enjoy the 
thing. The creditor holds it for security purposes only. Unlike other limited real rights – 
                                                          
91 Van der Merwe CG ‘Real Security’ in Du Bois Wille’s Principles 630-65. 
92 Lee Elements 175. 
93 Mostert & Pope Property Law 357. 
94 This may be the case where a third party provides security on behalf of the debtor. It is, 
however, important to note that the security grantor must be the owner of the property that 
serves as security or be a legally recognised representative of the owner. 
95 According to some authors a right of retention is not a ‘right’ but a ‘defence’ and therefore not 
a real security right. See Wiese 2014 PELJ 2526-53. 
96 Van der Merwe CG ‘Real Security’ in Du Bois Wille’s Principles 631. 
97 Mostert & Pope Property Law 300. 
98 Badenhorst,  Pienaars & Mostert Law of Property 51. See also Thienhaus NO v Metje and 
Ziegler Ltd and Another 1965 (3) SA 25 (A). 
99 Van der Merwe CG ‘Real Security’ in Du Bois Wille’s Principles  631. 
100 Mostert & Pope Property Law 325. See also SA Timber and Joinery Works (Pty) Ltd v The 
Sherriff 1955 (4) SA 56 (O). 
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servitudes, for example – a real security right accords its holder the right to execute 
the property in the case of default by the debtor.101 
I turn now to a consideration of how a real security right vests, its legal nature, and 
how it operates.  This discussion focuses principally on express real security rights 
over movable property as the main thrust of the study is the pledge and the notarial 
bond – both express real security rights.  
3.3 Vesting 
3.3.1 General 
Tacit real security rights vest by operation of law (ex lege). In all instances the vesting 
of the real right depends on a debt due by the debtor. The landlord’s tacit hypothec is 
regarded as a real security right only once the landlord is in control of the movable 
property (invecta et illata). A lien depends on continuous control by the lien holder.102 
The tacit hypothec of a creditor changes the ownership of the owner who has 
reserved ownership in terms of a credit agreement, to a real security right on the 
insolvency of the debtor.103 The vesting of a judicial mortgage or pledge is constituted 
by judicial attachment in terms of a writ of execution to satisfy a judgment debt.104  
In order to create an express real security right, three legal acts are required: (i) the 
conclusion of a credit (loan) agreement; (ii) the conclusion of a security agreement; 
and (iii) publication.105 The credit agreement describes the arrangement between the 
creditor and the debtor in terms of which the former lends a sum of money or makes 
credit available to the latter. In addition to the loan agreement, a security agreement 
must be concluded. In terms of the security agreement a debtor agrees to provide 
security to the creditor for the repayment of the principal debt. Both the credit 
agreement and the security agreement give rise to personal rights and are governed 
                                                          
101 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Law of Property 358. 
102 Id at 416-7. 
103 Id at 403-04 and s 84 of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936. 
104 Van der Merwe CG ‘Real Security’ in Du Bois Wille’s Principles 631 and Badenhorst, Pienaar, 
& Mostert Law of Property 407-08. 
105 Mostert & Pope Property Law 303. 
26 
by the law of contract and the provisions of the National Credit Act.106 The third 
requirement, publication, necessitates a comprehensive analysis.  
3.3.2 Publication 
Valid loan and security agreements alone do not create a real security right. Some 
form of publication is required for this right to vest. It is a principle of the law of 
property that the existence of a real right must be public knowledge. The publicity 
principle serves two purposes. Firstly, this principle ensures that a real right (which is 
effective against third parties) cannot be kept secret. Secondly, it provides 
information for those who might need it, such as actual or prospective creditors or 
third party purchasers.107 In its ‘Model Law on Secured Transactions’108 (Model Law) 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development considered the importance 
of secured credit in a growing economy. The Model Law was designed to provide a 
fair balance between the competing interests of debtors, secured creditors, and other 
parties who might have some dealings with the property that serves as security. This 
goal can only be achieved if the publicity principle has been sufficiently complied 
with. Creditors of the debtor and other third parties who may wish to have some 
dealings with the movable property that serves as security, must be aware of the 
existence of the right. Hamwijk109 explains the position as follows: 
[I]n both civil and common-law traditions the principle of publicity is regarded as a 
fundamental principle of property law and accordingly secured transactions law. In 
a nutshell, it is based on the idea that property rights (should) only have effect vis-
á-vis third parties if they are actually public, i.e can be known by such third 
parties. 
It is necessary at this point to examine the publicity principle more closely. The notion 
of non-possessory security has elicited considerable criticism in Europe in that it is 
seen as a violation of the publicity principle.110 Hamwijk111 discusses two different 
lines of reasoning with regard to publicity: the problem solving approach; and the 
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dogmatic approach. The problem solving approach refers to the problem of the false 
appearance of creditworthiness. She formulates this approach as follow: 
Hence, in the first line of reasoning (let us refer to it as the ‘problem solving’ 
approach), possession in the hands of someone who does not have any rights in 
the asset as suggested by its possession is said to cause the problem, whereas 
publicity would have prevented this problem. 
The dogmatic approach refers to third parties’ duty to respect property rights which 
they can only do if they are aware of the existence of the rights. 
Both approaches involve publicity. In most legal systems publicity is achieved 
through either registration – in the case of immovable property – or delivery 
(possession) – in the case of movable property. Hamwijk question whether 
possession as a means of publicity is really effective. Publicity means that the 
existence of a security right and who hold that right (the creditor) is made public to 
the world at large. The point at which a real security right arises is determined by 
when the creditor gained possession of the thing. Thereafter the effectiveness of 
possession as publicity may be questioned:  
[E]ven if we could have noticed the transfer of possession, this in itself does not 
tell us much. It is impossible to conclude from the dynamic movement (nor from 
the newly arrived static situation) that a special legal transaction must have taken 
place, let alone which one. … Since physical possession can mean a wide variety 
of things including leasing or borrowing, it hardly tells the observer anything.112  
The purpose of possession as publicity should therefore be further investigated. 
According to Hamwijk113 one argument is that the debtor is stripped of his possession 
so preventing him from misleading third parties. The debtor, who is no longer in 
control of the thing, is unable to alienate the thing or to use it as security for another 
debt. Depriving the debtor of possession prevent the problem of ‘false appearance of 
creditworthiness’.114 It does, however, allow the creditor who is in control of the thing, 
the opportunity to create a false appearance of ownership:  
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A full-blown Babylonian confusion presents itself: when held by one party, an 
asset is said to create a false impression, but when held by another party it is said 
to provide information. Or conversely: when held by one party, an asset is said to 
not give (correct) information and thus to create false impression. It is sometimes 
difficult to keep track.115   
The author states that the publicity principle may be read in two ways: “publicize 
security rights as much as possible” or “property rights should not be enforceable 
against third parties, unless these rights were public to them”.116 Hamwijk argues that 
the publicity principle originates from the latter interpretation as it is based on “typical 
bona fide protection rules”.117 A third party will easily place confidence in the debtor 
who is in control of the thing and should therefore be protected should the debtor sell 
the thing to him or offer it as security when there is another existing right over the 
thing. However, possession by the debtor (or even the creditor) offers no information 
as to who has a right in the thing, what that right is, and in what capacity the person 
holds the thing. Hamwijk proposes that a public filing would ensure compliance with 
the principle of publicity: 
I believe that the original publicity principle has given way for a more modern 
reading of the publicity principle as to entail a call for public filing. In theory, this 
modern version of the publicity principle is better than the old one because it 
serves the interest of third parties across the full spectrum: both first-in-time 
owners and lenders and not second-in-time (‘third’) parties ‘win’ as the conflicted 
is avoided in the first place.118    
This argument of Hamwijk is contrary to the statement made by Sacks119 on the 
effectiveness of registration of real security rights over movable property. 
In my concluding chapter I comment on the feasibility of a public filing system (an 
online registration system of real security right over movable property) in South 
Africa. For the present, however, I consider the legal position in South African law as 
regards publicity and real security rights. 
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In general, the nature of the security object determines the required form of publicity: 
either registration or delivery. If the security object is an immovable thing, the real 
security right (mortgage bond) in favour of the creditor must be registered against the 
title deed of the immovable property. If the object of the real security right is a 
movable thing, delivery is generally a prerequisite for the vesting of a real security 
right.120 The registration of a notarial bond over movable property is an exception to 
the rule – no delivery is required, but the notarial bond must be registered in the 
Deeds Office.121 For both registration and delivery there must be a real agreement to 
create a security right. The content of the real agreement determines whether 
ownership is transferred or whether the movable property is merely given as security 
for the repayment of the principal debt. In the case of delivery the debtor must have 
the intention to deliver the movable property as security for the repayment of the 
debt, and the creditor must have the intention to receive the thing as security for the 
repayment of the debt. The debtor must have the intention to provide security for the 
repayment of the debt in the form of registration of a mortgage over his property in 
favour of the creditor, and the latter must have the intention to receive the mortgage 
as security for the repayment of the debt. The security agreement must clearly 
indicate an intention to grant real security for the due performance of the principal 
obligation by the creation of the real security right in a specified immovable thing.122 
A claim (personal right), as an incorporeal thing, can also be the object of a real 
security right. It can be: (i) ceded; (ii) pledged; or (iii) used as security in terms of a 
general notarial bond. The cession of a claim requires no publicity – the debtor need 
neither receive notice of nor consent to the cession of the claim.123 In order to comply 
with the publicity principle in the case of a pledge of claims, the facts must be made 
known to the debtor so that he can respect the right of the pledgee. It is not certain 
whether compliance with the publicity principle in this case can be achieved through 
registration or by any other means. Notice to the debtor of the existence of the pledge 
of a claim seems to be method most favoured in ensuring compliance with the 
principle of publicity. Registration of the pledge of a claim is not a method favoured to 
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ensure compliance with the publicity principle as it places an unnecessary burden on 
the debtor to ascertain whether his creditor has not ceded or pledged his right against 
the debtor.124 A general notarial bond over a claim will not grant the bondholder a real 
security right – only once the bondholder acquires physical control of the thing 
through perfecting the bond will he have a real security right in the form of a pledge.  
3.4 Operation 
A distinction should be drawn between the situation where a debtor does not repay 
his debt but is solvent, and the situation where a debtor is declared insolvent. In the 
first instance the holder of the real security right (creditor) institutes his claim against 
the debtor, while in the latter he institutes his claim against the debtor’s insolvent 
estate. In the first instance the creditor may apply for a court order instructing the 
debtor to pay his debt. Should the debtor fail to comply with the court order, a writ of 
execution can be issued in terms of which the Sheriff may attach the security object 
and have it sold in execution at public auction. The proceeds of the sale are used to 
repay the debt and any net proceeds are paid to the debtor.125  
The realisation of a real security right when the debtor is declared insolvent is more 
complicated. Any one of the debtor’s creditors may apply for a court order declaring 
the debtor insolvent. The debtor himself may also apply to court to be declared 
insolvent. The aim of this analysis is not to provide a detailed discussion of 
insolvency law and procedure: it suffices to say that all the requirements of 
insolvency as prescribed in section 8 and other relevant sections of the Insolvency 
Act126 must be complied with.127 I now briefly discuss the legal position of a secured 
creditor with a real security right against the insolvent estate of the debtor.128   
Neither a secured creditor nor a preferential creditor is defined in the Insolvency Act. 
However, the meaning attributed to secured creditors and preferential creditors is 
derived from the definitions of ‘security’ and ‘preference’. A secured creditor has a 
preferential right over some of the property in the insolvent estate by virtue of a 
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special mortgage, a landlord’s legal hypothec, a pledge, or a right of retention. 129 A 
special mortgage is defined as 
 ‘special mortgage’ means a mortgage bond hypothecating any immovable 
property or a notarial mortgage bond hypothecating specially described 
movable property in terms of section 1 of the Security by Means of Movable 
Property Act, 1993 (Act No. 57 of 1993), or such a notarial mortgage bond 
registered before 7 May 1993 in terms of section 1 of the Notarial Bonds 
(Natal) Act, 1932 (Act No. 18 of 1932), but excludes any other mortgage 
bond hypothecating movable property. 
The Insolvency Act130 defines preference as follows 
‘preference’, in relation to any claim against an insolvent estate, means the 
right to payment of that claim out of the assets of the estate in preference to 
other claims; and ‘preferent’ has a corresponding meaning. 
A secured creditor has a real security right over property for his claim. He is entitled 
to be paid out of the proceeds of the property that serves as security for his claim. His 
preference arises from his ‘security interest in the specific property’.131 A preferential 
creditor differs from a secured creditor with a preferential right. The former does not 
have security for his debt but is entitled to payment of his claim before concurrent 
creditors in terms of the Insolvency Act. His (preferential creditor’s) preferential right 
arises from the provisions of the Act whereas a secured creditor’s preferential right 
arises from his security interest in the property.132    
The secured creditor’s preferential right operates as follows: Once the debtor has 
been declared insolvent and a trustee has been appointed, the creditor must prove 
his claim against the insolvent estate. If the creditor is in control of the movable 
property, the trustee of the insolvent estate may take over the movable property 
which is held by the creditor as security for his claim. The trustee will take over the 
property against a value determined by the parties (trustee and creditor) or the full 
amount of the creditor’s claim.133 Should the trustee decide not to take over the 
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property, the creditor may realise his security by selling the property at public 
auction.134 Before such a sale the creditor must notify the trustee of the public auction 
and the trustee must, in turn, give written notice to all other creditors of the insolvent 
estate.135 Any net proceedings from the sale at the public auction must be paid to the 
insolvent estate.136 If the secured creditor’s claim exceeds the proceeds of the sale, 
he becomes an unsecured concurrent creditor in the free residue137 of the insolvent 
estate.138   
When a debtor has more than one secured creditor and the first ranked secured 
creditor realises his secured claim by court order and a sale in execution, his claim 
will be satisfied from the proceeds of the sale. Thereafter other secured creditors are 
entitled, in the order of their ranking, to the surplus of the proceeds of the sale. It is 
possible for a later creditor (not the first-ranked creditor) to foreclose on his mortgage 
and execute his property. However, the first-ranked mortgage creditor may then set a 
reserve price for the sale in execution and will be paid first. Even unsecured creditors 
may apply for a court order to have the mortgaged property sold in execution. The 
proceeds of the sale will, however, be paid first to secured creditor/s, and only then 
will the unsecured concurrent creditors be entitled to their share of surplus of the 
proceeds of sale.139   
3.5 Summary 
Real security rights are divided into three categories: express (also known as 
conventional) real security rights; tacit real security rights; and judicial real security 
rights. Express real security rights include pledges and mortgages. These types of 
right are based on agreement between the debtor and the creditor, or even a third 
party. Tacit real security rights – such as a tacit hypothec of credit grantors, tacit 
hypothecs of landlords and liens – are created by operation of law. Judicial real 
security rights are created by statute or by court order. This dissertation is concerned 
with an express real security right. Movable corporeal, movable incorporeal, and 
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immovable property can form the object of an express real security right. Real 
security rights require some form of publicity save in the case of cession (incorporeal 
property). The form of publicity required is determined by the nature of the security 
object. Registration or delivery is required in the case of corporeal movable property. 
In the case of immovable property the real security right must be registered in favour 
of the creditor against the title deed of the immovable property.  
Criticism has been levelled against the debtor retaining possession (physical control) 
of the property that serves as security subject to registration in the Deeds Registry. 
The criticism is based on the fact that possession of the property can mislead third 
parties as to the wealth of the debtor, and does not in itself show the existence of a 
real security over the property. The debtor can sell or give the property as security to 
another creditor without any knowledge on the part of the security holder. 
In a situation where the debtor is solvent, the creditor may apply for a court order 
instructing the debtor to pay his debt. A writ of execution can be issued for the 
attachment of the property and to have it sold in execution at public auction should 
the debtor fail to comply with the court order. In the case of the debtor’s insolvency a 
secured creditor is entitled to be paid from the proceeds of the property that serve as 
security in order of his ranking as secured creditor. Lower-ranked secured creditors 
are entitled to the surplus of the proceeds of the sale in accordance with their 
rankings. A preferential unsecured creditor is entitled to payment of his claim before 
concurrent creditors.  
This chapter provided an overview of the legal position of a real security right holder 
in general. In the following chapter I discuss the nature and legal operation of a 
common-law pledge in South African law. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PLEDGE 
4.1 Introduction 
Debtors often do not have any or sufficient immovable property to offer as security for 
the repayment of a debt and so can offer only movable property. It is also not 
uncommon for debtors who do not have sufficient movable corporeal property to offer 
their incorporeal property as security.140 The value of movable property has 
increased over the decades to the point where it may now constitute a suitable 
security object.141 The most common form of security over movable property, both 
corporeal and incorporeal, is a pledge. I therefore now consider the definition, legal 
nature, vesting, and operation of a pledge. Notarial bonds grant the bondholder a 
right described as ‘deemed to be pledged’ and it is therefore important to establish 
the extent of a pledge in South African law. Having established these aspects, I turn 
to a brief overview of why the Law Commission’s proposed pledge without 
possession has not been included in the SMPA.  
4.2 Definition and legal nature 
A pledge can be defined as a limited real right over the movable property of the 
pledgor in favour of the pledgee, securing repayment of the principal debt, and is 
constituted through delivery of the pledged thing to the pledgee.142 Delivery of the 
movable property that serves as security is, therefore, essential to ensure compliance 
with the publicity principle and so create a real security right.143 This requirement 
gives effect to the principle of publicity through direct control.144 
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A pledge can only be established over movable property and immovable property can 
consequently not be pledged.145 Incorporeal movable property may be pledged: a 
debtor (pledgor) cedes (pledges) a claim in the form of a personal right to his creditor 
(pledgee) as security for a debt.146 This is termed cession in securitatem debiti.147 No 
transfer of ownership takes place in this form of cession.148 
The pledgor is the person whose movable property forms the object of security. A 
pledgor can, however, provide security to the pledgee on behalf of a third party for 
the repayment of the third party’s principal debt. The pledgor must be the owner of 
the movable property which serves as security, or must have a legally recognisable 
right in the property. The pledgee is the person (creditor) in whose favour the pledge 
vests.149 
4.3 Vesting 
In order for the pledgee to acquire a limited real right over the movable property that 
serves as security, three legal acts are required: (i) a credit agreement; (ii) a pledge 
agreement; and (iii) delivery of the thing pledged. I discuss each of these legal acts 
separately in what follows.  
4.3.1 Credit agreement 
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The credit and pledge agreements are often contained in a single document. A credit 
agreement refers to the principal obligation which the pledge intends to secure.150 
This may be the case where, for example, the pledgor and the pledgee enter into an 
agreement in terms of which the pledgee will loan the pledgor a sum of money or 
make credit available to him subject to repayment at a later stage.151 This agreement 
gives rise to personal rights only and is governed by the law of contract and the 
provisions of the National Credit Act.152 A pledge can be used to secure an existing 
or a future debt.153 A future debt refers to a debt that has not yet been incurred when 
the credit agreement is concluded. 
4.3.2 Pledge agreement  
In terms of a pledge agreement154 (pactum), the pledgor agrees to secure a valid 
underlying principal debt by pledging his movable property to the pledgee.155 A 
pledge agreement is governed by the law of contract and gives rise to personal rights 
only.156 The pledgor need not be the person who owes the debt as he may also give 
a valid pledge for a debt owed by a third party.157 This agreement must clearly 
indicate an intention to create a pledge.158  
There are certain clauses that may be included in a pledge agreement.159 Parties to 
the pledge agreement may agree that the pledgee may use and enjoy the property 
that serves as security and take its fruits in return for not charging interests on the 
debt (pactum antichresis).  
Parties may also include a summary execution (parate executie) clause in their 
pledge agreement. In terms of this clause, parties may validly agree that the pledgee 
may sell the movable property without obtaining a court order160 in the event of 
default by the pledgor. The sale must be by public auction and the pledged property 
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must be sold to the highest bidder. Any net surplus of the proceeds must be paid to 
the pledgor. Should the proceeds of the sale be insufficient to satisfy the creditor’s 
claim in full, the creditor acquires an unsecured claim for the balance against the 
debtor’s solvent estate or against the free residue of the debtor’s insolvent estate.161   
In Findevco (Pty) Ltd v Faceformat SA (Pty) Ltd162 Judge Froneman declared 
summary execution clauses unconstitutional. He based his decision on the fact that a 
summary execution clause infringes the debtor’s right of access to the courts as 
provided for in section 34 of the Constitution.163 Scott164 criticises the Findevco 
decision on the basis that the debtor hands over his movable property to the creditor 
voluntarily and authorises the creditor to sell his property should he default. 
According to Scott, a summary execution does not amount to spoliation or self-help 
by the creditor. Furthermore, the debtor may seek the protection of the court if the 
creditor or his representative breaches any of his duties in terms of the mandate or if 
the debtor has suffered prejudice as a result of the creditor’s actions and there is a 
dispute in this regard.165 In 2004 the Supreme Court of Appeal, in Bock v Duburoro 
Investements (Pty) Ltd,166 reinstated the validity of summary execution clauses as set 
out in, amongst others, Osry v Hirsch Loubser and Co Ltd.167 Consequently, a parate 
executie clause may still be included in a pledge agreement.  
The National Credit Act168 (the NCA) impacts on summary execution clauses in a 
pledge agreement. The Act defines a ‘secured loan’169 as an agreement in terms of 
which a creditor lends money or grants credit to a debtor and retains any movable 
property as security for the loan or credit amount. A loan agreement secured by a 
pledge therefore qualifies as a ‘secured loan’.170 A ‘pawn transaction’171 is defined in 
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the NCA as an agreement in terms of which a creditor: (i) lends money or advances 
credit to the debtor; (ii) takes property belonging to the debtor as security for the 
repayment of the debt; and (iii) may sell the property if the debtor does not repay 
him after a specified period and retain the proceeds of the sale to satisfy the debt 
owing to him. A pledge agreement with a summary execution clause, therefore, 
qualifies as a pawn transaction.172 A pawn transaction is a ‘small agreement’173 
which generally involves smaller debts.174 The NCA175 allows a credit provider to sell 
the debtor’s property should he fail to pay the debt within a prescribed period. Any 
credit agreement which is not a pawn agreement but which qualifies as a ‘secured 
loan’, may not authorise the creditor to act as agent in the private sale of the 
property.176 The legal effect of the provisions in the NCA is that summary execution 
clauses are only valid and enforceable in pawn transactions as opposed to any 
other credit agreement or a secured loan.177 
A pactum commissorium is a forfeiture clause in terms of which the parties to a 
pledge agreement agree that the pledgee may retain the property that serves as 
security as his own should the pledgor default with payment. This clause is invalid.178 
Parties may, however, agree that the pledgee may acquire ownership of the movable 
property at a fair price should the pledgor default (pactum deprehenta as known in 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law).179 This agreement (clause) must be entered into 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
171 NCA 35 of 2005 s 1: ‘ "pawn transaction" means an agreement, irrespective of its form, in 
terms of which- 
a) one party advances money or grants credit to another, and at the time of 
doing so, takes possession of goods as security for the money advanced or credit 
granted; and 
b) either- 
i) the estimated resale value of the goods exceeds the value of the money provided 
or the credit granted, or 
ii) a charge, fee or interest is imposed in respect of the agreement, or in respect of 
the amount loaned or the credit granted; and 
c) the party that advanced the money or granted the credit is entitled on expiry of a 
defined period to sell the goods and retain all the proceeds of the sale 
in settlement of the consumer’s obligations under the agreement.’ 
172 See Brits 2013 SA Merc LJ 561. 
173 S 9(2)(a) Act 35 of 2005. 
174 S 92(3)(a) Act 35 of 2005. 
175 S 99. 
176 This amounts to an unlawful act in terms of s 90 Act 35 of 2005. 
177 See Brits 2013 SA Merc LJ 555-77 for a comprehensive discussion of summary execution 
clauses and the NCA.  
178 Graf v Buechel 2003 (4) SA 378 (SCA); Mapenduka v Ashington 1919 AD 343; Bock v 
Duburoro Investments (Pty) Ltd [2003] 4 All SA 103 SCA. 
179 LAWSA Vol 17(2) 427. See also Bock v Duburoro Investments (Pty) Ltd (Pty) Ltd (228/2002), 
[2003] ZASCA 94, [2003] 4 All SA 103 SCA. 
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after the debt has become due and the debtor must be willing to part with his thing at 
that point.180 The parties must agree on a purchase price and if they cannot, a third 
party must determine a fair price.181  
A clause stipulating that the debtor may not repay the debt and is not entitled to have 
the thing restored to him, is invalid.182  
4.3.3 Delivery  
Delivery of the movable property is the third act that must take place in order for the 
pledgee to acquire a real right in property that serves as security. In Zandberg v Van 
Zijl183 the (then) Appellate Division confirmed that a pledge comes into being as a 
real right only once the pledged object has been delivered to the pledgee. The 
pledgor retains ownership of the movable property that serves as security. The 
requirement of delivery from the pledgor to the pledgee serves to protect the 
pledgee’s real right of security by preventing the pledgor from alienating the property 
to other person or giving it as security for another debt.184 It also serves as notice to 
third parties of the existence of a real security right.185  
Delivery of the movable property may be actual or constructive.186 Actual delivery 
refers to the transfer of physical control over the movable property that serves as 
security from the pledgor to the pledgee – for example, when the pledgor hands over 
a gold watch to the pledgee. Constructive delivery takes different forms some of 
which are accepted by our courts, while others are not.187 The forms of constructive 
delivery accepted by our courts are traditio brevi manu (delivery with the short 
hand),188 clavium traditio (symbolic delivery),189 and attornment.190 Constitutum 
                                                          
180 Mapenduka v Ashington 1919 AD 343. 
181 Bock v Duburoro Investments (Pty) Ltd [2003] 4 All SA 103 SCA. 
182 Michell v De Villiers (1900) 12 SC 85. 
183 1910 AD 302 318. 
184 LAWSA Vol 17(2) 421. 
185 See the discussion on the publicity principle and the effectiveness of delivery as publication in 
3.3.2 above. 
186 There are different forms of constructive delivery and some are accepted by the South African 
courts while others are not. The forms of constructive delivery accepted by our courts are: 
traditio brevi manu; traditio longa manu; clavium traditio; and attornment. Constitutum 
possessorium is a form of constructive delivery which is not accepted by our courts.  
187 Van der Merwe CG ‘Real Security’ in Du Bois Wille’s Principles 525. 
188 Kleyn & Boraine Law of Property 184. No transfer of physical control takes place in this form of 
delivery as the transferee is already in physical control of the thing. This can arise in the case 
of an instalment sale transaction in terms of which the transfer transfers physical control of the 
thing to the transferee but retains ownership of the thing upon payment of the full purchase 
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possessorium as a form of constructive delivery for purposes of pledge is not 
accepted by our courts.191 In terms of constitutum possessorium the pledgor retains 
physical control of the movable property that serves as security.192 South African 
courts did not accept this form of delivery because of the possibility that third parties 
may be misled as to the true state of affairs with regard to the pledged thing. Delivery 
of incorporeal things is also somewhat problematic.193  
The leading case on delivery through constitutum possessorium and simulated 
transactions is Vasco Dry Cleaners v Twycross.194 In this case Carides sold his 
business and other dry-cleaning machines to a company (Air Capricon (Pty) Ltd) 
controlled by Duff. In terms of their contract of sale, the purchase price would be paid 
in instalments and ownership would be reserved to Carides until the last instalment 
had been paid. Air Capricon then ran into financial difficulties before the last 
instalment had been paid. Fearing that Carides would reclaim the dry-cleaning 
machines, Duff approached his brother-in-law, Twycross, for financial assistance. 
Twycross then bought the machines from Air Capricon. The purchase price was 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
price. On payment of the last instalment, the transferee acquires ownership by means of 
traditio brevi manu. Kleyn & Boraine Law of Property 184. 
189 Id at 181-2. This form of delivery refers to a situation where a symbol or a token of a thing 
which cannot be physically delivered, due to its size or nature, is delivered from one person to 
the other. The symbol or token of the thing indicates that delivery of the object has taken 
place, eg, the handing over of the keys to a house.  
190 This form of delivery takes place by means of an agreement between the transferor, the 
transferee and a third party in terms of which the parties agree that the third party will exercise 
physical control of the property on behalf of the transferee. The owner of the property 
(transferor) will therefore transfer ownership of the property in circumstances where he is not 
in physical control. A discounting agreement is an example of attornment. In a discounting 
agreement a car dealer sells a motor vehicle to a purchaser in terms of a credit transaction. 
The car dealer then cedes his personal rights in terms of the sale agreement with a purchaser 
and his reserved ownership in the motor vehicle to the bank which pays the full purchase price 
to the car dealer. The effect of this is that the motor vehicle is sold and delivered to the bank. 
Therefore, the transfer of the motor vehicle from the dealer to the bank takes place by means 
of attornment. See Van der Merwe CG ‘Real Security’ in Du Bois Wille’s Principles 530-3. The 
court in Air-Kel (Edms) Bpk h/a Merkel Motors v Bodenstein 1980 (3) SA 917 (A) considered 
the question of whether delivery by means of attornment remains effective where the third 
party loses physical control of the  property to another person, eg where the third party’s 
cousin borrows the property (movable) to go to the nearby store. In this case the court held 
that delivery by means of attornment still remains effective as long as the third party can 
regain physical control of the property without any legal assistance (eg, by means of a court 
order). A difficult situation arose in Hearn & Co (Pty) Ltd v Bleiman 1950 (3) SA 617 (C). In this 
case the third party was not in physical control of the property at the time of the tripartite 
agreement though the third party agreed to hold on behalf of the new owner. The court found 
that delivery by attornment had not taken place. See also Southern Tankers (Pty) Ltd t/a 
Unilog v Pescana D Oro Ltd (Velmar Ltd Intervening) 2003 (4) SA 566 (C). 
191 Kleyn & Boraine Law of Property 189. 
192 Mostert & Pope Property Law 203. 
193 See discussion of an incorporeal thing as right of security in 3.3 above. 
194 1979 (1) SA 603 (A).   
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equivalent to the sum owed to Carides. The agreement provided that Twycross would 
pay the purchase price directly to Carides and not to Air Capricon. Air Capricon and 
Twycross entered into a further agreement in terms of which Twycross ‘resold’ the 
machines to Air Capricon for exactly the same purchase price. Their contract 
required the purchase price to be paid in instalments and provided that Twycross 
remained the owner of the machines until the final instalment had been paid. In all 
these transactions, no physical transfer of the machines took place and Air Capricon 
retained physical control of the machines at all times. Approximately four months 
later, Air Capricon sold and delivered the dry-cleaning machines to Vasco Dry 
Cleaners. Air Capricon warranted that it owned the dry-cleaning machines although it 
had paid no instalments to Twycross as required by their ‘resale’ agreement. This 
means that Air Capricon had not acquired ownership in the machines. Twycross then 
claimed ownership arguing that when he bought the machines from Air Capricon and 
paid the purchase price to Carides, ownership in the machines was transferred from 
Carides to Air Capricon by means of traditio brevi manu, and then from Air Capricon 
to him by means of constitutum possessorium. This argument was, however, rejected 
by the Appellate Division. In its judgment the court looked at the actual intentions of 
the parties (Twycross and Air Capricon) and came to a finding that the parties had 
not intended to enter into a sale and resale, but rather to create a pledge. 
Consequently, the court held that the agreement between the parties amounted to a 
simulated transaction. Since actual physical control of the machines was never 
exercised by Twycross, a pledge had not been created and no real security right had 
vested in the pledgee as required by the common law.  
There is a different line of thinking with regard to what constitutes a simulated 
transaction. Scott195 is of the view that there are two approaches: an ‘old fashioned’ 
approach and a ‘modern’ approach, which can be used to determine whether the 
parties intended to enter into a pledge agreement or a sale and resale transaction. 
The old fashioned approach originates from the Roman law test which regards every 
juristic act as simulated when its economic and practical consequences are not in 
accordance with the normal legal consequences of the juristic act intended by the 
                                                          
195 Scott 1992 THRHR 615.  
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parties. This approach was adopted in Skjelbreds Rederi A/S v Hartless (Pty) Ltd196 
though the case does not specifically deal with a pledge without possession. This 
case involved the cession of a foreign claim by a peregrinus cedent to an incola 
cessionary in order to allow an action to be brought to found jurisdiction in a South 
African court by the cessionary against another peregrinus. The cedent was a 
peregrinus who had no standing in the South African courts. In examining the deed of 
cession, the court concluded that the agreement did not reflect the true intention of 
the parties. It was found that in form the agreement appeared to be a cession, but in 
substance it amounted to a mandate to the cessionary to enforce the cedent’s claim. 
In terms of the modern approach, a juristic act is regarded as a simulated transaction 
only when it appears clear from the transaction as a whole that the parties falsified 
their intention to conclude the juristic act which they supposedly entered into.197  
Scott supports the modern approach as adopted in Hippo Quarries (Tvl) (Pty) Ltd v 
Eardley.198 This case involved the supply of goods by a cessionary to a company and 
the transaction was secured by a deed of suretyship signed by the director of the 
company. The company was subsequently liquidated and the cessionary instituted 
action against the director as surety. The cessionary withdrew the action when it 
realised that the suretyship was in favour of the cedent, a company associated with 
the cessionary. This resulted with the cedent executing a deed of cession in which it 
purported to cede its rights against the director to the cessionary. In deciding the 
case, the court looked at the true intention of the parties to the disputed cession 
rather than their falsified intention and disregarded the simulated transaction.  
Van der Merwe199 points out that the South African courts have on several occasions 
accepted sale and lease-back transactions as transactions reflecting the true 
intention of the parties. Van der Merwe’s view is that the parties did not intend a form 
of pledge which requires delivery of the movable property to the pledgee, but rather a 
                                                          
196 1982 (2) SA 710 (A). This case involved a cession of a foreign claim by a peregrinus cedent to 
an incola cessionary to allow an action to be brought to found jurisdiction in a South African 
court by the cessionary against another peregrinus.  The cedent was a peregrinus who did not 
have standing in the South African court. In examining the deed of cession, the court came to 
a finding that the agreement did not reflect the true intention of the parties. It was found that 
the agreement appeared to be a cession in form, but in substance it amounted to be a 
mandate to the cessionary to enforce the cedent’s claim.       . 
197 Scott 1992 THRHR 615 and 620. See also Hippo Quarries (Tvl) (Pty) Ltd v Eardley 1992 (1) 
SA 855 (A). 
198 1992 (1) SA 855 (A). 
199 Van der Merwe Sakereg 689. 
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form of security created by the passing of ownership of the movable property. Instead 
of pledging the thing and losing control over it, the debtor (owner) sells the thing to 
the creditor and enters into a hire-purchase or credit agreement. If the debtor does 
not repay his debt, the tacit hypothec of a credit grantor will secure the creditor’s 
claim against the debtor. This view has, however, been rejected by the South African 
courts.200 Sonnekus201 argues that simulated transactions undermine the principle of 
publicity in that third parties can easily be misled as to the true state of affairs with 
regard to the property.  
In Zandberg v Van Zijl,202 the court found that simulated transactions did not prove to 
be a practical alternative to the common-law pledge. The court therefore reduced a 
simulated transaction to that of a pledge without possession. Whether the parties 
intended to create a pledge depends on whether the requirements for the creation of 
a valid pledge were complied with.203 A simulated transaction was also considered by 
the Appellate Division in Goldinger’s Trustees v Whitelaw and Son.204 In arriving to its 
judgment, the court looked at the true intention of the parties and came to the finding 
that there had been no transfer of ownership. A pledge rather than a sale and resale 
agreement had therefore been created. This judgment is in line with Vasco Dry 
Cleaners v Twycross.205 
To summarise: Actual physical control is required to vest a pledge. Fictitious delivery 
in the form of constitutum possessorium is not delivery for purposes of vesting a 
pledge. With reference to simulated transactions, South African law does not 
acknowledge a simulated transaction, for example a sale and lease back 
agreements, as a substitute for delivery. 
The following discussion focuses on the operation of a pledge and explains how 
effective this right is once all the legal acts have been complied with.  
 
                                                          
200 Vasco Dry Cleaners v Twycross 1979 (1) SA 603 (A). See also Parton and Colam NNO v GM 
Pfaff (SA) (Pty) LTD 1980 (4) SA 485 (NPD) were the same principles were adopted in dealing 
with simulated transactions. 
201 Sonnekus 1993 TSAR 110. 
202 1910 AD 302.  
203 A credit agreement, a pledge agreement, and delivery. 
204 1917 AD 66. See also Quenty’s Motors (Pty) Ltd v Standard Credit Corporation Ltd [1994] 2 
All SA 340 (A). 
205 (1884) 3 EDC 439. 
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4.4 Operation 
A real security right of pledge serves to ensure performance of a principal obligation 
by the pledgor or a third party to the pledgee. It is enforceable against the pledgor 
personally, and against all third parties.206 Any real security right to the movable 
property established after that of the pledgee is subject to the pledge on the basis of 
the maxim prior in tempore, potior in iure (first in time, first in law).  
The pledged thing provides two forms of security. Firstly, if the debtor fails to pay his 
debt the pledgee may have the pledged thing sold in execution. Secondly, if another 
of the pledgor’s creditors attempts to attach the pledged thing, or if the debtor is 
declared insolvent, the pledge gives the pledgee a preferential right over the 
proceeds of the sale of the pledged thing.207  
In an ideal situation the debtor will repay his debt and the creditor will restore 
possession of the pledged property to the pledgor together with all its fruits.208 When 
the debtor does not repay the debt the creditor may realise his security in the 
movable property of the debtor. Although the pledgee is already in control of the 
pledged thing, he must still obtain a court order to sell it in execution (unless there is 
a summary execution clause in the pledge agreement209). The pledgee is, however, 
in a better position than unsecured creditors: he has already identified the security 
object (pledged thing) and is in control of it. Unsecured creditors, on the other hand, 
must identify a security object and obtain an attachment order instructing the Sherriff 
to attach the security object. Furthermore, the pledgee’s secured right enjoys 
preference over all the rights of other concurrent creditors. The pledgee is also in a 
better position than other secured creditors. The order of preference of all secured 
creditors is determined by the qui prior in tempore rule. As a pledgee is in control of 
the thing, it is impossible for multiple pledges to vest over it. Should the pledged thing 
be the object of a general notarial bond, a landlord’s tacit hypothec, or a credit 
grantors hypothec, the creditor must still attach the thing in order to establish a real 
right. If the pledged thing is the object of a special notarial bond, the pledge ranks 
first. In terms of the maxim mobilia non habent sequelam ex causa hypothecae a 
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208 Van der Merwe CG ‘Real Security’ in Du Bois Wille’s Principles 650. 
209 See the discussion of the validity of summary execution clauses in 4.3.2 above. 
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pledgee’s right of pursuit is restricted. If the pledgee loses control of the pledged 
object voluntarily he cannot claim it from whomever is in control of it. If he loses 
control of the thing involuntarily, he may claim it from whoever is in control of it.210   
The common-law pledge as discussed above certainly places the pledgee in a very 
strong position. The fact that the pledgor loses control over his thing is, however, a 
considerable negative and not economically desirable. I now discuss the termination 
of a pledge. 
4.5 Termination of pledge 
A pledge remains effective so long as the pledgor retains physical control over the 
movable property that serves as security.211 In Heydenrych v Fourie212 the court held 
that the pledgee must retain control of the movable property that serves as security 
for the existence of the pledge.213 A pledge terminates should the pledgor voluntarily 
lose control of the pledged object.214 Stratford’s Trustees v London and South African 
Bank215 dealt with voluntary loss of control of the movable property that serves as 
security. In this case the court held that a pledgee who returned the pledged wool to 
the pledgor to wash, had not lost his right of pledge. The court explained further that 
if the wool had been returned for the personal use of the pledgor, then the pledge 
would have terminated. The rationale for the court’s decision was that the wool was 
returned solely on the basis of locatio operis faciendi.216  
In terms of the maxim mobilia non habent sequelam ex causa hypothecae, a 
pledgee’s right of pursuit is restricted. If the pledgee loses control of the pledged 
object voluntarily he cannot claim it from whomever is in control of it. If he loses 
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211 Stander 2000 TSAR 549. 
212 (1896) 13 SC 371 
213 Ibid. 
214 Zandberg v Van Zyl 1910 AD 302 313; Heydenrech v Fourie (1896) 13 SC 371.  
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216 This view was approved by the Scottish court in the case of North Western Bank v Poynter, 
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control of the thing involuntarily he may claim the thing from whomever is in control of 
it.217   
Other ways in which a pledge may be extinguished include: the discharge of the debt; 
sale in execution; destruction of the pledged thing; repudiation of the pledge by the 
pledgee; where the pledgee becomes owner of the pledged thing; a court order; and 
novation.218  
I now discuss the South African Law Commission’s 1988 proposal to introduce 
pledge without possession in South African law together with criticism levelled at and 
arguments for pledge without possession. 
4.6 Pledge without possession 
In 1988 the South African Law Commission published a paper (Project 46 (1987)) on 
Security by Means of Movable Property. The SMPA is a result of this project. Two 
aspects were addressed in this publication – security over corporeal movable 
property, and security over incorporeal movable property. Security over corporeal 
movable property consisted of two proposals: pledge without possession (clause 1); 
and notarial bonds (clause 2). For purposes of the present discussion I focus only on 
pledge without possession (‘besitlose pand’) as proposed in clause 1. Notarial bonds 
are dealt with later.219 
The only requirements for the vesting of a pledge without possession were: the 
agreement must be in writing (clause 1(1)(a)); it must prescribe the content of the 
written agreement (clause 1(1)(b)); and a clause that the pledgee may not enforce his 
right against future bona fide acquirers must be included in the written agreement 
(clause 1(3)). It appears that clauses 1(1) and 1(3) were intended to ensure 
compliance with the publicity principle. According to Scott220 the lack of compulsory 
notarial execution as a formality leaves the door wide open for fraud. A debtor will 
easily be able to deceive his creditors. Once the debtor realises he is in financial 
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219 See the discussion in 5.1 below. 
220 Scott 1989 De Jure 122. ‘Die gewetenlose insolvente skuldenaar sal nie eens besonder 
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trouble and that he will be declared insolvent, he draws up an agreement (pledge 
without possession) in favour of a conspirator who poses as a creditor of the debtor. 
All or much of the debtor’s movable property will then be ‘subject’ to the conspirator’s 
pledge without possession. A written agreement as proposed in clause 1(1) will not 
provide sufficient protection for third parties.  
Sonnekus221 indicates that the agreement as described in clause 1(1) has no face 
value for third parties, and that it does not replace possession for purposes of 
publication. The written contract/document is proof of an agreement between the 
pledgor/debtor and the pledgee/creditor but does not give notice to third parties of its 
existence or content.  
Another concern raised by Scott222 is the provision in clause 1(4) which stipulates 
that pledgee has the right to claim physical control of the pledged object on the 
debtor/pledgor’s insolvency. The creditor has the right to acquire control without court 
intervention. Clause 1(4) makes no provision for the creditor of a solvent debtor to 
take control of the pledged object in the case of the latter’s default.  
Sonnekus223 warns that the acknowledgement of pledge without possession as 
formulated in clause 1 would exclude the operation of the legal maxim traditionibus et 
usucapionibus dominia rerum, non nudis pactis transferuntur224 which is deeply 
rooted in South African law. In his view the Project 46 (1987) dealt with the publicity 
principle haphazardly without paying the necessary attention to the role and function 
of the publicity principle in property and insolvency law. The lack of publication in the 
proposed pledge without possession impacts on insolvency law. This negative 
influence is explained225 as follows: The effectiveness of any real security right 
depends on the preference/priority enjoyed by the holder of the real security right 
over other creditors. In terms of the Insolvency Act226 a preferential creditor does not 
have to contribute to the cost of the winding up of the insolvent estate – these costs 
are covered primarily by unsecured creditors. This privileged position enjoyed by the 
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secured creditor with a real security right should rely on the degree of publicity with 
which his real security right or preferential position is made public or known to the 
outside world. A registered mortgage bond over immovable property, possession of 
the pledged object, or a thing held in terms of a lien, are all forms of publicity of the 
existence of a preferential right. They serve as a warning to third parties carefully to 
consider the creditworthiness of the proposed borrower (debtor). This enables future 
creditors to determine the risk involved in lending money to the debtor. When the risk 
is high, the interest payable on the loan will probably also be high, which makes the 
loan more ‘expensive’. Sonnekus regards this as a healthy market mechanism which 
ensures that credit is provided to non-creditworthy persons only at a high premium. It 
partly captures the increased risk of default by the debtor and prevents the non-
creditworthy debtor from sinking into a bottomless pit of debt. Furthermore, it aids in 
detecting acts of insolvency timeously which limits the risk of a negative impact on 
economically sound enterprises or individuals. Any material amendment to real 
security rights will influence insolvency law. The meaning and benefit of real security 
rights emerge in the case of a concursus creditorium. No statutory amendments to 
security rights should be undertaken unless their impact on the insolvency law 
principles has been examined. There is no sense in creating unconsidered new real 
security rights if they will contribute to the negation of the basic principles of 
insolvency law.  
Sonnekus227 offers four reasons why possession of the pledged object by the creditor 
should be required for the creation of a valid pledge. Firstly, there is a rebuttable 
presumption that the person in possession of the thing is its owner.  When the debtor 
(pledgor) is still in control of the thing it creates the impression that he is the owner of 
the thing.228 Secondly, subsequent potential credit providers should not be misled as 
to the possible creditworthiness of the debtor who is in control of the pledged thing. 
The fact that he is in control of the thing might create the impression that he is 
creditworthy. Thirdly, the debtor should have no authority to sell the thing or offer it as 
security to more than one creditor. It is, therefore, of cardinal importance that the 
pledged thing is in possession of the creditor and not the debtor. Lastly, the debtor 
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loses his entitlement to use and enjoyment of the thing. This negative consequence 
of a pledge might serve as a deterrent for debtors to incur reckless debts.    
It is clear that pledge without possession as proposed in clause 1 amounts to pledge 
without publication. A registered pledge in terms of Belgian law (a special notarial 
bond in terms of the SMPA) is a pledge without possession but with publication in the 
form of registration. 
Both Scott229 and Sonnekus230 are of the opinion that the legislature itself did not 
appear convinced of the efficacy of a pledge without possession as formulated in 
clause 1 in that clause 2 stipulates that nothing prevents the parties to the pledge 
agreement from rather registering a notarial bond. The argument is that if the 
legislature considered the pledge without possession construction effective it would 
not have provided an alternative in the form of a notarial bond. 
Based on the above, it is clear that the legislature made the right decision in not 
including a pledge without possession in the SMPA. The need to broaden forms of 
security over movable property was, to some extent, addressed in the SMPA. In 
Chapter 6 I discuss the provisions of the SMPA with reference to special notarial 
bonds over movable property.  
4.7 Summary  
Three legal acts are required for the pledgee to acquire a limited real right in the 
movable property that serves as security: a credit agreement; a security agreement; 
and delivery. The pledgee, as the holder of a real security right, has a preferential 
claim to the proceeds of the sale in execution of the pledged property, or upon the 
insolvency of the pledgor. He has a concurrent claim against the proceeds from the 
realisation of the other assets of the debtor should the proceeds of the sale in 
execution prove insufficient to cover the principal debt. The legal position of a 
pledgee as set out in this chapter, applies to a notarial bondholder (general or 
special, before the enactment of the SMPA) once he has perfected his bond.    
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After consideration, a pledge without possession as proposed by Project 46 (1987) 
was not included in the SMPA. This is generally perceived as the correct decision. 
The SMPA was enacted and granted a ‘fictitious pledge’ in the form of a special 
notarial bond. I now discuss the background and development of notarial bonds in 
South African law, after which I consider the nature, vesting and operation of general 
notarial bonds.  
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CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL NOTARIAL BONDS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a general introduction to notarial bonds, an overview of the 
historical development of notarial bonds, and relevant legislation and case law 
dealing with notarial bonds in South African law. Thereafter the legal nature, vesting, 
and operation of general notarial bonds are discussed. Chapter 6 provides a 
comprehensive discussion of special notarial bonds in South African law. 
5.2 Notarial bonds in South African law 
5.2.1 Introduction 
A notarial bond in present-day South African law is a bond, attested by a notary 
public, which hypothecates movable property, either generally or specifically, and 
which has been registered in the Deeds Registry.231 It provides a means by which a 
debtor may hypothecate the movable property that serves as security without having 
to deliver the property to the creditor.232 The debtor may continue to use the property.  
South African law divides notarial bonds into general and special notarial bonds.233 
General notarial bonds, governed by the common law, are registered over all the 
movable property, corporeal or incorporeal, owned by the debtor. Special notarial 
bonds burden specifically described movable property of the debtor and are limited to 
corporeal movable property.234 I now discuss the historical evolution of general 
notarial bonds in 1880s into notarial bonds in current South African law. 
5.2.2 Historical development 
A notarial bond in South African law can be traced back to the Roman law 
hypotheca.235 In terms of the hypotheca a lessee of rural land could give the lessor 
security in the form of a security right over his movable property. Later, this form of 
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security was extended to any debtor and creditor who agreed to it. The creditor was 
granted a ius re in aliena over the property of the debtor, while the debtor retained his 
ownership of the property. It became a popular form of security, especially when 
immovable property was used as security. The modern-day mortgage developed 
directly from this form of securing a credit. This form of security was also applied in 
Roman-Dutch law. With regard to movable property Roman-Dutch law developed 
certain rules determining that the security over movables was valid only “so long and 
so far as the res remained in the ownership and the possession of the debtor”.236 
These rules were later encapsulated in the maxim mobilia non habent sequelam. In 
essence the maxim means that movables cannot be followed up from third parties. 
Should the debtor transfer ownership or give away possession of the thing to a third 
party, the creditor will not be able to claim the thing from the third party. Therefore, 
the security was only effective “so long and so far as the res remained in the 
ownership and the possession of the debtor”.237 This maxim did not apply in 
Friesland and the creditor with a security right in movable property could claim it from 
any person in possession thereof. 238  
Through the reception of Roman-Dutch law as applied in the provinces of Holland, 
the hypotheca was applied in the European agricultural community at the Cape. This 
form of security was referred to as a ‘general bond’ and it burdened all the movable 
and immovable property of the debtor. It took the form of a single document which 
vested hypotheca over movable and immovable property. In 1886 and 1896 the Cape 
legislature attempted, without success, to abolish general bonds (‘general 
mortgages’).239  
Between 1916 and 1993 a series of legislative measures and an Appellate Division 
judgment resulted in fundamental changes to common-law notarial bonds in South 
African law. I now discuss these in the following order: Insolvency Acts 1916 and 
1936; Natal Bond (Natal) Act, 1932; Deeds Registry Act, 1937; Cooper v Die 
Meester240 1992; and the Security by Means of Movable Property Act,1993.  
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5.2.3 Relevant legislation and case law 
5.2.3.1 Insolvency Act 32 of 1916241 
Developments in the South African insolvency law eventually changed the legal 
position of the general notarial bond.242 Before the enactment of the 1916 Insolvency 
Act,243 a general clause in a general notarial bond created a general bond over all the 
debtor’s property. In the event of two or more creditors with a general bond, the 
principle qui prior est tempore potior est jure applied: the earlier bond (right) enjoyed 
preference (was stronger in law) over later bond/s. The bondholder was not required 
to perfect his bond – he enjoyed a preferential right over other creditors for the value 
of the mortgaged property in possession of the debtor (or the trustee of his insolvent 
estate).244  
In terms of the section 87 of the 1916 Insolvency Act general bonds registered after 
the enactment of the Act had no operation as regards the proceeds of immovable 
property.245 A bond specifically describing certain movable property (special bond) 
without delivery to the creditor (bondholder) conferred a preference in respect of the 
movables specially described in the special bond upon their realisation by the trustee 
in insolvency.246 
Section 86 of the 1936 Insolvency Act247 preserved the abolition of any preference in 
respect of immovable property conferred by a general mortgage bond: 
No general mortgage bond registered after the thirty-first day of December, 
1916, shall confer any preference in respect of immovable property, and no 
general clause in a mortgage bond hypothecating immovable property 
registered after the said date shall confer any preference in respect of any 
property … 
                                                          
241 In 1916 the Parliament of the Union of South Africa repealed all the statutes which applied in 
the four provinces and enacted the Insolvency Act 32 of 1916. This was replaced by the 
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243 32 of 1916. 
244 See Cooper v Die Meester 1992 3 SA 60 AD 71G-H. 
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A distinction was drawn between secured creditors and preferential creditors.248 
Section 102 granted preference to a general notarial bondholder:  
Thereafter any balance of the free residue shall be applied in the payment 
of any claims proved against the estate in question which were secured by a 
general mortgage bond, in their order of preference [...] 
This preference was granted to the bondholder irrespective of whether or not the 
bond had been perfected. It should be noted that the preference granted to the 
notarial bondholder was limited to the value of the mortgaged property over which the 
notarial bond extended. If the claim exceeded the value of the mortgaged property, 
the notarial bondholder had an unsecured claim (with no preference) in the free 
residue249 of the insolvent estate for the outstanding amount. 
5.2.3.2 Natal Bond (Natal) Act 18 of 1932 
In 1932 the Natal Bond (Natal) Act250 came into operation in the South African 
province of Natal. The Natal Act provided as follows: 
This Act shall apply only to movables situate within the Province of Natal 
and shall apply to a notarial bond only in so far as such bond hypothecates 
movables specially described and enumerated therein: Provided that such 
bond is passed by a person (hereinafter referred to as “mortgagor”) and 
registered in the deeds registry in Pietermaritzburg at a time when no other 
notarial bond generally hypothecating such mortgagor’s movables is 
registered in such deeds registry: Provided further that notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary in any law, usage or custom, no notarial bond shall 
have the force or effect of a pledge on movables without delivery thereof by 
the debtor and taking and keeping in possession by the creditor unless it 
has been passed and registered as aforesaid.251 
This section speaks to the security object, the vesting of the rights, and their 
operation: 
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(a) The security object is: (i) movables within Natal Province; which are (ii) specially 
described and enumerated in the bond. 
(b) The right vests when: (i) the bond is passed by the mortgagor; (ii) registered in the 
Pietermaritzburg Deeds Registry; and (iii) the security object is not subject to any 
other general notarial bond registered in the deeds registry. 
(c) The right operates as a pledge over movables provided (a) and (b) have been 
complied with. 
From the above it is clear that the Natal Act did not apply to general notarial bonds. 
The Act did not provide for the registration of general notarial bonds and any 
registered general notarial bond was governed solely by common law and the Deeds 
Registry Act.252 
It is necessary to examine the operation of a notarial bond in terms of the Natal Act 
more closely. Sacks253 notes that the most significant effects are not found in the 
provisions of the Natal Act, but in the operation of the Insolvency Act. Section 4 of the 
Natal Act provides: 
The movables specially hypothecated by a notarial bond shall not form part 
of the free residue (as expressed and defined in any law relating to the 
sequestration or assignment of estates) of the mortgagor’s insolvent or 
assigned estate but shall nevertheless be realized by the mortgagor’s 
trustee or assignee and the proceeds derived from such realization shall be 
dealt with in the same manner as if they were the proceeds of a special 
bond hypothecating immovable property, save that the landlord’s hypothec 
shall to the extent set forth in section 86 of the Insolvency Act, 1916, or any 
amendment thereof, rank in priority to the hypothec of the holder of the 
notarial bond. 
The Insolvency Act 1936 defined security as  
movable property of that estate over which the creditor has a preferent right 
by virtue of any special mortgage, landlord’s legal hypothec, pledge or right 
of retention. 
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A special mortgage is defined as 
a mortgage bond hypothecating any immovable property or a notarial 
mortgage bond hypothecating specially described movable property in 
terms of section 1 of the Notarial Bonds (Natal) Act, 1932 (Act No 18 of 
1932), but excludes any other mortgage bond hypothecating movable 
property.  
Sacks254 points out that a special notarial bondholder in Natal had a ‘security’ based 
on two foundations. Firstly, as the holder of a ‘security’ as described in the Insolvency 
Act (‘Natal bondholder per se’). Secondly, as ‘a pledgee in law’ as provided for in 
section 1(1) of the Natal Act.   
General notarial bonds in Natal, and all notarial bonds in the other South African 
provinces, were governed by the common law and the Deeds Registry Act,255 and 
granted limited preference to the creditor’s claim on the insolvency of the debtor.256 
5.2.3.3 Deeds Registry Act 47 of 1937 
The Deeds Registry Act was enacted in 1937, six years after the enactment of the 
Natal Act and one year after the enactment of the 1936 Insolvency Act. Section 102 
defines a notarial bond as ‘a bond attested by a notary public hypothecating movable 
property generally or specifically’.  
Section 3(j) makes provision for the registration of notarial bonds: 
(1) The registrar shall, subject to the provisions of this Act - 
(j) register notarial bonds, and cancellations and cessions thereof 
(including cessions made as security) and cancellations of such 
cessions if made as security; 
Section 53(1) excludes the registration of a general clause in a mortgage bond and 
therefore proscribes the registration of a general notarial bond over all the property, 
movable and immovable, of the debtor. It explicitly prohibits the registration of a 
notarial bond over immovable property: 
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 Save as provided in any other law the registrar shall not attest any 
mortgage bond which purports to bind movable property or which contains 
the clause, commonly known as the general clause, purporting to bind 
generally all the immovable or movable property of the debtor or both and 
shall not register any notarial bond which purports to bind immovable 
property. 
The requirements for the registration of a notarial bond are dealt with in sections 61 
and 62. In short, a notarial bond must be registered within three months of the date of 
its execution. This period may be extended by a court. The notarial bond must 
disclose the place and date of execution and the place where the notary practices. 
Furthermore it must disclose the place where the debtor resides and the place where 
he carries on business (if any). Section 62 prescribes where the notarial bond is to be 
registered 
(1) … every notarial bond shall be registered in the deeds registry for the 
area in which the debtor resides and carries on business, or if he resides 
and carries on business in areas served by different deeds registries, in the 
deeds registry for the area in which he resides and in every deeds registry 
serving any area in which he carries on business: Provided that notarial 
bonds passed in Natal in pursuance of the Notarial Bonds (Natal) Act, 1932 
(Act No. 18 of 1932), irrespective of whether the debtor resides or carries on 
business in Natal, shall be sufficiently registered for the purposes of this Act 
if registered in the deeds registry at Pietermaritzburg.  
(2) Registration of a notarial bond in accordance with the provisions of 
subsection (1) shall be effective as registration for the whole Republic.   
It is clear from the above that there is no distinction between the registration 
requirements for general and special notarial bonds. The Deeds Registry Act does 
not speak to the legal operation of notarial bonds. The provisions of sections 61 and 
62 determine when a notarial bond is registered, and in terms of the Natal Act and 
the SMPA, a registered special notarial bond vests a real security right. The fulfilment 
of the requirements in sections 61 and 62, together with the provisions of the Natal 
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Act or the SMPA, vest a real security right in favour of the holder of a special notarial 
bond. 
Before the enactment of the SMPA the Appellate Division delivered judgment in a 
case that dealt with all of the above: the Insolvency Act, the Natal Act, and the Deeds 
Registry Act. I now discuss this case and the criticism levelled at the judgment. 
5.2.3.4 Cooper v Die Meester257 
In 1985 a debtor, Aldrich, registered a notarial bond over specified movable property 
in favour of one of his creditors, Sentraalwes. The notarial bond secured a debt of 
R150 000 owed by him to Sentraalwes and was registered in the Bloemfontein 
Deeds Office. At no point did Sentraalwes acquire control of the specified movables. 
In 1987 Aldrich was sequestrated and the proceeds of the specified movable property 
totalled R138 895. Sentraalwes proved an outstanding claim of R148 128 against the 
insolvent estate. Cooper, the trustee of the insolvent estate, acknowledged 
Sentraalwes’s claim but regarded it as an unsecured non-preferential claim. As 
concurrent creditor, Sentraalwes was awarded R6 540 from the free residue of the 
insolvent estate. Trustbank, another creditor of Andrich’s insolvent estate, had a 
claim against the insolvent estate secured by a general notarial bond. Trustbank was 
favoured by Cooper’s decision: as the holder of a general notarial bond it had a 
preferential claim over concurrent creditors. Sentraalwes appealed Cooper’s 
decision. The Master of the High Court relied on Vrede Koöp Landboumaatskappy 
Bpk v Uys258 and held that Sentraalwes had a preferential claim against the insolvent 
estate. Cooper approached the Orange Free State Provincial Division for a 
declaratory order affirming that Sentraalwes’s claim was not preferential.  
In the Free State Provincial Division Olivier J held that the general bond (‘algemene 
verband’) referred to in section 102 of the Insolvency Act includes a special bond 
(‘spesiale verband’). Special bonds, consequently, enjoy the same preference as 
provided for in section 102. Furthermore, Olivier J held that a claim secured by a 
special notarial bond over specified movable property enjoys preference over claims 
of other concurrent creditors in terms of the common law. He referred to Vrede Koöp 
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Landboumaatskappy Bpk v Uys259 as authority for the statement that the common 
law granted a preferential claim to the holder of a special bond. According to Olivier 
J, section 86 of the 1936 Insolvency Act abolished the preference that a general 
notarial bond over immovable property enjoyed over other creditors. However, the 
1936 Insolvency Act did, according to the judge, not abolish the common-law 
preference of a special notarial bond over concurrent creditors. He therefore held that 
Sentraalwes’s claim (secured by the special notarial bond) was preferential.  
Cooper took this decision on appeal to the Appellate Division. Joubert JA formulated 
the legal question:  
The legal question … is whether Sentraalwes as mortgagee of a registered 
notarial bond on certain movable things that remained in the possession of 
the mortgagor, Aldrich, until his sequestration, had any preference or priority 
over other concurrent creditors in respect of the free residue that is made up 
of proceeds of the mortgaged movable properties. [My translation.]260 
Referring to Roman and Roman-Dutch law, Joubert JA stated that creditors may be 
divided into four groups. The first group consists of creditors with death-related 
claims, including a funeral undertaker’s claim and claims for medical expenses. The 
second group consists of creditors with preferential mortgages, including claims 
secured by special mortgage bonds over immovable property. The third group 
consists of creditors with non-preferential mortgages, including the tacit hypothec of a 
landlord. The fourth group consists of creditors with unsecured non-preferential 
personal claims. The order of preference of claims to the proceeds of the realised 
security objects261 is as follows: The first group of creditors enjoys preference over 
the second, third and fourth groups. The second group of creditors enjoys preference 
over the third and fourth group. The third group enjoys preference over the fourth 
group. The preference referred to in this regard refers to the preferential claims on 
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the proceeds of the realised security object. If there is more than one creditor in a 
group, preference is awarded in accordance with the prior in tempore rule.262 
The judge studied the relevant provisions of the 1936 Insolvency Act and drew a 
clear distinction between: (i) proceeds of securities; and (ii) proceeds of non-
securities which make up the free residue of the estate.  
(i) Securities 
This is property subject to the following secured claims: landlord’s tacit hypothec; a 
special mortgage bond; a pledge; and a lien. The creditor’s claim must be satisfied 
from the proceeds of the specific property, for example the landlord’s claim must be 
satisfied from the proceeds of the lessor’s invecta et illata. Any surplus proceeds from 
the realisation of the securities will fall in the free residue of the estate. 
 (ii) Non-securities 
The Insolvency Act, sections 96-102, accords unsecured creditors preference  over 
the free residue of the insolvent estate in the following order: funeral and death costs 
(section 96(1)); sequestration costs (section 97(1)); execution costs (section 98(1)); 
statutory liabilities (section 99(1)); salaries and wages of employees (section 
100(1)(a)); personal income and profit taxes (section 101); claims secured by a 
general bond (section 102); and concurrent unsecured creditors with  non-preferent 
claims (section 103) rank after unsecured creditors listed in sections 96-102.   
A special notarial bond is not listed under securities or non-securities as provided for 
in sections 96-102 of the Insolvency Act. The court held that sections 96-102 contain 
an exhaustive list of statutory preferences. Special notarial bonds are excluded from 
this list and consequently a claim secured by a special notarial bond is not a 
preferential claim.  
The ensuing question was whether Olivier J’s conclusion that a ‘general bond’ in 
section 102 includes a ‘special bond’ was correct. According the Joubert JA, the 
legislature did not make provision for ‘special bonds’ as it did for ‘general bonds’ and 
the other preferential claims specifically described in sections 96-101. It therefore did 
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not have the intention to grant preference to special bonds and it would be wrong to 
assume that section 102 ‘general bonds’ include ‘special bonds’. Joubert JA also 
rejected the view of Olivier J that the common law grants preference to the holder of 
a special bond.263 Consequently Joubert JA held that Sentraalwes had no preferential 
claim against the insolvent estate and ranked equally with concurrent creditors. 
Sentraalwes was only entitled to R6 540 of the free residue.  
The case changed the whole spectrum on the issue of insolvency by rejecting the 
assumed legal principle that a special notarial bond afforded the creditor a 
preferential claim to the free residue of the debtor’s insolvent estate in the same way 
a general notarial bond did.264  
The Cooper-case evoked considerable academic criticism265 which I highlight briefly 
in what follows.  
Scott266 raises serious concerns about the impact of the Cooper case on the 
business and credit world. Credit grantors who have gone to the trouble of 
specifically describing certain movable property in notarial bonds, have no secured 
right and all costs incurred in the registration of these special notarial bonds have 
been wasted. In her view the common law granted preference over concurrent 
creditors to the holder of a bond registered over specified movable property which is 
not in his control. The 1936 Insolvency Act did not explicitly abolish this preference. 
Her criticism focuses on the purpose of the law, the functioning of the courts, and 
aspects of Joubert JA’s interpretation of the common law.  
Sonnekus’267 concerns are similar to those of Scott. He also criticises the judgment 
on its analysis of the common law. Sonnekus268 provides a thorough discussion of 
the development of general and special mortgages and other preferential rights in 
Roman law, Roman-Dutch law, and Germanic law. He refers to section 13 of the 
Politieke Ordinansie which clearly stated that the prior in tempore rule is the only 
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ground for preference in the case of competing general and special notarial bonds. 
He further emphasises the fact that the holder of both a general and special notarial 
bond has only a preferential claim over other concurrent creditors – it is not a secured 
claim. In order to acquire a secured claim there must be some form of publication, 
and, before the enactment of the SMPA, registration of both a general and a special 
notarial bond (with the exception of the legal position in Natal) was not regarded as 
publication. Only after perfecting the bond did the holder acquire a secured 
preferential claim.  
Van der Spuy269 criticises Joubert JA’s judgment on the basis of his examination of 
the legislature’s intention that ‘general bonds’ do not include ‘special bonds’. 
According to Van der Spuy, the judge’s reference to the Natal judgment In re 
Insolvent Estate Carter270 is inappropriate in that Natal had a unique legal framework 
and legislation governing the operation of notarial bonds. He points out that it is 
inequitable that preferential rights can be given to a special notarial bondholder within 
the jurisdiction of Natal, but not to special notarial bondholders outside the jurisdiction 
of Natal. For purposes of this discussion it suffices to say that the judgment placed 
holders of special notarial bonds in an unfavourable position. 
The SMPA changed this unsatisfactory legal position. Section 1(3) of the Act 
provides that a special notarial bondholder of specified and described movable 
property, whose bond was registered before the commencement of the Act, enjoys 
the same preference in respect of the entire free residue of the debtor’s estate as that 
enjoyed by the general notarial bondholder. The decision in Cooper case continues 
to apply to unregistered special notarial bonds created after the commencement of 
the Act.   
5.2.3.5 Security by Means of Movable Property Act (SMPA) 
In 1993 the Security by Means of Movable Property Act 57 of 1993 came into 
operation. This Act applies only to special notarial bonds and not to general notarial 
bonds, and only to corporeal movables and not to incorporeal movables. The most 
significant consequence of the Act is the distinction between special and general 
notarial bonds as regards the protection enjoyed by holders on the insolvency of the 
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debtor.  In terms of the SMPA, the holder of a special notarial bond is a secured 
creditor whether or not the special bond has been perfected. But the holder of a 
general notarial bond is not a secured creditor unless he has perfected the bonds. 
As the SMPA applies only to special notarial bonds, it is dealt with comprehensively 
in the following chapter. 
5.2.4 Summary 
General notarial bonds have been acknowledged in South African law since 1880. 
South African legislation first provided for notarial bonds in 1916. The Insolvency Acts 
(1916 and 1938), the Notarial Bond (Natal) Act (1932), the Deeds Registry Act 
(1937), and the SMPA (1993) provided/provide rules for the operation of notarial 
bonds. A turning point in the law governing notarial bonds came in 1993 after the 
Cooper case. This case placed special unperfected notarial bonds in a weaker 
position than general unperfected notarial bonds and special notarial bonds 
registered in Natal. The SMPA is a result of this case and of the Law Commission’s 
Project 46 (1987). 
I turn now to the nature and operation of general notarial bonds. 
5.3 General notarial bonds 
5.3.1 Introduction 
It is important to note that neither the SMPA nor the Natal Bond (Natal) Act applies to 
general notarial bonds. The legal nature of general notarial bonds, therefore, subsists 
even after the commencement of the SMPA.271 Despite registration in the Deeds 
Registry, a general notarial bondholder acquires only a personal right over the 
property that serves as security. Third parties and potential creditors or purchasers 
are not bound by this bond. The real security right vests when the bondholder obtains 
physical control of the property through a valid and enforceable perfecting clause. 
Once he has perfected the bond, the creditor is in the same position as a pledgee 
who is in control of the pledged object.272  
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5.3.2 Legal nature 
A general notarial bondholder acquires a personal right over all the debtor’s movable 
property – including movable property acquired by the debtor after registration of the 
notarial bond. If the bond has not been perfected, the bondholder acquires no real 
right to the movable property.273  
5.3.3 Security object 
A general notarial bond, governed by the common law and the Deeds Registry Act, is 
registered over all the movable property, corporeal or incorporeal, owned by the 
debtor.274 This includes movables acquired after the execution of the bond.275 
Movables that may be used as security for purposes of notarial bonds include: 
normal corporeal movable property (eg vehicle or machinery); a registered contract of 
lease (incorporeal); and a liquor licence. In terms of legislation276 aircraft and ships 
may not be mortgaged as security for the discharge of an obligation under a notarial 
bond. Crops, both existing and future, that have not been harvested cannot be 
mortgaged by notarial bond as they are classified as immovable property.277  
5.3.4 Legal operation 
A general notarial bond is created by means of a principal debt followed by the 
conclusion of a security agreement between the debtor and the creditor, or even the 
debtor and a third party, in terms of which a debtor agrees to provide security for the 
repayment of the principal debt. However, no real right to the movable property is 
created without a further legal act: the perfecting of the bond.  
A distinction should be drawn between the position before insolvency and the 
position after insolvency of the debtor. 
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(i) Before insolvency 
In order for a general notarial bondholder to acquire a real security right in the 
movable property that serves as security, the bond must include a valid and 
enforceable perfecting clause.278 The perfecting of a bond refers to the moment at 
which a real security right arises.279 The perfecting clause allows the creditor to claim 
control of the defaulting debtor’s movable property. The creditor acquires control over 
the property with the consent of the debtor who delivered the thing to the creditor. If 
the debtor refuses to deliver the thing to the creditor the latter can apply for a court 
order ordering specific performance of the perfecting clause in the bond.280 The court 
has a discretion whether or not to grant specific performance. A notarial bondholder 
who waits to perfect his bond until just before the sequestration of the debtor, might 
be limited by section 30281 of the 1936 Insolvency Act – undue preference to 
creditors.282  
According to Sonnekus,283 the creditor acquires a right of pledge once the bond is 
perfected and he secures physical control of the thing. The creditor’s status as 
pledgee does not arise from the perfecting clause in the bond, but from his 
compliance with all the requirements for the vesting of a real security right (pledge). 
The perfecting clause is a mechanism by which to acquire the physical control over 
the secured object required for vesting a right of pledge.  
Academic opinion differs as to the correctness of the assumption that a notarial 
bondholder is in the same position as a pledgee upon the perfecting of his security 
right. Van der Walt284 is of the view that a notarial bondholder is in a stronger position 
                                                          
278 Jansen 2003 Juta’s Business Law 155. See also Barclays National Bank Ltd and Another v 
Natal Fire Extinguishers Manufacturing Co (Pty) Ltd and Others 1982 (4) SA 650 (D). 
279 Scott 1995 THRHR 675. 
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281 ‘If a debtor made a disposition of his property at a time when his liabilities exceeded his 
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bond and thus acquires a pledge over the movables, falls within the definition of ‘disposition’. 
See Sonnekus 2002 SALJ 567, 569. 
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than a pledgee because of the protection he enjoys without having control over the 
movable property, whereas a pledgee’s real security right terminates should he lose 
control of the property. In terms of Van der Walt’s argument, a notarial bondholder, 
unlike a pledgee, does not lose his real security right when he loses control over the 
movable property. When a notarial bondholder loses control of the movable property, 
he loses his right of pledge but can still rely on his position as a notarial bondholder. 
The ordinary pledgee also loses his right of pledge when he loses control over the 
movable property, but has no other form of security (for example, registration in the 
case of a special notarial bondholder) on which to rely. Van der Walt’s argument is 
based on the way in which an ordinary pledge and the notarial bondholder’s pledge 
are constituted.   
(ii) Insolvency of the debtor 
In the case of the insolvency of debtor, the bondholder enjoys a right of preference in 
the free residue of the insolvent estate, over the debtor’s other concurrent creditors285 
This preference extends to all the movables owned by the debtor at the time of 
sequestration. The general notarial bondholder can only become a secured creditor 
once the bond has been perfected.286 It is generally accepted that before the 
perfecting of the bond, the general notarial bondholder enjoys preference only 
against unsecured creditors.287 The perfecting of the bond after insolvency is not 
possible in the light of section 20 of the Insolvency Act.288 The effect of the 
sequestration of the insolvent estate is to divest the insolvent of his estate and to vest 
it in the Master until a trustee has been appointed, at which point the insolvent estate 
will vest in the trustee.289  
There may also be several registered notarial bonds none of which has been 
perfected. In this case the prior tempore potior iure rule (first in time, first in law) 
applies.290 In terms of this rule the bond that was registered earlier is preferred to the 
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one registered later.291 If one of the general notarial bondholders has perfected his 
bond before the debtor’s insolvency, he has a real right to the movables that are in 
his physical control. He is therefore in the same position as a pledgee and his real 
right therefore enjoys preference over those of other general notarial bondholders. An 
unperfected registered general notarial bond gives rise to a personal right which is 
only enforceable amongst the parties to the agreement. Therefore, the registration of 
a general notarial bond short of perfecting, has no meaningful effect on the bond. 
However, failure to register a general notarial bond affects its validity as a notarial 
bond and can nullify the security right. Section 102 of the Insolvency Act gives the 
creditor preference in respect of the free residue of the debtor’s estate.  
5.3.5 Summary 
A general notarial bond, which applies to all movable property, both corporeal and 
incorporeal, in the debtor’s possession, is regulated by the common law and the 
Deeds Registries Act. Neither the SMPA nor the Natal Bond (Natal) Act applies to 
this bond. In order for the general notarial bondholder to acquire a real security right 
in the property, a valid and an enforceable perfecting clause must be included in the 
bond. Perfecting of the bond allows the debtor to take physical control of the property 
of the defaulting debtor and he therefore becomes a secured creditor. Upon the 
debtor’s insolvency and before the perfecting of the bond, section 102 of the 
Insolvency Act provides that the bondholder enjoys a right of preference only over the 
debtor’s other concurrent creditors as regards the free residue of the insolvent estate. 
In the case of several registered general notarial bonds the prior tempore potior iure 
rule applies. The bondholder becomes a secured creditor once the bond has been 
perfected and is, therefore, in the same position as a pledgee. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
291 Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to Property 296. See also Jansen 2003 Business Law 
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CHAPTER 6 
SPECIAL NOTARIAL BONDS 
6.1 Introduction 
A special notarial bond burdens specifically described movable property belonging to 
the debtor.292 In 1993 the Security by Means of Movable Property Act 57 of 1993 
came into operation. The SMPA changed the legal position of special notarial 
bondholders. The ensuing discussion of the legal position of notarial bonds in South 
African law distinguishes between the legal position before the enactment of the 
SMPA (ie pre-1993), and the position after its enactment (ie post-1993).  
6.2 Legal position pre-1993 
6.2.1 Introduction 
A principal debt and a security agreement were required for the creation of a special 
notarial bond. However, the holder of a special notarial bond acquired no real right 
over the movable property that served as security. In order for a special notarial 
bondholder to acquire a limited real right (other than a special notarial bond in Natal 
which was regulated by the provisions of the Notarial Bond (Natal) Act),293 a valid and 
an enforceable perfecting clause294 had to be included in the bond. The bondholder 
could only acquire a limited real right upon delivery of the movable property that 
served as security.295 A distinction should be drawn between the legal position before 
insolvency and the legal position after insolvency. 
6.2.2 Before insolvency 
The holder of a special notarial bond had no security right. He had to obtain physical 
control of the movable property in order to acquire a real security right in the property. 
This was done by perfecting the bond in terms of a valid and enforceable perfecting 
                                                          
292 Scott 1995 THRHR 675. 
293 18 of 1932. See the discussion in 2.4.1.1 above regarding the application of the Act.  
294 For the creditor to acquire physical control of the movable property in terms of the perfecting 
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a court order compelling the debtor to give him control of the thing. See Fevrier-Breed 1993 
THRHR 146. See 5.3.4(i) above for a comprehensive discussion of a perfecting clause. 
295 Sonnekus 1983 TSAR 252-3.  
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clause in the bond. Once he had acquired physical control of the movable property, 
the special notarial bondholder was treated as a pledgee.296  
In Natal (s 2 of the Natal Act) corporeal and incorporeal movables that had been 
specifically described in a notarial bond, were regarded as having been delivered to 
the bondholder who acquired a pledge over the movables. The bondholder acquired 
a right of pledge without ever obtaining physical control. All movables subject to the 
special notarial bond were immune from attachment in execution. This special 
notarial bond ranked below the tacit hypothec of a landlord (s 4 of the Natal Act). A 
special notarial bondholder in Natal did not have to perfect his bond in order to obtain 
a right of pledge.297 
6.2.3 After insolvency 
Before the commencement of the SMPA, the issue of notarial bonds in the case of 
insolvency was, to a large extent, uncertain. There was a fragmentation of laws 
governing special notarial bonds: the Natal Act298 (granting real security right to the 
creditor/bondholder) applicable only in Natal; and the Deeds Registry Act (granting 
no real security right to the creditor/bondholder but merely a preference on the entire 
free residue of the insolvent estate over concurrent creditors).299  
In 1982 the South African Law Commission embarked upon an investigation into real 
security rights over movable property. The final report300 was published in 1991 and 
acknowledged the need for a form of security that allows the debtor to remain in 
control of his thing, while granting a real security right over the thing to the creditor. 
The Law Commission’s proposed Bill introduced two possible forms of security over 
movable property: (i) unregistered pledge without possession; and (ii) registered 
pledge without possession. Each of these is briefly considered in what follows. 
 
                                                          
296 Sonnekus & Neels Sakereg Vonnisbundel 755. See 4.4 above for the legal operation of a 
pledge. 
297 Scott 1995 THRHR 673. 
298 See 5.2.3.2 above for a comprehensive discussion of the provisions of the Natal Act. 
299 Lubbe & Van der Walt 1988 TSAR 554. 
300 South African Law Commission Report (Project 46) ‘The Giving of Security by Means of 
Movable Property’ (1991). 
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(i) Unregistered pledge without possession301 
The proposed pledge without possession (clause 1 of the Bill) was discussed in 
Chapter 4. I repeat the essence here in order to provide a comprehensive overview 
of the Law Commission’s Proposals. This proposed form of security did not require 
the debtor to give the creditor control over the property. All that was required was a 
written agreement signed by the parties in which the security object was specified 
and described. The proposal was that this agreement would have the same legal 
effect as a pledge – ie it would create a real security right. The unregistered pledge 
would therefore create a real security right without compliance with the publicity 
requirement. Should the debtor be declared insolvent, section 83 of the Insolvency 
Act would apply to the creditor. If the debtor is solvent but in default, the creditor has 
no preferred right over the debtor’s other creditors. Furthermore, if the debtor offers 
the thing as security to another creditor(s), the first creditor has no right to claim the 
thing from these creditor(s) and in essence has no security. Sonnekus refers to this 
as ‘mooiweers-sekerheidsregte’ (‘fair weather security rights’) which means that the 
rights are effective only if the debtor is still in control of the thing and is declared 
insolvent. However, if the debtor is no longer in control of the thing and in default, the 
creditor has no security.302 The unregistered pledge proposed in clause 1 of the Bill 
was not included in the SMPA.  
(ii) Registered pledge without possession 
The second proposed form of security (clause 2 of the Bill) was the nationwide 
introduction of special notarial bonds over specified movables which would grant the 
creditor preference over the debtor’s other creditors. The creditor has a right of 
preference as if he is in control of the movable property but is in fact not in control of 
the property. This form of security is based on the Natal regime. The two 
requirements for the vesting of a registered pledge are registration of the notarial 
bond, and the satisfactory description of the movable property. Fulfilment of these 
two requirements justifies the non-delivery of the movable property.303 This form of 
security has been included in the SMPA, and was welcomed by most commentators. 
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Sonnekus304 distinguishes between security rights without possession (‘besitlose 
sekerheidsresgte’) and security rights without publication (‘publisiteitslose 
sekerheidsregte’). In my opinion, section 1 of the Bill amounts to security without 
publicity, whereas section 2 (special notarial bonds in the SMPA) amounts to security 
without possession. Possession is a means to an end, namely publicity. It is not an 
end in itself and can therefore be replaced by registration which would then be the 
means to the end, namely publicity. 
As mentioned previously, in Cooper v Die Meester305 the Appellate Division delivered 
a judgment that led to considerable confusion until the enactment of the SMPA. The 
judgment emphasised the urgent need for legislation to give legal certainty regarding 
special notarial bonds and their legal effect. The Cooper-case is discussed in 5.2.3.4 
above. In short: the court held that a special unperfected notarial bond gave no 
preference over the claims of other concurrent creditors, and consequently ranked 
below a general notarial bond (bonds). The court did not acknowledge the common-
law preference granted to special mortgages and relied solely on the provisions of 
sections 96-102 of the 1936 Insolvency Act. The decision resulted in an unequal legal 
position for special notarial bondholders in Natal as opposed to special notarial 
bondholders in the other provinces. 
The SMPA changed the unsatisfactory legal position established by the Cooper-case. 
However, the decision in the Cooper-case continues to govern unregistered special 
notarial bonds created after the commencement of the Act.  
I turn now to an examination of the provisions of the SMPA, relevant case law, and 
academic opinion, on the nature and operation of special notarial bonds under the 
SMPA.  
6.3 Legal position after 1993 
6.3.1 Introduction 
The SMPA came into operation on 7 May 1993. The preamble to the Act reads as 
follows: 
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To regulate the legal consequences of the registration of a notarial bond over 
specified movable property; to exclude the operation of the landlord’s tacit 
hypothec in respect of certain movable property; to repeal the Notarial Bonds 
(Natal) Act, 1932; to adjust another law in consequence of such repeal; and to 
provide for matters connected therewith. 
The Act consists of only six sections. I quote the relevant sections below before 
embarking upon a comprehensive analysis of special notarial bonds created in the 
SMPA. In analysing the Act, I first consider the vesting requirements as prescribed in 
the SMPA and then the legal position of a special notarial bondholder with reference 
to the nature and operation of the right under the SMPA. 
The Act reads as follows:  
1. Legal consequences of special notarial bond over movable property 
(1) If a notarial bond hypothecating corporeal movable property 
specified and described in the bond in a manner which renders it 
readily recognizable, is registered after the commencement of this 
Act in accordance with the Deeds Registries Act, 1937 (Act No. 47 
of 1937), such property shall – 
(a) subject to any encumbrance resting upon it on the date of 
registration of the bond; and 
(b) notwithstanding the fact that it has not been delivered to the 
mortgagee, be deemed to have been pledged to the 
mortgagee as effectually as if it had expressly been 
pledged and delivered to the mortgagee. 
(2) Upon the discharge of the debt secured by a bond mentioned in 
subsection (1) the mortgagee shall, at the request of the 
mortgagor, furnish to the mortgagor, free of charge, proof of such 
discharge in the form required for the cancellation of the bond. 
(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (4) a notarial bond 
contemplated in subsection (1) other than a notarial bond 
contemplated in section 1 of the Notarial Bonds (Natal) Act, 1932 
(Act No. 18 of 1932), which was registered before the 
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commencement of this Act shall, upon the insolvency of the 
mortgagor before or after such commencement, confer on the 
mortgagee the same preference in respect of the entire free 
residue of the insolvent estate as that conferred on a mortgagee by 
a general bond in terms of section 102 of the Insolvency Act, 1936 
(Act No. 24 of 1936). 
(4) The provisions of subsection (3) shall not apply if any part of such 
free residue was, before the commencement of this Act, paid out to 
concurrent creditors in terms of a confirmed account. 
(5) If, at the commencement of this Act, an account has been 
confirmed but dividends have not yet been paid out as 
contemplated in subsection (4), such account shall be reopened so 
as to give effect to the provisions of subsection (3) without 
obtaining the permission of the court in terms of section 112 of the 
Insolvency Act, 1936. 
2. Exclusion of landlord’s tacit hypothec 
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the common law or in 
any other law, movable property – 
(a) which, while hypothecated by a notarial bond mentioned in 
section 1(1), is in the possession of a person other than the 
mortgagee; or 
(b) to which an instalment agreement as defined in section 1 of 
the National Credit Act, 2005, relates, (Section 2(b) 
substituted by section 172 of Act 34 of 2005) shall not be 
subject to a landlord's tacit hypothec. 
(2) The provisions of subsection (1) in respect of movable property 
hypothecated by a notarial bond mentioned in section 1(1) shall not 
apply if such bond is registered after the landlord's hypothec has 
been perfected. 
3. Repeal of Act 18 of 1932 
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The Notarial Bonds (Natal) Act, 1932 (Act No. 18 of 1932), is hereby 
repealed.306 
4. Amendment of section 2 of Act 24 of 1936, as amended by section 2 of 
Act 16 of 1943, section 1 of Act 6 of 1972 and section 1 of Act 27 of 
1987 
Section 2 of the Insolvency Act, 1936, is hereby amended by the substitution 
for the definition of "special mortgage" of the following definition: 
“special mortgage” means a mortgage bond hypothecating any immovable 
property or a notarial mortgage bond hypothecating specially described 
movable property in terms of section 1 of the [Notarial Bonds (Natal) Act, 
1932 (Act No. 18 of 1932)] Security by Means of Movable Property Act, 
1993, but excludes any other mortgage bond hypothecating movable 
property;. 
6.3.2 Vesting 
The SMPA created what is termed a ‘fictitious pledge’. Section 1(1) of the SMPA 
provides that corporeal movable property, if specified and described in a way that 
renders it readily recognisable, is deemed to have been pledged and delivered as if it 
has in fact been pledged and delivered.307 This right is often referred to as a fictitious 
pledge. The right vest over the movable property subject to any prior rights resting 
upon the property (s 1(1)(a)). Section 1(1)(b) of the SMPA provides for the 
registration of a special notarial bond over defined and specified movables of the 
debtor without requiring delivery of the movable property from the debtor to the 
creditor. This ‘fictitious pledge’ has been criticised by certain academics as a ‘very 
clumsy way of creating a new form of real security’.308 Others have welcomed the 
SMPA.309 In summary, a special notarial bond over movable property vests on its 
registration, provided that the movable property encumbered is described in the 
notarial bond in terms that make it readily recognisable.  
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6.3.2.1 Registration 
In order to create a real right, delivery of the movable property that serves as security 
is replaced by registration in the Deeds Registry. In order for a real security right to 
enjoy preference in the event of the debtor’s insolvency, it must comply with the 
publicity principle. Negating the publicity principle infringes the basic principles of 
security and undermines insolvency law.310 In terms of the SMPA, the special notarial 
bondholder acquires a real right in the property that serves as security upon 
registration of the bond in the Deeds Registry. An unregistered notarial bond does 
not confer any form of security or preference on the special notarial bondholder over 
that of concurrent creditors of the insolvent estate.311 Registration of a notarial bond 
in the Deeds Registry entails that the bond document, setting out the principal debt 
and describing the movable property that serves as security, must be attested by a 
notary public and registered in the Deeds Registry within a period of three months 
after attestation.312  
Sonnekus and Neels313 emphasise the fact that the SMPA has not done away with 
the hassles and limitations attendant upon registration in the Deeds Office. The 
SMPA does not address this issue and the difficulties and costs of registration 
consequently still impact negatively on the use of a special notarial bond. Prospective 
credit grantors will have to search all Deeds Registries in the country to ensure that 
the movable asset/s offered as security are not already subject to another real 
security right.   
Brits314 suggest investigating the possibility of a ‘more sophisticated and 
computerised — yet simple, inexpensive and quick — system of publicity for security 
rights over movables’. He correctly points out that the SMPA was enacted in 1993 
and that there have been innumerable technological advances since 1993. Although 
the registration of land in the Deeds Office is effective and serves as fair publicity, an 
alternate asset registry for movable property should be considered.   
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In principle, the person who registers the notarial bond over the movable property 
does not have to be the debtor himself. He must, however, have the legal capacity to 
burden the thing. In Bokomo v Standard Bank van SA Bpk315 Minassian (trading as 
Rolo Bakery) registered a special notarial bond over movable property (equipment) in 
favour of Standard Bank for a debt of R115 359. The bond was registered on 26 May 
1993 and was subject to the provisions of the SMPA. In terms of the SMPA Standard 
Bank was in the same legal position as a pledgee who received delivery of the 
pledged thing. The only qualification was that Standard Bank’s right was subject to 
any real security rights vested over the property before the registration of the special 
notarial bonds. Minassian bought the equipment from United Bank under an 
instalment sale agreement. United Bank reserved ownership until payment of the last 
instalment. On 28 September 1993 Minassian entered into a purchase agreement 
with Bokomo. On 29 September Minassian paid the final instalment to United Bank 
and on 30 September ownership was transferred to Bokomo by delivery through 
constitutum possessorium. Minassian hired the equipment from Bokomo and 
remained in control thereof. Bokomo had never been aware of the special notarial 
bond registered over the equipment. In September 1994 Standard Bank instituted an 
action against Minassian for the payment of R198 590 due in terms of a lease 
agreement. It is not clear whether there was any link between this debt and the debt 
secured by the special notarial bond. The writ of execution of property to the value of 
R115 359 did, however, correspond to the movable property (equipment) described 
in the special notarial bond registered in May 1993. In the magistrate’s court Bokomo 
objected to the attachment of the movable property (equipment) averring that it 
(Bokomo) was the owner. The objection was denied and Bokomo appealed against 
the decision. On appeal Standard Bank averred that its right in terms of the special 
notarial bond was preferential to Bokomo’s right as owner. It is clear from the facts 
that Minassian was not the owner of the equipment when it registered the special 
notarial bond over the movable property in favour of Standard Bank. However, it did 
later become the owner and the court held as follows: 
On behalf of the respondent the argument was submitted to us that even if 
Minassian only became owner of the equipment after the notarial bond was 
registered, such acquisition of ownership by Minassian gave legal effect to the 
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pledge created by the notarial bond before appellant acquired any rights 
thereto. In support for the argument reference was made to the following 
statement in Wille’s Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa 3rd ed (by Scott and 
Scott) at 35: 
 ‘If a person mortgages the property of another without the latter’s consent 
or authority, and the mortgagor subsequently acquires the dominium of the 
property, the acquisition of the dominium has the effect of making the mortgage 
valid.’ 
Based on this argument the court held in favour of Standard Bank.  
Sonnekus316 criticises this judgment on the following ground: In order to create a real 
security right, the person granting the right over the security object must be capable 
of doing so, either as owner or as a person who has the necessary legal capacity to 
deal with the thing. As Minaissen had neither, it could not vest a real security right 
over the equipment and Standard Bank therefore had no real security right (special 
notarial bond) over the equipment. He refers to Roman law, Roman- Dutch law, and 
foreign law to substantiate his argument. What is evident from this judgment is that 
registration of a special notarial bond does not necessarily comply with the publicity 
principle.    
6.3.2.2 Security object (corporeal movable) described 
The SMPA makes provision only for a special notarial bond over corporeal movable 
property. In terms of section 1(1) of the Natal Act, a special notarial bond could only 
be registered over ‘movables specially described and enumerated’. Section 1(1) of 
the SMPA deems corporeal movable property that has been specifically described 
and is consequently readily recognisable in the bond itself to have been delivered to 
the notarial bondholder as if delivery had in fact taken place. The test of specifying 
and describing the movable property as provided for in section 1(1) of the Act, is set 
out in the Ikea Trading und Design v BOE Bank.317 The test is whether a third party is 
able to identify the property from the description in the bond itself without recourse to 
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extrinsic evidence.318 In this case Woodlam Industries CC (Woodlam), a close 
corporation, registered a special notarial bond in favour of Ikea Trading. This bond 
was registered in terms of the SMPA. The movable property concerned was listed in 
a schedule attached to the bond and not specified and described in the bond itself. 
Woodlam was subsequently declared insolvent. BOE Bank was a creditor of 
Woodlam and had a general notarial bond registered over Woodlam’s movable 
assets. This general notarial bond was, however, registered in 1991 before the 
enactment of the SMPA. BOE Bank was therefore not a secured creditor but did have 
a preferential claim against the free residue of the insolvent estate.319 The bank 
challenged the validity of the special notarial bond on the ground that the movable 
property was not described in a way that rendered it ‘readily recognisable’. BOE Bank 
stated that it was not possible to identify the movable property from the bond itself 
without having recourse to external evidence such as invoices, other documents, and 
even the testimony from a former employee familiar with the insolvent’s properties. 
Based on these arguments, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the special 
notarial bond was invalid as it did not meet the test set out by the court that: 
Third parties must be able to tell, without reference to extrinsic evidence, 
that the creditor has a right in the property pledged.320 
Consequently, Ikea Trading was a mere concurrent creditor of the insolvent estate. 
Woodlam’s movable property fell in the free residue of the insolvent estate. In terms 
of section 102 of the 1936 Insolvency Act, BOE Bank’s registered general notarial 
bond granted it a preferential claim over other concurrent creditors in the free residue 
of the insolvent estate.   
The use of the terms ‘specified and described’ in the SMPA points to a stricter test 
than that under the Natal Act which required the property to be ‘specially 
enumerated’.321 This stricter test, which is applied to determine whether a third party 
can identify the movable property from the terms of the bond itself without recourse to 
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extrinsic evidence, serves to conform to the principle of publicity. In terms of the Natal 
Act it was sufficient to ‘specially enumerate’ the property. The Oxford Dictionary322 
defines enumerate as ‘mention one by one’ or to ‘establish the number of’. It is clear 
from the Ikea judgment that, in terms of the SMPA, the property must be described 
specifically.  
Sonnekus323 explains that in terms of the Natal Act it was sufficient to say a bond has 
been registered over a certain number of cans of fish on a shelf. The interpretation of 
section 1(1) of SMPA in the Ikea case is that 
[t]he property must be so described that only it, and not other property of a 
like kind, can be identified as that which is pledged (para 24). 
The issue is, therefore, not the number of cans on the shelf, but about the specified 
description of each can of fish. Instead of physical control by the creditor which 
indicates to third parties that a right other than ownership exists over the property, the 
property in the bond must be described in a manner that will indicate with absolute 
certainty which property is subject to the special notarial bond.  
Although Sonnekus welcomes the decision in Ikea Trading, he is concerned about 
the underutilisation of this form of security, and considers the fact that the strict 
application of the description of the property renders it an expensive form of 
security.324 He refers to paragraph 24 of the Ikea judgment (quoted above) and 
comments:  
In my view there should be no difficulty in identifying machinery, vehicles, even 
furniture, that is bonded by reference to labels, numbers or bar codes. […] 
each of the assets enumerated could be given an identifying mark referred to 
in the bond. The third party would then readily be able to recognise the thing 
from the reference in the bond. 
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Referring to the above, he proposes that the thing could be described by using a 
special mark on the property. The description in the notarial bond must then indicate 
how the specific couch was marked in order to make it readily recognisable. The 
mark on the movable property would then have been described in the bond.325   
The following shows an instance where a special notarial bond would be beneficial, 
but cannot be registered in terms of the strict application of the description of the 
thing. A recording label where a company wishes to offer its ‘equipment’ as security 
for the repayment of the principal debt. ‘Equipment’ appears to be a revolving class of 
assets which does not meet the requirement as provided for in section 1(1) of the 
SMPA. In principle, a special notarial bond must be registered over each individual 
piece of equipment. Should some of the equipment be replaced, a new notarial bond 
would have to be registered over that piece of equipment.326 This is costly and 
benefits neither the creditor nor the debtor – only the notary ‘scores’. Sonnekus327 
proposes that the property can be determined, and therefore comply with the 
requirements in section 1(1) of the SMPA, by the use of an assets registry together 
with a special mark described in the bond.  
One could be excused for assuming that the strict application of the description of the 
thing provides legal certainty and complies with the publicity function. Brits,328 
however, is of the view that the description requirement is relatively unclear and open 
ended. His view is based on the fact that unlike immovable property, there is no 
standard uniform manner in which movable property should be described. In some 
instances it will only be clear whether the description of the movable thing was 
adequate once the case reaches the court – which is hardly a less desirable state of 
affairs. It is therefore wise to be conservative in dealing with movables that are used 
as security under special notarial bonds. Brits agrees with Sonnekus’s proposition 
that there are other ways to describe the movable property. He proposes an 
amendment to the SMPA to provide a list of methods by which the movable property 
may be described. I return to this proposition in my final analyses.329 
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6.3.2.3 Incorporeal property excluded from the SMPA 
A special notarial bond over incorporeal movable property does not enjoy priority 
over a general notarial bond. The right does not create a real right of security. In 
order to create a real right of security over a specified incorporeal thing, a perfecting 
clause must be included in the bond. The bondholder can also acquire a real security 
right (pledge) if he obtains a court order for the attachment of the incorporeal thing.330  
According to Scott,331 the “regrettable decision in the Cooper case necessitated the 
hasty introduction of the SMPA.” The exclusion of incorporeal movable property by 
the SMPA has a negative impact on the commercial needs of the debtor. She 
formulates the shortcoming of the SMPA in this regard as follows: 
[T]he theoretical and practical unacceptable situation that an act professing 
to deal with security by means of movables omits to deal with security by 
means of claims. In the modern credit world, security by means of claims, 
be it as a pledge, an out-and-out cession or a notarial bond, forms by far the 
most important form of security.  
From this it is clear that the exclusion of incorporeal movable property from the SMPA 
leaves a void and that legal reform in this regard should be considered as a matter of 
urgency.  
6.3.3 Operation 
6.3.3.1 Real security right  
A special notarial bondholder acquires a limited real right in the movable property that 
serves as security upon registration of the bond.332 The Act creates a (fictitious) 
pledge in favour of a bondholder on registration. The bondholder is deemed a 
pledgee notwithstanding the fact that delivery has not taken place (s 1(1)(b)). Based 
on the wording333 of this subsection, it is assumed that the creditor has exactly the 
same right of pledge as a normal pledgee. The bondholder does not have to perfect 
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the bond in order to acquire a real security right (pledge). The common-law principles 
applicable to a pledge, as set out in 4.4 above, apply to a special notarial 
bondholder.334  
The legal position before and after insolvency is the same as that of a pledgee. Upon 
the insolvency of the debtor, the creditor will be a secured creditor who can realise 
his claim under section 83 of the Insolvency Act.335  
6.3.3.2 Special notarial bonds registered before enactment of SMPA 
In terms of section 1(3) of the SMPA, the holders of special notarial bonds registered 
before the enactment of the SMPA are in the same position as general notarial 
bondholders in terms of section 102 of the Insolvency Act.336 This affords the holder 
of a special notarial bond registered before the enactment of the SMPA, the same 
preference in respect of the entire free residue as that enjoyed by the general notarial 
bondholder.337 In terms of section 1(3) of the SMPA, the holder of a general notarial 
bond has a preferential claim over the entire free residue. This appears to be in 
contrast with section 102 of the Insolvency Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal judgment in FirstRand Bank Ltd v Land and Agricultural Development Bank 
of South Africa.338 In this case the court had to decide whether the preference 
afforded to the holder of a general notarial bond extends only to the portion of the 
free residue consisting of the proceeds of movable property, or to the entire free 
residue. The appellant’s argument, as the general notarial bondholder, was that 
section 102 of the Insolvency Act entitled it to claim the entire balance of the free 
residue over all the movable property of the debtor. The respondent, as a concurrent 
creditor of the debtor, argued that the appellant had no preferential claim to any part 
of the balance of the free residue arising from the realisation of the assets not subject 
to the bond. The argument was that the entire free residue must be distributed 
amongst all the debtor’s concurrent creditors. This argument was rejected by the 
High Court but leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal was granted. The 
Supreme Court of Appeal held that the preference afforded to the holder of a general 
notarial bond in terms of section 102 of the Insolvency Act was limited to such portion 
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of the free residue as may consist of the proceeds of movable assets covered by the 
bond, and did not extend to the entire free residue. The SMPA changed this position. 
Section 1(3) expressly states that the holder of a special notarial bond registered 
before the enactment of the SMPA is in the same position as a general notarial 
bondholder and enjoys preference over other concurrent creditors in the entire free 
residue of the insolvent estate.  
6.3.3.3 Movable property under special notarial bond not subject to landlord’s tacit 
 hypothec  
Section 2 of the SMPA excludes movables registered in terms of the SMPA under a 
special notarial bond from the operation of the lessor’s tacit hypothec. This means 
that, upon default of payment of rent by the lessee, a lessor cannot exercise a 
landlord’s tacit hypothec over movables registered in terms of the Act and present on 
the leased premises. Sonnekus339 criticises the practical relevance of this section. He 
argues that the lessor is placed in the position of a pledgee by attachment and as 
such he will enjoy preference over the notarial bond as provided by section 1(1) of 
the SMPA. Scott340 disagrees, saying that attachment by the landlord does not place 
him in the position of a pledgee. The attachment is an act to perfect the hypothec and 
to prevent the lessee from removing the movables from the leased property. Should 
the landlord perfect his hypothec through attachment before the registration of the 
special notarial bond, the hypothec will not be subject to the notarial bond. If the 
landlord perfects his hypothec after the registration of a special notarial bond, his 
hypothec will be subject to the special notarial bond. 
6.3.3.4 Amended definition of ‘special mortgage’ in Insolvency Act 
Section 4 of the SMPA amends the definition of a ‘special mortgage’ in the 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 to include a special notarial bond registered in terms of 
section 1(1) of the SMPA. Scott341 indicates that this provision is superfluous as the 
special bondholder is a secured creditor (a pledgee) who should rely on section 83 of 
the Insolvency Act.  
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6.3.3.5 Perfecting clause in special notarial bond 
Brits342 indicates that special notarial bondholders often still include a perfecting 
clause in the notarial deed despite the fact that registration grants the notarial 
bondholder a real security right upon registration. Creditors often feel more secure 
when they have possession of the movable thing, regardless of the existence of their 
real security right. The question is whether such a perfecting clause in a special 
notarial bond is enforceable. According to Brits, under the Natal Act courts would 
have been opposed to the granting of a perfecting order as “the security was already 
complete by virtue of the deemed pledge”.343  
In Senwes Ltd v Muller344 the bondholder sought a court order ordering the debtor to 
give up possession of the movable property under the special notarial bond in terms 
of a perfecting clause in the special notarial bond. The debtor argued that the 
bondholder had a security right in the form of a special notarial bond (fictitious pledge 
or pledge without possession) and that he was under no obligation to give up his 
possession. In granting the order, the court held that: 
The applicant [bondholder] is contractually entitled to protect its interest by 
seeking a court order which permits it to take possession of the movables 
specially and generally placed under the terms of the notarial bonds and, to 
extent that to the parties have agreed thereto, I consider the respondent 
[debtor] to be bound thereby …    
According to Brits,345 a bondholder would want to obtain possession of the movables 
in order to protect the value of the security and to eliminate the risk of the movable 
property not being properly described which would leave him without a security right.  
6.3.4 Summary  
The SMPA changed the legal position of the special notarial bondholder. In essence 
it extended the operation of the Natal Act to all provinces. The position of a special 
notarial bondholder was strengthened in that he acquired a real security right 
(fictitious pledge) on registration, as opposed to the previous position where he had 
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no secured claim against the insolvent debtor’s estate. Although the introduction of 
the SMPA is regarded as a welcome development in the law of real security rights 
over movable property, it is not without problems. It is to these problems that I now 
turn.  
6.4 Problems 
I have narrowed down the issues relevant to special notarial bonds in South African 
law to five: the issue of publicity; the existence and operation of the mobilia non 
habent sequelam ex causa hypothecate maxim; revolving assets as security object; 
the exclusion of incorporeal movables from the SMPA; and finally, the suitability of a 
special notarial bond as a pledge without possession. I now briefly elaborate on each 
of these. The purpose of this discussion is to highlight the problem areas in South 
African law. 
There can be no objections to the substitution of delivery with registration as a means 
of promoting the practical commercial needs of the debtor. In the discussion above 
reference is made to the purpose and effectiveness of publicity.346 Arguments are 
made that delivery of the movable thing to the creditor in an ordinary pledge does not 
necessarily comply with the publicity principle. Third parties can see that the thing is 
in the creditor’s control but that does not inform them about the nature of the 
relationship between the creditor and the thing: he might be the owner or he might be 
holding the thing as a borrower. There is a strong argument that in the case of an 
ordinary pledge delivery does not necessarily give notice to third parties. Scott347 
explains the interaction between the accessory nature of a real security right and 
publication. The aim of registration is to notify third parties that a chosen form of real 
security exists over a specific thing as security for repayment of a principal debt. 
There must be a link between the real security right and the principal debt. 
Registration is not only notice to third parties of the existence of a real security right, 
but should give content to the right by stipulating what the principal debt secured by 
the real security right is. The real security right and the existing principal debt must be 
linked.  
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The role of the maxim mobilia non habent sequelam ex causa hypothecate in 
protecting bona fide third parties in a system where the pledge is publicised through 
registration, should be considered. The competing interests of the creditor and third 
parties must be balanced. According to Brits,348 the legislature (SMPA) placed a 
special notarial bondholder in the position of a pledgee and in so doing “expressed a 
policy choice in favour of protecting the creditor’s security regardless of who actually 
possesses the movable”. He points out that the need for a valid form of pledge 
without possession “outweighs the prejudice certain third parties might suffer”. This 
strong position of the creditor is only afforded with due compliance to the provisions 
of the SMPA.  
As I have pointed out, the strict application of section 1(1) of the SMPA (described in 
a manner that renders it readily recognisable) is a two-sided coin: on the one hand it 
promotes legal certainty, but on the other hand it prevents owners from using certain 
movable property as security – for example, revolving assets. The proposed 
registry349 must take note of this and provide a way in which revolving assets can be 
used as security under a special notarial bond. 
There is no clear indication of why the SMPA excluded incorporeal movable property. 
In this regard I agree with Scott350 who is of the view that the “regrettable decision in 
the Cooper case necessitated the hasty introduction of the SMPA.” This limitation 
was not found in the Natal Act. Incorporeal movable property can only be used as 
security under a general notarial bond and the bondholder will have to perfect his 
bond in order to obtain a real security right. The distinction between corporeal and 
incorporeal movables, and the weaker position of the owner of incorporeal movable 
property appears unfounded. The inclusion of incorporeal movable property as 
security object for a special notarial bond should be seriously considered. The 
proposals made by Sonnekus351 with regard to the identification of movable property 
through a mark or in an inventory must be considered. A balance should be struck 
between the economic needs of the debtor (inclusion of incorporeal) and the 
protection of third party creditors in the description of the security object, coupled with 
the need to comply with the publicity principle. 
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A final point for consideration is whether a special notarial bond should be classified 
as a pledge without possession. Would it not be better to legislate a new form of real 
security right with its own specific rules and regulations suited to the circumstances 
under which special notarial bonds are created? Brits352 states as follows: 
The practical call for a form of nonpossessory security over movable 
property is clear, but whether it is altogether necessary or sensible to 
achieve this by way of a pledge construction with reference to a deemed 
(‘as if’) delivery is open to debate. … Another way could also have been to 
regard the rights created by the special notarial bond as a sui generis real 
security right …... Special notarial bonds simply differ too significantly from 
both special mortgages and common-law pledges. 
In the following chapter I discuss a right of pledge in Belgian law. The current legal 
position, as well as the position in terms of the Belgian Pledge Act,353 is discussed 
below.  
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CHAPTER 7 
BELGIAN LAW 
7.1 Introduction 
The current legal reform of real security rights over movable property in Belgian law 
and its Roman-law origin makes this legal system relevant to South African law. 
Belgian law enacted a new system of security rights as a tool to facilitate the 
extension of credit to businesses and individuals.354 This chapter provides an 
overview of the Belgian legal system. Real security rights and pledge under the Civil 
Code are discussed so as to contextualise the study of the non-possessory pledge 
under the new Belgian Pledge Act. In the final chapter I provide a comparative 
summary and recommendations. 
7.2 Belgian legal system 
Belgium is a federal state consisting of three communities355 and three regions.356 
The federal state is a member of the European Union. The Belgian Constitution is the 
highest domestic law.357 It deals with the separation of powers, how these powers are 
exercised, and societal fundamental values and basic rights of citizens. The following 
acts rank below the Constitution: special acts; acts, decrees and ordinances; royal 
orders, governmental orders, and ministerial orders.  
The law of property in Belgium is based on the Belgian Civil Code.358 Articles 
regulating real security rights are spread throughout the Civil Code. The Code is 
based on the French Civil Code of Napoleon which was introduced in 1831 – the year 
of the Belgian independence.359 The provisions of the Belgian Civil Code resemble 
the corresponding provisions of the French Civil Code as it existed before the 2006 
reform. This includes the judicial (courts) system. As a result of the adoption of the 
Napoleonic Code the Roman legal heritage has been reflected in contemporary 
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European legal systems.360 Roman law principles of property law and real security 
rights form the foundation of Belgian law in this regard.361 Although there have been 
minor changes to the regulation of the law of property362 for economic reasons, the 
Civil Code remains the basic source for the law of property in Belgian law. 
I now turn to consider real security rights in Belgian law. 
7.3 Real security right  
7.3.1 Definition and legal nature 
A real security right can be defined as: 
Any right or device created by law or by agreement between the creditor and the 
debtor, that confers to the creditor the right to recover one or more assets from 
the estate of the debtor or to obtain a preferential payment out of the proceeds of 
these assets, in order to satisfy his claim against the debtor.363 
In essence, the notion of a real security right is that the debtor transfers a possessory 
interest in his property to the creditor as security for the repayment of the principal 
debt.364 As appears from the above definition, a real security right protects the 
creditor by giving him preferential rights to the assets of his debtor (or a third party). 
This entitles him to recover his claim from the proceeds of the assets before 
unsecured and lower-ranking creditors. The secured assets remain in the debtor’s 
estate but are earmarked for the satisfaction of the underlying principal debt. In 
Belgian law real rights adhere to the numerous clausus principle365 – a principle not 
followed in South African law.  
7.3.2 Vesting 
Corporeal and incorporeal movable and immovable property may form the security 
object of a real security right in Belgian law.366 A real security right may also vest over 
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assets which the debtor will acquire in the future. The vesting of a real security right 
depends on the type of real security right and the nature of the security object. As in 
South African law, three acts are in principle required for the creation of a real 
security right:  a credit (loan) agreement; a security agreement; and publication. A 
real security right depends on the existence of an underlying principal debt. The 
parties conclude a security agreement in terms of which the creditor acquires an 
interest in the debtor’s asset as security for the repayment of the principal debt. The 
creditor obtains a security interest as from the conclusion of the security 
agreement.367 Article 2071 of the Belgian Civil Code refers to the security agreement 
when it defines a pledge as a contract in terms of which a debtor delivers a thing to 
his creditor as security for a debt. Delivery in this regard serves to fulfil the third 
requirement (publication). Therefore, a real security right over movable property is 
perfected through taking physical control of the property.368 A real security right will 
only vest in the creditor once all three requirements have been met. 
7.3.3 Operation 
A real security right, once properly vested, becomes enforceable against third 
parties.369 It is generally accepted that a real security right will have no value in 
secured transactions if the right cannot withstand the entitlement of other unsecured 
or lower-ranking creditors, or the administrator of an insolvent estate.370 It is a basic 
legal principle in all European legal systems that creditors must be treated on an 
equal footing (pari passu) save where the creditor has a legally valid real security 
right and/or legal privilege.371 The value of the property that serves as security is 
therefore distributed proportionally between the creditors, unless there is one or more 
creditors who has a legitimate basis for preferential treatment.372 The pari passu 
principle entails that creditors who are on an equal footing (in other words where one 
creditor does not have a preference over the other) are treated equally. The pari 
passu principle, though highly theoretical in practice, only applies in the case of 
concursus creditorum. A concursus creditorum occurs when creditors of the same 
debtor simultaneously enforce their claims against the debtor’s estate or a particular 
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asset in the estate.373 This does not raise problems when the debtor is solvent. 
Issues in concursus creditorum arise when the debtor is insolvent. In this case the 
actions of the debtor before insolvency are carefully scrutinised by the administrator 
of the insolvent estate. The administrator can choose to avoid real security rights 
created within a certain time limit before the debtor’s insolvency.374 The pari passu 
principle is not a compulsory principle binding on the parties. Parties are free to enter 
into agreements to determine their rankings. This principle is rather directed at 
achieving equality amongst contesting creditors. However, it is important to note that 
this chapter deals only with one of the exceptions identified above: namely, when a 
creditor has a real security right over the property of the debtor. The pari passu 
principle, therefore, does not apply if one of the creditors has a real security right and 
that creditor will rank above other creditors. 
As stated earlier as an exception, in the case of competing real security rights the 
rule of anteriority applies.375 In terms of this rule, an earlier right enjoys precedence 
over a later one (prior tempore, potior jure).376 This means that the creditor who 
acquired a real security right over the debtor’s property (either through delivery in the 
case of movable property, or registration in the case of immovable property) before 
other secured creditors, has a preferential right based on the nature of his claim in 
the event of insolvency. 377 The secured creditor’s preferential right over the proceeds 
of the sale of the debtor’s assets is limited to the amount of the secured debt, 
although his right can be enforced over the asset as a whole.   
It is clear that in Belgian law a real security right is similar to a real security right in 
South African law. I now discuss a civil pledge regulated by the Belgian Civil Code 
and a commercial pledge governed by the ‘Wet van 5 Mei 1972’.  
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7.4 Civil and commercial pledge  
7.4.1 Civil possessory pledge 
7.4.1.1 General 
A pledge governed by the provisions of the Belgian Civil Code has its origin in 
Roman law. Scott378 states that the draughtsmen of the Belgian Civil Code did not 
pay much attention to a right of pledge since little value was attached to movables at 
the time. The pledge instrument is currently still underutilised, not because of the 
small value of movables, but because it has certain disadvantages for the pledgor. 
The transfer of physical control requirement renders a pledge unattractive to debtors.  
Article 2071 of the Belgian Civil Code defines a pledge as: 
An agreement by which the debtor gives possession of an asset to 
his creditor as security for his debt. Assets which, by law, cannot be 
transferred cannot be pledged. 
A pledge entails an agreement by which the debtor (pledgor) or other contracting 
party delivers physical control of the movable property, including corporeal and 
incorporeal property, to the creditor (pledgee) or an agreed third party as security for 
the repayment of the principal debt.379 A pledge is synonymous with a classic form of 
‘possessory’ security. ‘Possessory’ means that the asset is not held by the debtor 
(security grantor) but by the secured creditor or a third party. In South African law the 
pledge object must be delivered to the pledgee himself. Delivery to a third party will 
not constitute a valid pledge.380  
The purpose for the transfer of possession of the asset to the secured creditor or a 
third party is to secure the repayment of the debt should the debtor default with 
payment. The creditor has the right to sell the movable property should the debtor 
default and the creditor ranks as a preferential creditor over other creditors in the 
proceeds of the sale. Article 2078 of the Belgian Civil Code requires the creditor to 
obtain an authorisation by means of a court order in order to sell the defaulting 
debtor’s movable property. This means that the Belgian Civil Code does not 
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acknowledge summary execution clauses. The New Pledge Act does not abolish a 
possessory pledge under the Civil Code. Debtors and creditors have the option of 
choosing between a pledge without possession and a possessory pledge. The New 
Pledge Act replaces and amends articles 2071-2091 in the Civil Code to provide for a 
pledge without possession and a possessory pledge.  
7.4.1.2 Vesting 
Three conditions must be fulfilled in creating a valid pledge.381 Firstly, there must be 
an official document or a registered private agreement which contains the amount of 
the principal debt and a description of the pledge.382 Secondly, if the pledge is a 
pledge in respect of a claim or a right, the pledgor’s debtor must be notified of the 
pledge.383 If, for example, X has a creditor’s claim against Y and X wants to use this 
claim as security for a loan from Z, Y must be notified that the claim is the object of 
Z’s security right. The reason for this is that in the case of a pledge in respect of a 
claim or right, the publicity principle is fulfilled through notification to the pledgor’s 
debtor.384 It is generally accepted that the debtor must acknowledge the notification. 
In the case of a conflict between competing creditors, priority is determined by the 
time of notification.385 In the case of corporeal movable property, there must be the 
transfer of physical control over the movable property, either constructive or 
fictitious.386 The property must be under physical control of the creditor or a third 
party in order for the pledge to remain valid.387 It is important to note that Belgian law 
does not require a notarial deed or registration to validate the pledge.388 Actual 
physical control must be taken on conclusion of the pledge agreement.389 The 
property may, for example, be stored in a warehouse owned and operated by a third 
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party acting as a custodian for the parties to the pledge agreement.390 This is 
contrary to South African law where the pledgee must be in physical control of the 
pledged object and if he loses control he loses his right of pledge.391 
The pledge will vest a real security right only once all these conditions have been 
fulfilled. The first two conditions are intended to inform third parties of the existence of 
a preferential right. As regards the operation of the agreement between the parties, 
proof of the date that the agreement was concluded, either the date of signature of 
the agreement if in writing, or oral evidence in the case of a verbal agreement, is 
sufficient proof of the existence of the pledge. In this regard, the pledge will not bind 
third parties but only bind parties to the pledge agreement. 
7.4.1.3 Operation 
A pledge over corporeal movable property becomes enforceable against third parties 
once the transfer of physical control of the property has taken place. A pledgee (as 
the one who has obtained physical control of the property) acquires a preferential 
claim over unsecured and lower-ranking creditors. Article 2078 of the Belgian Civil 
Code provides that the pledgee has the right to have the assets of the pledgor sold 
upon default of payment. This is, however, subject to the authorisation of the court.392 
This means that where the pledgor defaults, the pledgee cannot dispose of the 
pledged object himself. He must obtain a court order for either a public sale or an 
order awarding the thing to him (the debtor) as payment of the outstanding debt.393 
Article 2078 further provides that any clause in a pledge agreement which authorises 
the creditor to appropriate the pledge object or to dispose of it without authorisation 
by a court, is void.394 The debtor (pledgor) remains the owner of the pledged property 
which is in the hands of the creditor or a third party until his ownership of the property 
is terminated.395 The pledgee must apply to a court for authorisation to retain the 
property that serves as security in fulfilment of and to the extent of his obligation, or 
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to have the property sold by auction. This is similar to South African law which follows 
the prohibition on pacta commissorium.396 
In addition to the two orders discussed above, a judge may also order that the debtor 
be granted a moratorium on the repayment of his debt.397 This will only be possible in 
specific circumstances398 and in the case of contractual obligations. The moratorium 
may entail a deferment of payment or even a remission of partial payments.399 
7.4.2 Commercial pledge 
In terms of article 2084, the legal principles laid down in articles 2071-2083 of the 
Belgian Civil Code do not apply to commercial pledges. Commercial pledges are 
dealt with in the Wet van 5 Mei 1872. The nature of the principal obligation is the 
determining criterion for a commercial pledge: commercial debts. An example of a 
commercial debt is a merchant’s debt(s) incurred in day-to-day business. Despite the 
provision in article 2084 that the Civil Code provisions are not applicable to 
commercial pledge, the Wet van 5 Mei 1872 is not entirely adequate to deal with 
commercial pledges. Therefore, the general principles applicable to a civil pledge 
also apply to commercial pledges in so far as they do not conflict with any of the 
provisions in Wet van 5 Mei 1872. Two forms of commercial pledge that do not 
require physical delivery of the pledge object are a pledge over a business, and a 
special purpose vehicle pledge. 
7.4.2.1 Pledge over a business 
A pledge over a business covers all the movable property of the business enterprise 
with the exclusion of fifty per cent (50%) of the inventory.400 It includes all the 
elements that constitute the goodwill of a business without having to enumerate 
them.401 This form of pledge has the advantage that the movable property that serves 
as security does not have to be delivered to the pledgee and can continue to be used 
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by the pledgor in the normal operation of his business.402 A pledge over a business 
is, however, limited in that it is available only to banks and financial institutions. An 
ordinary pledgor or debtor (as opposed to a pledge over the assets of a business) 
does not enjoy the benefit of this form of pledge. The position of ordinary debtors 
could be improved were this flexible form of pledge is extended to them rather than 
limiting it to banks and financial institutions. This form of pledge is similar to the 
English ‘floating charge’ as the pledgee’s priority right only extends to the essential 
assets for running a specific business. It is a security over the present and future 
assets of a company which changes in the normal operation of a business and which 
continues to be controlled by the pledgor until payment of the principal debt or when 
the pledgee executes his security right.403  
In order to protect third parties, a pledge over business assets must be created by a 
notarial deed and registered in a Registry Office and competent Mortgage Registry at 
a place where the pledgor’s business operates. Once properly registered, a pledge 
over a business confers on the creditor a preferential right to the assets constituting 
the business of the pledgor. Should the debtor default with payment, the creditor can 
seize the assets of the business. However, the creditor cannot sell these assets 
without authorisation by a court. The court must validate the sale before it can take 
place.  
It is important to note that registration of this form of security is not accessible 
nationally but only on the level of the different judicial districts (‘arrondissement’).404 
This raises specific questions as to the legal efficacy of this form of pledge: The 
accessibility of the register is questionable as to whether or not the publicity principle 
is sufficiently satisfied as regards accessibility, and whether third party creditors or 
potential purchasers are adequately protected. I am of the view that the publicity 
principle would be sufficiently complied with if the register were available on a 
national level – and preferably in electronic format – as opposed to the current 
fragmented and complicated searches required on the district level.   
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Subsequent business pledges can be taken by creditors in which case the principle 
of anteriority (first in time, first in law) will apply.405 This means that in the case of 
insolvency, the security right which was registered first enjoys preference over other 
rights. 
In terms of the New Pledge Act a general right of pledge will replace the business 
pledge. In principle the debtor’s entire inventory may be subject to the general pledge 
and it may be granted to creditors other than banks and financial institutions. The 
parties can also agree that the pledged object be sold (in specified circumstances) 
without court intervention.406     
7.4.2.2 Special purpose vehicles (SPV) 
A second exception to the delivery requirement is the creation of Special Purpose 
Vehicles (SPV).407 An SPV is a commercial company established as a limited liability 
company (naamloze vennootschap/société anonyme) or as a limited liability 
partnership (commanditaire vennootschap op aandelen/société en commandite par 
actions). In practice, an SPV can be used to buy assets at the request of the 
enterprise (company or partnership). All rights and obligations attaching to the assets 
are transferred to the SPV. The SPV can then sell the assets to the enterprise. The 
purpose is to protect the enterprise against the claims of its creditors.  
A consignment can also be used by an SPV. In this case the SPV buys assets and 
delivers them to the enterprise which then holds and sells them as a consignee. The 
SPV then buys the assets from the enterprise and sells them back to the enterprise. 
All rights and obligations attaching to the assets are transferred to an SPV. 
An SPV appears to be a form of a simulated transaction which is not recognised by 
South African courts.408 
From this overview it appears that the civil pledge is less practical than the 
commercial pledge, specifically when it comes to the delivery requirement. In 
conclusion, the current legal position provides for a pledge over movable property 
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either by way of a possessory pledge (pand) or a non-possessory pledge over a 
commercial business (pand op de handelszaak). I turn now to the new Pledge Act. 
7.5 Belgian Pledge Act 
7.5.1 Introduction 
The new Belgian Pledge Act409 (the Act), enacted by the Belgian Parliament on 30 
May 2013, has changed the law of real security rights over movable property in 
Belgium. The Act introduces a new title ‘XVII’ in the Belgian Civil Code which 
replaces the provisions in articles 2071-2091. The most significant change brought 
about by the Act is that Belgian law now acknowledges a pledge without possession. 
Dirix410 states that the Act “contains a complete modernization of the legal framework 
regarding security rights over movables including the retention of title and the legal 
lien”. The Act, which follows the functional approach, is not yet in operation although 
it was expected to come into operation on a date to be determined by Royal Decree, 
but not later than 1 December 2014. This date has been postponed by the 
‘Postponement Act’ to 1 December 2017 due to the substantial delay in the 
establishment of the National Electronic Register. On 15 July 2016, the date of 
operation was again postponed to January 2018. 
The Act applies to all security interests over movable property, but does not amend 
either the Mortgage Act of 16 December 1851, or the Financial Collateral Act of 15 
December 2004.411 As the Act is not yet in operation, this chapter conducts a 
theoretical evaluation of its significant but projected effect on the law of real security 
rights over movable property with specific reference to pledge without possession. 
The framework for the new Electronic Pledge Register (EPR) is also discussed. 
The Act brings significant changes to the current legal framework for the creation, 
perfecting and realisation of security interests on all forms of movable property, 
corporeal or incorporeal.412 It does not follow the DCFR and article 9 of the UCC by 
introducing a general ‘security interest’ but retains the traditional terms of pledge, 
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retention of title, and legal lien.413 I now give a brief overview of the ‘registerpand’ 
(pledge without possession). 
7.5.2 Registerpand  
As discussed above in Belgian law a pledge requires physical control over the pledge 
object by the pledgee. The Act now provides for a pledge that is registered in the 
EPR and the debtor (pledgor) remains in control of the pledged object. In so doing 
the Act makes it easier for a debtor to grant a pledge over his thing. A simplified 
execution procedure which no longer requires a court order for execution save in the 
case of a consumer (consument), is introduced. The right of pledge remains vested in 
the movable property regardless of its transfer to someone other than the debtor. 
Buyers of movable property must therefore consult the EPR before purchasing a 
thing to ensure that it is not burdened by a right of pledge. The business pledge 
(pand op handelzaak) is replaced by the general pledge as regulated by the Act. 
There is no longer a distinction between a civil pledge and a commercial pledge.414 It 
is important to note that different rules apply to consumers. I now elaborate on 
noteworthy aspects of the pledge without possession for natural persons, after which 
I highlight the different rules applicable to consumers.  
7.5.3 Security object 
The Act applies to all types of movable: specific movable things; a business; a future 
claim; and intellectual property rights. It applies to pledges on any or all business 
assets such as inventory, intellectual property rights, deliverables and financial 
instruments. The Act does, however, not affect security interests on ships and 
financial assets.415  
7.5.4 Validity of pledge between the parties 
A clear distinction should be drawn between the validity of the pledge between the 
parties and the effectiveness of the pledge against third parties (third party/real 
operation). I first consider the validity of the inter-party pledge, followed by an 
evaluation of the effectiveness of the pledge against third parties.  
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A pledge without the transfer of physical control as introduced by the Act is created 
by means of a pledge agreement between the pledgor and the beneficiary/ies of the 
pledge or the representatives of the beneficiaries.416 Article 2 prescribes that parties 
may create a valid pledge merely by agreement. In terms of article 4, when one of the 
parties is a consumer, the pledge agreement must be in ‘documentary form signed by 
both parties’.417 The requirement of writing depends on the circumstances of each 
case. It can serve to confirm either the validity of the pledge agreement, or as 
evidence of the existence of a pledge. However, if a pledgor is not a consumer or if 
delivery of the pledged object has taken place, the need for written pledge agreement 
falls away. It is, however, advisable for parties to enter into a written pledge 
agreement. Certain information must be included in a pledge agreement and this 
information must refer precisely to the pledged object, the secured obligations, and 
the maximum amount secured. The written agreement must also state the value of 
the property subject to the pledge if the pledgor is a consumer. The parties remain 
free to include all other information they deem necessary. The pledgor, as a party to 
the pledge agreement, must be the owner of the movable property subject to the 
pledge or be legally authorised to pledge the movable property. The pledge 
agreement will, nevertheless, be valid and enforceable if the pledgee could, at the 
time the pledge agreement was entered into, reasonably assume that the pledgor 
was authorised to enter into the pledge agreement. The pledgor does not necessarily 
need to be an actual debtor secured under the pledge agreement. A pledgor might be 
acting as surety for an actual debtor.418  
The pledgee is the person entitled to benefit under the pledge agreement (the so-
called beneficiary/ies). The Act empowers the representative of the beneficiary/ies of 
the pledge to conclude a pledge agreement on his/her/their behalf. It is, however, 
important that the beneficiary/ies are identifiable.419  
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7.5.5 Effectiveness of pledge against third parties 
Publicity was formerly a fundamental aspect of Belgian security rights as Belgian law 
has always been “opposed to undisclosed security interests”.420 According to Dirix,421 
recent legislation422 has moved away from this traditional position. A pledge under 
the Act becomes a real security right and, in principle, effective against third parties 
on the moment of registration in the EPR.423 There are certain exceptions to the rule. 
A pledge (security right) will be effective against third parties without registration in 
the following circumstances: (i) the creditor (security holder) has taken possession of 
the movable property;424 or (ii) the creditor (security holder) has taken control of the 
movable property.425 The difference between possession and control is that 
‘possession’ means to be in physical control of the movable property, whereas to be 
in ‘control’ means when the security holder is obliged to notify the debtor of the 
encumbered claim”.426 
The practical implication of the third party effectiveness of the pledge without 
possession may be illustrated as follows: X registers a pledge over Y’s vehicle. Y 
sells the vehicle to Z. X’s right of pledge will be effective against Z and he (X) is 
entitled to realise his security by selling the car should Y not pay his debt. Purchasers 
of movable things must, therefore, always consult the EPR before buying the thing so 
as to ensure that there is no right encumbering it. 
7.5.6 Ranking of creditors 
Registration of a pledge in the pledge register also serves to determine the priority 
ranking of the security right. The pledge registered first enjoys preference over latter 
pledges.427 This is in accordance with the principle of anteriority. The principle of 
anteriority also applies in the case of a conflict between a registered pledge and a 
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possessory pledge. In terms of this principle the date of registration and the date of 
dispossession are compared and the earlier date prevails over the later one.428 
There are certain exceptions to the ‘first-in-time-rule’. Article 58 grants priority to an 
unpaid seller; a subcontractor; and creditors with claims regarding repairs.429 The Act 
abolishes the agricultural privilege (het voorrecht voor de zaden en oogsten) and the 
hotel owner’s right of preference (het voorrecht van de hotelhouder).   
7.5.7 Court intervention 
The Act provides for limited court intervention in the enforcement of a pledge.430 It is 
therefore possible for the creditor to enforce a pledge without prior court approval.431  
This does not apply to consumers. Parties do, however, remain free to determine 
enforcement measures in the pledge agreement or at a later stage.432 Enforcement 
by a court can take place if one of the parties to the pledge agreement deems it 
necessary. Any party to the pledge agreement has the right to seek court intervention 
at any stage for the enforcement of the pledge.433 This means that the pledgor, the 
pledgee, and any interested third party can bring any dispute relating to the 
enforcement of the pledge to the attention of a court at any stage. Court intervention 
has the effect of suspending the enforcement of the pledge until the matter has been 
dealt with by the court.  
Should the pledgor default with payment, the pledgee can sell or rent the movable 
property that serves as security.434 Any surplus amount from sale must be returned to 
the pledgor as the pledgee cannot acquire more than what is due to him by the 
pledgor. Prior notification to the debtor and other relevant creditors is required. The 
agreement on the form of realisation (sell or rent) of the security right can be reached 
when the security interest is created. The pledgee can also appropriate the property 
provided that the pledgor consents to this and an agreement on the valuation of the 
property has been reached.435 The agreement on the valuation of the property by an 
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expert is reached at the moment of appropriation.436 Article 47 prescribes that 
“foreclosure must take place in an economically sound manner”.437 
7.5.8 Consumer pledgor 
If the pledgor is a consumer (consument) certain exceptions to the above rules apply. 
Firstly, a pledge agreement between a consumer pledgor and a pledgee must be in 
writing. Secondly, the pledgee may not realise his security without a court order 
should the consumer pledgor default. Thirdly, the value of the pledged object may not 
be more than twice the debt secured.438 
7.5.9 Registration 
In order to vest a pledge without possession enforceable against third parties, the 
pledge must be registered in the EPR. Only if the pledge is registered will it be 
enforceable against third parties. A pledge agreement is required for registration and 
advance filing is therefore not possible.439 This register encompasses principles 
similar to those enunciated in the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCRF).440 
Access, fees, and any other matter relating to registration may be set by Royal 
Decree after consultation with the Commission on Privacy.441  
I now consider the registration process and certain functions of the EPR. These are 
only guidelines as the final regulations will be determined by the Royal Decree.442 
The EPR is organised on a national level and will be placed in the service of the 
Hypotheken van de algemene administratie van de Patrimoniumdocumentatie van 
Financiën (hypothecs of the general administration of Patrimoniumdocumentatie443 of 
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Finance). The register is a computerised system directly accessible for online 
registration, renewal, and deletion of a pledge.444 
Access to the register is subject to authentication of the user. The precise rules for 
authentication are yet to be determined. Consultation of the EPR shall be free for the 
pledgor, pledgee, and a list of individuals as indicated in the Royal Decree. It is 
possible, depending on the Royal Decree decision, that persons other than pledgees 
and the individuals listed, may need to pay a fee to access EPR.  
The pledgee who wishes to register a pledge must provide the following details: the 
identity of the pledgor (or his legal agent); the security object and the guaranteed 
obligation; and the maximum amount for which the obligation is guaranteed. The 
security objects must be described accurately. 
The Act places the responsibility on the pledgee to ensure that correct information is 
recorded in EPR.445 The pledgee will be liable against third parties who acted on the 
incorrect information in the EPR. He must inform the pledgor in writing once the 
pledge has been registered and also of any amendments. Once the pledgor receives 
the notification he has a chance to request the pledgee to remove or correct any 
inaccurate or incorrect data entries. Should the pledgee fail to do so, the pledgor may 
approach the Dienst Hypotheken who will check the accuracy of the data and make 
any necessary corrections. 
Third parties may access the EPR and view all the details provided by the pledgee. A 
registration number and date of registration will also be available. Specific rules 
pertaining to privacy are to be established by the Royal Decree.  
The pledgee may amend details in the EPR if details in the pledge agreement are 
amended, or if some details in the EPR are incorrect. The initial details and the 
amended details will show in the EPR. 
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The registration of the pledge will lapse after ten years.446 If the pledgee wishes to 
renew the pledge he must do so before the registration lapses. Once the pledgor has 
settled the debt, the pledgee must remove the registration from the register. The 
pledgee and pledgor may agree that the registration be removed from the register 
before the debt has been settled. The pledge will then no longer be enforceable 
against third parties.         
A transfer of the pledge together with the principal obligation must be recorded in 
EPR. The registration must be done by the transferor and the identity of the 
transferee should be recorded. How this is to be done is yet to be determined. 
As stated above, the registration of the pledge renders it enforceable against third 
parties. Errors in the register will influence the effectiveness against third parties. The 
incorrect description of the pledgee, pledgor, or pledged object renders the pledge 
unenforceable against third parties, unless the incorrect information would not send a 
reasonable person on the wrong track. The incorrect description of the guaranteed 
obligation and the maximum amount secured by the pledge will not render it 
unenforceable against third parties.447 
From the above it is evident that clear guidelines are in place for the regulation of the 
EPR. I conclude this discussion with the following remark by Dirix:448  
Furthermore, it remains uncertain whether the new Act will attain fully the 
economic objectives of the reform. The answer to that question also depends on 
the manner in which the pledge registry is organised and the cost of establishing 
security rights and access to the registry.  
7.6 Summary 
Initially, the Belgian Civil Code required the pledgor (debtor) to give possession of his 
property to his creditor in order to vest a security interest (right of pledge) enforceable 
against third parties. Once in operation, the new Belgian Pledge Act will provide an 
alternative simplified process for the creation of a pledge without possession. In 
terms of the Act, a pledge is created by a simple pledge agreement followed by 
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registration on the EPR which is publicly accessible for consultation. This pledge is 
enforceable against third parties upon registration. Registration of the pledge in the 
EPR is intended to comply with the publicity principle. The Act makes provision for 
debtors and creditors to create a pledge by means of delivery of the pledge object to 
the pledgee should they prefer. 
To summarise, I refer briefly to the most noteworthy aspects of a pledge under the 
new Pledge Act. A pledge agreement vests a pledge between the parties, but the 
pledge is only effective against third parties once it has been perfected. There are 
two methods by which to perfect a pledge: either by giving possession to the 
pledgee; or by registering the pledge on the EPR. The pledge agreement must be in 
writing if the pledgor is a consumer. The agreement may be entered into by a 
representative of the pledgee. Generally speaking, all movable assets may be 
pledged. This includes corporeal and incorporeal property and property acquired in 
the future. The property must, however, be determined or determinable and tradable. 
Ships are excluded, and in the case of a consumer pledgor, the maximum value of 
the pledged object may not exceed twice the value of the debt. A pledgee may 
realise his security without a court order. He has three options: sell the thing; rent the 
thing; or appropriate the thing. Prior notice must be given to the pledgor and his other 
interested creditors. If the pledgor is a consumer, the pledgee may only realise his 
security by means of a court order. The EPR is not yet in operation and the 
implementation of the register has been postponed to January 2018. The exact 
operation of the register is to be determined by Royal Decree. Certain guidelines, 
such as the authentication of users, the information required, the pledgee’s duty to 
ensure correctness of information; and the renewal or termination of a pledge, are 
available. 
In the concluding chapter of this dissertation I provide a comparative summary of the 
legal position under South African and Belgian law. Noteworthy aspects relevant to 
security over movable property in both legal systems are highlighted and certain 
recommendations are made. 
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CHAPTER 8 
COMPARATIVE SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUDING 
REMARKS 
8.1 Introduction 
Despite the enactment in South Africa of the SMPA, there is still a need for the 
reform of the general principles of pledge of movables (corporeal and incorporeal).449  
The SMPA has contributed to positive development of security over movable 
property, but has not addressed all problematic aspects. In Belgium, the legislature 
has introduced a simpler form of security over movable property in the form of a 
pledge registered in the EPR. In principle, the Belgian Pledge Act provides for 
vigorous development of the law of real security over movable property. The Act has, 
however, not yet been implemented and its efficacy has not been tested. 
What follows is a comparative summary of the pledge without possession in both 
legal systems with particular reference to the security object, the different types of 
pledge (notarial bonds in South African law), the summary execution procedures, the 
forms of realisation, and the preference enjoyed by the right holder. 
8.2 Comparative summary 
8.2.1 Introduction 
South African law acknowledges a pledge without possession in the form of a special 
notarial bond. Special notarial bonds are governed by the SMPA.450 Belgian law 
acknowledges a pledge without possession in the form of a register pledge 
(registerpand) regulated under the new Belgian Pledge Act.451  
The SMPA abolished the Notarial Bond (Natal) Act.452 The Belgian Pledge Act 
replaced articles 2071-2084 of the Belgian Civil Code. I now consider some of the 
most noteworthy aspects of non-possessory pledges in both legal systems. 
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8.2.2 Security object 
The SMPA prescribes that a special notarial bond may only vest over corporeal 
movable property that can be described in a manner that renders it readily 
recognisable. There seems to be no sound reason for the exclusion of incorporeal 
movable property from special notarial bonds. According to Scott453 the exclusion 
may be the consequence of the ‘hasty’ implementation of the Act. Be it as it may, 
there is a dire need for the inclusion of incorporeal movable property as security 
object of a special notarial bond. Incorporeal movable property forms part of most 
people’s estates and may allow them access to credit secured by the incorporeal 
property.  
Furthermore, the strict application of section 1(1) of the SMPA results in revolving 
assets not being available as security object. These assets are often the only ‘object’ 
that business may have to offer as security. Their exclusion from the operation of the 
SMPA as they cannot be described as required in section 1(1) may be circumvented 
by more innovative methods of describing the assets. In this regard Sonnekus454 
offers the solution of the use of a specific mark or through entries in an inventory. 
The Belgian Pledge Act includes all movables as possible security objects. Even 
property acquired in the future can be the object of a register pledge. According to 
the legislature, the inclusion of the pledge in the EPR offers sufficient protection for 
the creditor and third party creditors, and the type of security object is unlimited. If 
this approach is followed in South African law, it will be possible to use incorporeal 
property, revolving assets, and future assets (governed by general notarial bonds in 
South African law) as security objects.  
Brits455 state that the description requirement in section 1(1) of the SMPA that 
appears strict is actually vague in that there are no exact guidelines as how 
sufficiently to describe movable property. The Deeds Registries Act456 gives specific 
guidelines on how to describe immovable property in a deed. The Belgian Pledge Act 
requires that the security object be described in the register. It will be interesting to 
see what requirements are set for the description of the movable property. 
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8.2.3 Types of pledge/notarial bond 
South African law provides for a common-law pledge where the pledged object is 
delivered to the pledgee. In terms of the Deeds Registries Act457 a general notarial 
bond may be registered over all movable property of the debtor. This does not 
constitute a right of pledge. Only once the bond has been perfected does the creditor 
obtain a right of pledge over the movable property. The special notarial bond, 
governed by the SMPA, grants a real security right on registration. This right is 
referred to as a fictitious pledge. Although it is in principle the same as a pledge, 
there are minor differences.458  
The Belgian Pledge Act replaced the provisions in the Civil Code governing a right of 
pledge. In terms of the new provisions a debtor and creditor can elect to use a 
possessory pledge in terms of which the pledged object is given to the pledgee. The 
legal position of such a pledge is, however, also governed by new title XVII of the 
Belgian Civil Code. This new title also makes provision for the registered (non-
possessory) pledge. The Act abolishes the business pledge and as regards a non-
possessory pledge, the only option is a general registered pledge. There are different 
legal consequences for consumer and non-consumer pledgors.459  
8.2.4 Summary execution procedures 
The validity of summary execution clauses in a pledge agreement in South African 
law has been questioned by academics. Some academics460 and certain cases461 
argue that a summary execution is invalid in the light of section 34 of the Constitution. 
It is not possible to sell another person’s thing without either his consent or a court 
order. Other academics462 argue that a pledge agreement containing a summary 
execution clause can be seen as the pledgor giving the pledgee authority to sell the 
thing should he be in default. Both the pledgor and pledgee may consult a court at 
any time and summary execution clauses are, therefore, valid and do not impinge on 
constitutional principles. In considering the influence of the National Credit Act on 
                                                          
457 Ibid. 
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summary execution clauses, Brits463 concludes that proper analyses of the NCA lead 
to the view that summary execution clauses can only be valid in pawn 
transactions.464 In terms of the SMPA a notarial bondholder may realise his security 
under section 83 of the Insolvency Act.465 The notarial bondholder does not have to 
acquire physical control of the thing but the procedure prescribed in the Insolvency 
Act must be followed in realising the security.   
The position of summary execution clauses in Belgian law is the opposite of that 
under South African law. The Roman-Dutch law principle of summary execution 
clauses has in recent years been interpreted more strictly and its application limited. 
The Belgian Pledge Act now grants the pledgee the right to sell, rent, or appropriate 
the security object without court intervention. Court intervention is only required if the 
pledgor is a consumer.466 It appears that the realisation of a pledged object is less 
limited in Belgium than in South Africa. This is interesting as access to courts in 
South African law is cumbersome, expensive, and time consuming. The purpose of 
the new Belgian Pledge Act is to simplify the creation and realisation of pledge 
without possession. 
8.2.5 Realisation of security 
In South African law the security must be realised through public sale. In the case of 
pawn transactions which allow summary execution, the security may be realised 
through private sale. The legal position before the new Belgian Pledge Act was that a 
pledgee could realise his security by court order and public sale, or a court could 
grant an order awarding the pledged object to the pledgee. If the court ordered 
appropriation the court had the full discretion to determine the value of the object 
pledged. The new Belgian Pledge Act follows a broader approach. The security 
object may be realised by private sale, rent, or appropriation without a court order. As 
stated above, a court order will only be required if the pledgor is a consumer.  
As regards the option which allows the pledgee to appropriate the thing, it is 
important to note that the parties must agree to this and to the valuation of the 
property. Reference should be made to the pactum commissorium (agreement that 
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pledgee may keep the thing) which is in principle void in both legal systems. Belgian 
law does allow appropriation but only if the parties agree to it and a fair value for the 
pledged object is determined. This is also possible in South African law after default 
by the pledgee. In essence it entails that the pledgee ‘retains’ the thing after paying a 
‘fair price’ to the pledgor.467  
8.2.6 Preferential rights 
A possessory pledge (including a perfected general notarial bond) and a special 
notarial bond are preferential rights in South African law. Section 2 of the SMPA 
grants specific preference to a special notarial bondholder over the tacit hypothec of 
a lessor. The new Belgian Pledge Act grants preference to the possessory and 
registered pledge. Preference is granted to an unpaid seller or a subcontractor and 
creditors with claims for repairs.468 
8.3 Recommendations 
From the above it is clear that the Belgian legislature adopted a functional approach 
when it drafted the new Belgian Pledge Act. The Act is written to address practical 
problems with regard to security over movable property. To give effect to the 
functional approach the EPR plays a vital role. Although the register is not yet 
operational, the guidelines for its operation may be of assistance in reforming South 
African law. 
Reflecting on the purpose of publication, which is required for the vesting of a real 
security right, persuasive arguments are formulated indicating that delivery of a 
movable thing does not necessarily inform third parties of the right vested in that 
specific movable thing.469 In South African law, registration of real rights as a form of 
publication has been questioned by many academics. In my view the registration 
itself is not the problem. The register is the problem. As indicated, using a registration 
system specifically designed for registration of rights in immovable property is 
problematic.  
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The time has come for the South African legislature to develop a registration system 
designed specifically for registration of real security rights in movable property. In 
order to provide proper notice as required by the publication principle, the registration 
system must be easily accessible and inexpensive. Regulations must be in place to 
ensure exactly how the security object must be described, who is responsible for 
registration, and for amendments to and cancellations of the registered rights.  
The South African law is currently awaiting public feedback on the e-Deeds Bill.470 
The objective of this Bill is to 
3.1 facilitate the enactment of electronic deeds registration provisions in 
order to effect the registration of large volumes of deeds as necessitated by 
the government’s land reform initiatives; and to 
3.2 expedite the registration of deeds by decreasing the time required for 
the deeds registration process. 
However, this Bill does not address the issue of registration of real rights in movable 
property, although it does pave the way for the development of the online registration 
of rights. 
The guidelines for the Belgian EPR and the recommendation for online registration in 
the Belgian Pledge Act are a good starting point for the introduction and development 
of a register for real security rights in movable property. A proper online registration 
system will satisfy the publicity principle and should ultimately do away with the 
distinction between general and special notarial bonds as it will allow for the 
registration of real security rights in current and future movable property. It will also 
allow registration of real security rights over incorporeal movables and revolving 
assets which have proven to be the object of the strongest criticism of the SMPA. 
8.4 Concluding remarks 
The principle of publicity as a cornerstone of real security rights, firstly requires that 
the existence of a real security right be made known to the public (third parties and/or 
potential purchasers). This means that third parties must be aware of, inter alia, the 
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content of the right (including the nature of the real right and the principal debt 
secured by the right) and the security object. Secondly, the registration of the real 
right must be easily accessible and inexpensive. I am of view that third party potential 
purchasers and/or creditors will be effectively protected if this route is followed. In 
order words, sufficient compliance with the publicity principle will ensure effective 
protection for third parties. Non-compliance with the publicity principle does not 
accord with the basic principles of real security rights and third parties are therefore 
left in the dark as regards the existence of a real security right.  
My study has revealed that the legal position of notarial bonds in South African law 
does not meet the above requirements. Despite the introduction of the SMPA, the 
legal position of notarial bonds in South African law remains inadequate. The SMPA 
only regulates special notarial bonds (corporeal movable property) specifically 
described and identifiable and does not apply to general notarial bonds (all the 
debtor’s assets, including incorporeal property) and revolving assets. I agree with 
Scott’s argument that the exclusion of incorporeal property from the legislation that 
regulates security over corporeal movable property is impractical and inconvenient 
for debtors.471 The description and identification requirement of the corporeal 
movable property, as set out in Ikea Trading case, has been criticised by 
Sonnekus472 as rendering the security right expensive and inaccessible when 
compared to the identification requirement as provided for by the Notarial Bond 
(Natal) Act. According to Sonnekus, the description requirement under the Notarial 
Bond (Natal) Act is less strict than that under the SMPA. Sonnekus is of the view that 
describing the movable property by making use of a special mark on the property is 
sufficient. Sonnekus’s view offers a solution to the description requirement, although 
doors remain open for the legislature to provide guidelines on how the property 
should be described. Brits,473 in criticising the description requirement and 
acknowledging Sonnekus’s proposition, holds that special notarial bondholders often 
prefer to include a perfecting clause in the notarial bond, despite the fact that 
registration gives them a real security right. This is due to the difficulties in describing 
the movable property in such a way that it is readily identifiable from the bond itself. 
Creditors therefore prefer to take possession of the property upon default by the 
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debtor in order to protect their security right from being realised in cases where the 
property is not specifically described in accordance with the SMPA. This may be 
ascribed to South Africa’s ineffective registration system. The ineffective registration 
system as adopted in South African law adds to the shortcomings in the SMPA. A 
registration system will meet the publicity principle if it is easily accessible and 
inexpensive. The e-Deed Bill does not resolve the hassles of the registration system. 
The Bill introduces a move away from the manual system of registration to a 
computerised system in recognition of new technological advances without any 
reference to the shortcomings in the SMPA. A new registration system specifically 
designed for the registration of real security rights over movable property must be 
considered. In the process of reforming the law on real security rights over movables 
South Africa must consider the Belgian approach to reform even though the Belgian 
system has not yet been tested. A centralised electronic register which can be easily 
accessed by third parties at minimal costs must be put in place.  
A look at the Belgian registration system reveals that South African law can learn 
from the system with regard to the accessibility. The system of registration in Belgian 
law is available online and any other dealings with regard to registration may be done 
online. Belgian law allows a pledge creditor to make entries directly on the pledge 
register subject to notification to the debtor. This is currently not the case in South 
African law. This is an aspect worth reconsidering. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
115 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
CILSA Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa   
DCFR Draft Common Frame of Reference 
EPR Electronic Pledge Register 
EPLJ European Property Law Journal 
Int Insolv Rev International Insolvency Review 
NCA National Credit Act 
PELJ Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
SALJ South African Law Journal 
SA Merc LJ South African Mercantile Law Journal 
SMPA Security by Means of Movable Property Act 
SPV Special Purpose Vehicle 
THRHR Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-Hollandse Reg  
TSAR Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg 
e-Deeds Electronic-Deeds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Books 
Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Law of Property 
Badenhorst PJ, Pienaar JM &  Mostert H Silberberg and Schoeman's The 
Law of Property 5 ed (LexisNexis 2006) 
Bertelsman et al Law of Insolvency 
Bertelsmann E, Evans RG, Harris A, Kelly-Louw M, Loubser A, Roestoff M, 
Smith AD, Stander S & Steyn LS The Law of Insolvecy in SA 9 ed (Juta Cape 
Town 2008) 
Bocken & De Bondt Introduction 
Bocken H & De Bondt W Intoduction to Belgian Law (Kluwer Law International 
2001) 
Clarke & Kohler Property Law Commentary 
Clarke A Kohler P Property law commentary and materials (Cambridge 
University Press 2005) 
Crabb Constitution of Belgium  
Crabb JH The Constitution of Belgium and the Belgian Civil Code (as 
amended to 1, 1982 in the Moniteur Beige) (Fred B Rothman and 
Co Publishers 1982) 
Cooke Modern Studies in Property Law 
Cooke EJ Modern studies in property law Vol II (Oxford University 
Press 2006) 
Dickson Security over movables 
Dickson MG, Wolgang R & Storm PM Security over movable property & 
receivables in Europe (ESC Publishing Oxford 1998) 
117 
Drobnig Divergences of Property 
Drobnig U, Snijders HJ &  Zippro E (eds) Divergences of Property law: 
An obstacle to the internal market (European Law Publishers 2006) 
Du Bois Wille's Principles  
Du Bois F Wille's Principles of South African law 9 ed (Juta Cape Town 
2007) 
Eidenmuller &  Kieninger Secured Credit 
Eidenmuller H & Kieninger EM The future of secured creditors in Europe: 
European Company and Financial Law Review Vol 2 (De Gruyter Recht 
2008) 
Feenstra Romeinsrechtelijke Grondslagen 
Feenstra R Romeinsrechtelijke Grondslagen van het Nederlands 
Privaatrecht (Universitaire Pres Leiden 1984) 
Hamwijk Publicity in Secured Transactions 
Hamwijk DJY Publicity in Secured Transactions Law: Towards a European 
public filing system for non-possessory security rights in movable assets? 
(Optima Grafische Communicatie Rotterdam 2014) 
Hosten et al Introduction 
Hosten WJ, Edwards AB, Bosman F & Church J Introduction to South African 
law and legal theory (Butterworths Durban 1995) 
Hall Maasdrop’s Institutes 
Hall CG Maasdrop’s Institutes of South African law Vol 11 (Juta & Co Cape 
Town 1961) 
Havenga et al Commercial law 
118 
Havenga M, Stoop P, Schulze H, Manamela T & Kelbrick RA General 
Principles of Commercial law 7 ed (Juta Cape Town 2014)   
Kieninger & Harry Cross-border Security 
Kieninger EM & Harry C Cross-border security over tangibes (Sellier Munich 
2007) 
Kleyn & Boraine  The Law of Property 
Kleyn DG & Boraine A Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 3 ed 
(Butterworth Durban 1992)  
Lee Elements 
 Lee RW The elements of Roman law with a translation of Justinian 4  ed  
(Sweet and Maxwell 1956) 
Lee Introduction 
Lee RW An Introduction to Roman-Dutch law (Clarendon Press Oxford 1953)
Mostert & Pope Property law 
Mostert H & Pope A (eds) The principles of the law of property in South 
Africa (Oxford University Press 2010)   
Morice English and Dutch law 
Morice GT English and Dutch Law (The African   Book   Company 
Grahamstown 1905) 
Nathan Common Law 
Nathan M The common law of South Africa Vol 11 (The Central News 
Agency Limited SA 1913) 
Scott & Scott Wille’s Law of Mortgage and Pledge 
119 
Scott TJ & Scott SJ Wille’s law of Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa 3 ed 
(Juta Cape Town 1987) 
Scott Law of Commerce 
Scott SJ (ed) The law of commerce in South Africa (Oxford University 
Press 2009) 
Scott Cession 
Scott S Cession for students 2 ed (Juta Cape Town 2013). 
Sigman & Kieninger Cross-border Security 
Sigman HC & Kieninger EM Cross-border security over tangibles (Sellier: 
European Publishers 2007) 
Sharrock Business Law 
Sharrock R Business Transactions Law 8 ed (Juta Cape Town 2011) 
Sonnekus &  Nee ls  Sakereg Vonnisbundel 
Sonnekus JC and Neel JL Sakereg Vonnisbundel 2 ed (Butterworth 
1994)  
Steyn Statutory Regulation 
 Steyn L Statutory regulation of forced sale of the home in South Africa 2012 
 (LLD Thesis UP) 
Stevenson & Waite Concise Oxford English Dictionary 
Stevenson A and Waite M (eds) Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford 
University Pres 2011) 
Thomas Essentialia 
Thomas PJ Essentialia van die Romeinse Reg (Lex Patria Johannesburg 
1994) 
120 
Thomas Textbook on Roman law 
Thomas JAC Textbook on Roman Law (Oxford University Press 1976) 
Thomas, Van der Merwe & Stoop Historical Foundations 
Thomas PJ, Van der Merwe CG & Stoop BC Historical Foundations of 
South African Private Law (Butterworths Durban 1998) 
Thomas Introduction to Roman law  
Thomas PJ Introduction to Roman law 5 ed (Kluwer Law and Taxation 1986) 
Van der Walt Casebook 
Van der Walt AJ Law of Property: Casebook for students 7 ed (Juta Cape 
Town 2009)  
Van der Walt & Pienaar Introduction to Property  
Van der Walt AJ & Pienaar GJ Introduction to the law of property 6 
ed (Juta Cape Town 2009) 
Van Erp & Akkermans International Property Law 
Van Erp JHM &  Akkerman B Cases, materials and text on national, 
supranational and international property law (Oxford University Press  
2012) 
Van der Merwe & Du Plessis Introduction  
Van der Merwe CG & Du Plessis JE Introduction to the Law of South Africa 
(Kluwer Law International The Hague 2004) 
Wille The Law of Mortgage 
Wille G The Law of Mortgage and Pledge in South Africa (Juta 
Cape Town 1961) 
Wood Security and Guarantees 
121 
Wood PR Comparative law of security and guarantees (Sweet and 
Maxwell 1995) 
Zimmerman, Visser & Reid Mixed Legal Systems 
Zimmerman A, Visser D &  Reid K (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in a 
Comparative  Perspective, Property and  Obligations in Scotland and 
South Africa (Juta Cape Town 2005)
Journal articles 
Bergkamp 2014 UCULR  
 Bergkamp D “The concept of private property in European legal history: The 
 Aristotelian and Belgian cases” (2014) III/1 UCULR 279-96 
Brits 2013 SA Merc LJ 
Brits R “Pledge of movables under the National Credit Act: Secured loans, 
pawn transactions and summary execution clauses” (2013) 25 SA Merc LJ 
555-77 
Brits 2015 SA Merc LJ  
Brits R “Two decades of special notarial bonds in terms of the Security by 
Means of Movable Property Act” (2015) 27 SA Merc LJ 246-74 
Cook and Quixley 2004 SALJ 
Cook S and Quixley G “Parate executie clauses: Is the debate dead?” (2004) 
SALJ 719-730 
Dirix 2014 Int Insol Rev 
 Dirix “The New Belgian Act on Security Interests in Movable Property” 
 (2014) Int Insol Rev 171-80 
Dirix & Sagaert 2014 EPLJ 
122 
 Dirix E & Sagaert V “The new Belgian Act on security rights in movable 
 property” (2014) EPLJ 231-55. 
Evans 2014 PELJ 
 Evans & Steyn “Property in Insolvent Estates – Edkins v Registrar of 
 Deeds, Fourie v Edkins, and Motlala v Moller” (2014) PELJ 2746-77 
Fevrier-Breed 1993 THRHR  
Fevrier-Breed PF “The end of the common-law special notarial 
bond:Cooper v Die Meester 1992 3 SA 600 (A)” (1993) 56 THRHR 144-9 
Goebel 1961 Tulane Law Review 
Goebel RJ “Reconstructing the Roman law of real security right” (1961) 
Tulane Law Review 29-66. 
Jansen 2003 Juta Business Law 
Jansen M “Security by means of general notarial bond” (2003) II/3 Juta’s 
Business Law 154-8 
Locke 2008 CILSA   
Locke N “Security granted by a company over its movable property: 
The floating charge and the general notarial bond” (2008) XLI/1 CILSA 
136-54 
Lubbe & Van der Merwe 1988 TSAR 
Lubbe GF & Van der Merwe CG “Die sekuriteitswaarde van notariële 
verbande in medelinging met sessie in securitatem debitiˮ (1988) TSAR 554-
59 
Sacks 1982 SALJ 
Sacks P “Notarial bonds in South Africa” (1982) 99 SALJ 605-36 
Scott 1995 THRHR 
123 
Scott S “Notarial bonds and insolvency” (1995) 58 THRHR 672-84 
Scott 1989 THRHR  
Scott S “Pledge of personal rights and the principle of publicity Britz v 
Siegocki, Hawthorne and Hoffman 1987 case no 1799 (D) (unreported)” 
(1989) 52 THRHR 458-62 
Scott 2010 CILSA 
Scott S “A comparison between Belgian, Dutch and South African law 
dealing with pledge and execution measures” (2010) 43/1  CILSA 93-
117 
Scott 2002 THRHR  
Scott S “Summary execution clauses in pledge and perfecting clauses in 
notarial bonds: Findevco (Pty) Ltd v Faceformat SA (Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 
251 (E)” (2002) 65 THRHR 656-64 
Scott 2007 THRHR  
Scott S “A private-law dinosaur's evaluation of summary execution 
clauses in the light of the Constitution” (2007) 70 THRHR 289-99 
Scott 2008 THRHR 
Scott S “A step towards a sympathetic credit security dispensation in 
South Africa” (2008) 71 THRHR 473-82 
Scott & Dirix 2009 THRHR 
Scott S & Dirix E “Calling up a mortgage bond of immovable property” 
(2009) 73 THRHR 575-97 
Scott 1989 De Jure  
Scott TJ “Sekerheidstelling deur middle van roerende goed׃ Die finale 
word” (1989) De Jure 119-26 
124 
Scott 2005 TSAR 
Scott S “Aard en rol van notariële verbandakte Van der Walt v Le Roux 
2004 4 All SA 476 (O)” (2005) TSAR 842-51 
Scott 1992 THRHR  
Scott S “Cession intended to serve secondary purpose for ultimate benefit 
of cedent” (1992) 55 THRHR 615-623 
Scott 1997 THRHR 
Scott S “Evaluation of security by means of movables: Problems and 
possible solutions. Section C: Codification of the law of cession” (1997) 60 
THRHR 633-48 
Scott 1992 De Jure 
Scott S “Cooper v Die Meester 1992 3 SA 60 (A): Speciale notariële 
verband-preferesie-insolvensie” De Jure (1992) 496-506. 
Schutte 2008 PELJ 
Schutte PJW “Should the real agreement be subjected to formalities” PELJ 
(2008) 1-7 
Sonnekus 1993 TSAR  
Sonnekus JC “Die Notariele  Verband, 'n Bekostigbare  Figuur teen 
Heimlike Sekerheidstelling in Suid Afrika” (1993) TSAR 110-38  
Sonnekus 1989 TSAR 
Sonnekus JC “Besitlose pand-ideale sekerheidsreg op roerende goed ook 
met inagneming van die beginsels van die insolvensiereg?ˮ (1989) TSAR 
523-552 
Sonnekus 1983 TSAR  
Sonnekus JC “Sekerheidsregte -n Nuwe Rigtig?” (1983) TSAR 97-117 
125 
Sonnekus 1997 TSAR  
Sonnekus JC “Spesiale notariele verband, beskikkings- onbevoegdheid en 
logiese vooroondeelˮ (1997) TSAR 154-63 
Sonnekus 2012 TSAR  
Sonnekus JC “The correlation between the requirements for and content of 
a real agreement and meaningful real security rights in a financial crisis” 
(2012) TSAR 670-99 
Sonnekus 2005 De Jure 
Sonnekus JC “Omskrywing van Sekerheidsobjekte vir die Doeleindes van die 
Wet op Sekerheidstelling deur Middel van Roerende Goed 57 van 1993’’ 
(2005) De Jure 133-44 
Stander 2000 TSAR 
Stander AL “Secured claims in insolvency and the order of preference among 
creditors secured by the same property” TSAR (2000) 542-51 
Van der Merwe & Pienaar 2004 Annual Survey of South African Law  
Van der Merwe CG &  Pienaar JM “Law of Property (including Real 
Security)” (2004) Annual Survey of South African Law 341-76.  
Van der Walt, Pienaar & Louw 1994 THRHR 
Van der Walt C, Pienaar G & Louw C “Sekerheidstelling deur middel van 
roerende goed-nog steeds onsekerheidˮ (1994) 57 THRHR 614-23 
Van der Walt 1983 THRHR 334. 
Van der Walt C “Aspekte van die reg insake notariële verbande” (1983) 46 
THRHR 332 
Van der Spuy 1992 De Jure  
126 
Van der Spuy PDEW “Cooper No v Die Meester 1992 3 SA 60 (A): spesiale 
notariële verband-preferensie-insolvensie” (1992) De Jure 496-506  
Wiese 2014 PELJ 
Wiese M “The legal nature of a lien in South African law” 2014 PELJ 2526-53  
Table of Cases 
Air-Kel (edms) Bpk h/a Merkel Motors v Bodenstein 1980 (3) SA 917 
Bokomo v Standard Bank van SA Bpk 1999 (9) SA 450 (KPA) 
Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd v The Master 1987 (1) SA 276 (A)  
Bock v Duburoro Investments (Pty) Ltd 2004 (2) SA 242 (SCA) 
Contract Forwardign (Ply) Ltd v Chestertin (Pty) Ltd 2003 (2) SA 253 (SCA) 
Cooper NO en Andere v Die Meester en ’n Ander 1992 (3) 60 (A)  
Case 29 March 1990, RW 1990-1991, 364 
Development Bank of South Africa Ltd v Van Rensburg 2002 (5) SA 425 (SCA) 
Findevco (Pty) Ltd v Faceformat SA (Pty) Ltd 2001 (1) SA 251 (E)  
Goldinger’s Trustees v Whitelaw and Son 1917 AD 66 
Graf v Buchel 2003 (4) SA 378 (SCA) 
Grobler v Oosthuizen 2009 (5) SA 500 
Hearn & Co (Pty) Ltd v Bleiman 1950 (3) SA 617 (C) 
Heydenrych v Fourie (1896) 13 SC 371 
Hare v Trustee of Heath (1884) 3 SC 32 
Hippo Quarries (Tvl) (Pty) v Eardley 1992 (1) SA 855 (A)  
lkea Trading and Design AG v Boe Bank Ltd 2005 (2) SA 7 (SCA) 
127 
In re Insolvent Estate Carter 1923 NPD 248 
Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa t/a The Land Bank v Favtaprops 1052 CC 
and Another 2016 (2) SA 477 
Leyds No v Noord-Westelike Koöperatiewe Landboumaatskappy Bpk 1985 (2) SA 
769 (A) 780 
Legator v McKennar v Shea and Other 2010 (1) SA 35 (SCA) 
Leyds NO v Noordwestelike Kooperatiewe Landboumaatskaapy Bpk en Andere 
[1985] ZASCA 148  
Mapenduka v Ashington 1919 AD 343 
Milne NO and Du Preez NO v Diana Shoe and Glove Factory (Pty) Ltd 1957 (3)  SA 
16 (W)  
Michelle v De Villiers (1900) 12 SC 85 
National Bank of South Africa Ltd v Cohen's Trustee 1911 AD 235 
North Western Bank v Poynter, Son and Macdonalds (1894) 22 R (HL) 
Osry v Hirsch Loubser and Co Ltd 1922 CPD 531 
Picardi Hotels (Pty) Ltd v Thekwini Propety (Pty) Ltd 2009 (1) SA 493 (SCA) 
Rosenbach and Co (Pty) Ltd v Dalmonte 1964 2 SA 195 (N) 204 
Sakala v Wamambo 1991 (4) SA 144 (ZH) 
Standard Bank v Odendaal's Trustees (1887) 5 SC 331 
SA Timber and Joinery Works (Pty) Ltd v The Sheriff 1955 (4) SA 56 (A) 
Senwes Ltd v Muller 2002 (4) SA 134 (T) 
Southern Tankers (Pty) Ltd t/a Unilog v Pescana Doro Ltd (Velmar Ltd Intervening) 
2003 (4) SA 566 (C) 
128 
Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd 2003 (5) SA 309 (SCA) 22 
Thienhaus NO v Metje and Ziegler Ltd and Another 1965 (3) SA 25 (A) 
Vrede Koöp Landboumaatskappy Bpk v Uys 1964 2 SA 238 (O)  
Willian Bain (Pty) Ltd v Pringle Wood 1973 (2) SA 443 (R) 
Zandberg v Van Zyl 1910 AD 302  
Statutes 
Belgium 
Belgian Burgelijk Wetboek (BW) 
Belgian Pledge Act 11 of July 2013 
Financial Collateral Act 15 of December 2005 
Bankruptcy Act 28 October 1997 
The Netherlands 
Dutch Burgelijk Wetboek 1992
129 
South Africa 
Deeds Registries Act 47 of 1936 
Insolvency Act 24 of 1936  
Notarial Bonds (Natal) Act 53 of 1932 
National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
Security by Means of Movable Property Act 53 of 1993 
Reports 
South African Law Commission Report on the giving of security by means of movable 
property, 1991 Vol 46. 
Electronic Resources 
“Belgian House of Representatives adopt a new act on security interests on 
movable                           assets”                             available                              at 
(date of use: 24 March 2016) 
Bregman R “ Notarial   bonds over specified movable property” available at 
http://www.roylaw.co.za/home/article/notarialbondsoverspecifiedmovablepro/pagei
d/secured-transactions (date of use: 15 February 2016) 
DeBacker CMS & Van Oekel A “Pledge over moveable assets-time for a radical 
change” available at  (date of use: 19 August 2015) 
e-Deeds Bill available at http://www.ghostdigest.com/articles/e-deeds-bill-
published/55006 (date of use: 29 May 2016) 
Natalie van Leuven -9781849804158 Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative law 2 ed 
(Belgium) Online (date of use: 17 February 2016) 
“New law on security over movable assets- Significant impact on financing 
transactions” available at https://www.google.co.za/#q=New+law+on+security+ 
over+movable+assets-+Significant+impact+on+financing+transactions (date of use: 
22 December 2015) 
130 
“Real Property Law Belgium-Draft Law 29 September 2004” available at 
http://www.eui.eu/Documents/DepartmentsCentres/Law/ResearchTeaching/Researc
hThemes/EuropeanPrivateLaw/RealPropertyProject/Belgium.PDF (date of use: 19 
November 2015) 
Steven A “Real Security Rights: Time for Cinderella to go to the ball?” 
available at http:ssrn.com/abstract=1837533 (date of use: 16 January 2014) 
West A “What may Serve” Ghost Digest 30 September 2010 available at 
http://www.ghostdigest.com/articles/what-may-serve/53777 (date of use: 14 April 
2016) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
